The more that comes about the Type
26 Global Combat Ship program, the more I worry whether all the options have
been considered. So that’s where this post comes from, a simple enquiry is the government
making the right decision? Is the Type 26 in its current form, in any form,
going to provide what Britain needs? Or is perhaps it better to follow the
American example of building an improved existing design?
What
Britain needs…
To start with there is the obvious,
whatever vessels are built, they will be called upon to participate in a wide
variety of war fighting missions – primarily as Type 23 replacements
Anti-Submarine warfare is going to be a prominent function, considering the
reduction in Type 45 numbers Air Defence
is also going to be a key capability, further to these support of Amphibious
warfare and long range strike capability would of course provide for them to
function as force multipliers in key RN missions. But ships don’t pay for themselves in war;
it’s in ‘peace time’ patrolling, policing and presence missions which justify
them.
Britain maintains due to its global
interests, mainly trade and legacy alliances, many patrols worldwide. Ranging
from counter piracy of the coast of East Africa to South Atlantic Guard Ship,
from Counter Drugs Operations in the Caribbean to NATO standing patrols… and
none of this takes into account the various exercises and port visits which the
fleets escorts take part in/carry out as part of Britain’s extensive diplomatic
actions.
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| Figure 1. The original pre SDSR future fleet... |
To do all these things Britain
needs numbers, not World War II number but more than are currently in service.
A like for like replacement on the Duke class
would provide 13 vessels, and after the 2010 SDSR there is not even the
prospect of the Type 27 to make up the numbers. Yet all political parties and
defence experts are in pretty much agreement that there are not enough vessels
to carry out all the missions that are required… so the obvious question is,
are 13 enough? Would even 16, the number of Duke
class originally built for RN be enough? It’s a no, there was a reason that
originally the Type 45 was going to be a class of 12, the C1 was going to be a
class of 10, and the C2 a class of 8; 30 escorts was the accepted minimum. Now
talk is of the 2,500ton vessels of the Mine Countermeasures, Hydrography and Patrol Capability
program making up the difference – and they will be able to do so in
constabulary duties…the drugs patrols, but they won’t be able to South Atlantic
Guardship, they won’t be able to do NATO patrols and they will not be able take
a lead in more weapons intensive war fighting roles as they are simply not big
enough to carry all the equipment. Therefore a criterion has to be to
build as many as possible, the Type 26 is to have a unit price of around
£350million pounds; but the costs don’t stop there, development, logistics,
training and infrastructure are all things which have to be paid for. So out of
a £10billion program, only £4.55 billon is going to go on buying the units –
even when leveraging from 80% known technologies, it still costs money in
development to make sure those technologies work together in the way they are
planned to...after all nasty surprises are not welcomed in battle, especially
when it’s something which works in theory but in practice lets the crew down. It’s
the numbers which produce the question as to whether the Type 26 is the way to
go for Britain and its strategic needs.
However this is not the final
requirement; whatever option is chosen it must be capable of generating export
orders – i.e. it must bring in work and money for the UK. This is a bigger ask
than at first glance it may look; successive governments whilst achieving sales
of ‘used’ equipment, regularly ‘barely used’ equipment, sometimes to the
detriment of Britain’s capabilities, have proved themselves unable to sell new
equipment… or rather new pieces of large equipment. The Type 26 is also proving
pretty difficult to sell, no matter how much hawking on international street
corners our ministers seem to try. Which is a problem, because the reason its
marketed as the ‘global combat ship’ rather than the Type 26, the reason its
versatility and adaptability are being stressed, the reason the vessel being
proposed is in many ways closer to being a small destroyer rather than a large
frigate is to make it sell; to make it attractive to nations seeking either the
modern equivalent of the American 18 pounder frigates that fought in the 1812
War, small fleet flagships, or those nations looking for an escort that can
punch above its weight and give them maximum capability for minimum numbers.
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| Figure 2. The Type 26 as currently presented |
What
are the options?
So what are the options available
to decision makers – the first is of course carry on build the new design, the
Type 26 Global Ships. Even in this there are options, they could be built as
currently planned, or they could be adapted…here are some possible mods:
·
Type 26 Mod 1 – 3 Phalanx (replacing 30mms aft), 32
cell MK41 VLS, 2x 8 cell Sylver A30 VLS forward (flanking ‘B’ position), 4x
Stan Flex modules (2 amidships, and 2 aft atop hangar), 4.5in DG
·
Type 26 Mod 2 – 4 Oerlikon Millennium 35mm (replacing
30mm & Phalanx – forward flanking the ‘B’ position, replacing the 30mm), 4
StanFlex modules (2 amidships flanking Sylver A30, and 2 aft atop hangar), 32
cell Mk 41 VLS, 2x 8 cell Sylver A30 VLS forward (in ‘B’ position and
amidships), 4.5in DG
·
Type 26 Mod 3 – 2 Phalanx (replacing 30mms aft), BAE
MK110 57mm (‘B’ position), 32 cell MK41 VLS, 2x 8 cell Sylver A30 VLS forward
(flanking ‘B’ position), 4.5in DG
The stanflex system could be a good
idea, as instead of being fitted for not with, British ships could be ‘moded
for not with’ – it would actually mean building a vessel closer in spirit to
the C2, but with it having the ability to be rapidly turned into something
more. Plus it’s a proven, off the shelf
system, which is buying in, like the MK 41 VLS to a wide range of development
partnerships reducing long term costs on the British Taxpayer. Everything is
still to play for with this design, because no one as yet has made any
decisions about the engines baring that there will be a range of options
available and they will generate enough power to get the ship to 28+ knots.
However, an educated guess would assume that the British ones are most likely
to be powered by the fruits of Rolls Royce… at least in part. Until the engines
are selected everything else which will be put in round them (even in the days
of fully electric systems, the sheer weight of the power plants still has a
massive impact on how equipment is distributed around the ship) is not
certain. The Type 26 can be whatever its
wanted to be; but that will cost and this will be a new system.
The other options are taking a leaf
out of the USN’s book, and like they did with the Arleigh Burke / Zumwalt decision,
build a modified/improved version existing, already supported and costed design.
So the options are Type 23 or Type 45?
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| Figure 3. HMS Marlborough in Portsmouth dockyard. |
The Type 23s already do the role,
their design is functional and proven, the final units built cost under
£100million per unit, a new upgraded version would probably be able to be
brought in at £175million unit, allowing for the purchase of 26 for the same
£4.55billion Unit purchase outlay as the Type 26. It won’t be as good as the
Type 26 is proposed to be; but at 2 units for the price of 1 it would allow for
a lot more operational flexibility. It could still carrying the new CAMM
missile, a large amount of equipment is going to be transition from the Type
23s anyway – this would make the transition easier. A modified Type 23 could
have CIWS fitted, all the problems/weakness in capabilities which the RN knows
as fully as it can after operating the class for over 20 years; with a better
power plant/drive train and improved sensors.
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| Figure 4. HMS Daring from every cubic angle but underneath |
A more logical option perhaps,
because they have finished being built would be to continue the Type 45s, and
just expand there already developed/in place support systems – as well as capitalise
on the logistics and training savings by using more of the money to purchase
units. After all at £500million a unit (based on the AAD version), the
£4.55billion could only buy 9 units, but the savings and synergies brought
about by having a fleet of ‘one type’ would probably allow for an £3billion to
be freed to purchasing units, allowing for a total purchase of 15 vessels and
fleet which would have 21 vessels using the same engines, the same spare parts,
the same systems… allowing for a far more operational productive structure than
two classes of 13 and 6 vessels would. An example of this would be, an Auxiliary
only has to carry one set of spare parts, so it can carry more of them, as well
as components which go wrong less often, allowing for a higher level of frontline
support to be achieved – maximising the force on station.
There is also the fact that the version
produced to fulfil the ‘brief’ would have to be general purpose, i.e. it could
have a cheaper less AAD focused radar such as the Artisan 3D radar already
proposed for the Type 26, it already has space in its design for drones but if necessary
an adaption to the superstructure or even a lengthening/broadening of the
design could be included as the RN has done with previous designs. It’s understood
from the most recent design that two types of VLS are desired, and the Type 45
does have the space for 2 8 cell A30 Sylver systems for the Sea Ceptors be put
in… they could be inserted either side of the stack between the 30mm and
phalanx mounts, whilst instead of just a 24 cell ‘attack’ VLS, a 48 cell system
could be fitted.
Another option would be for the RN to
keep to the existing radar set up, or possibly just the Sampson and use some of
the ‘attack’ VLS cells to carry extra Area Air Defence weapon or even
Anti-Ballistic Missile systems such as the SM-3; an option made more possible
by the larger ‘attack’ VLS able to be carried by the destroyer. Its more money
per unit but the program overall would not be more expensive; or it could mix
and match, build some with the Sampson as ABM vessels that can also reinforce
the existing AAD vessels, and build the rest with the Artisan radar… the fact
is that with the same engines, layout and broadly speaking design, the changes
would be relatively cosmetic in equivalence to the complexity of a modern
warship.
What
is the Best fit?
Well the sheer numbers offered by
the Type 23 is attractive; but in reality it’s almost a 40 year old design, and
its not big enough to do the mission profiles which will be expected of the
future escorts. There is also the manning issue; manning 26 rather than 13 ships
would be a big strain on the RN under its current size. Also whilst 3 ‘used’
units were sold to Chile, that’s not the sort of orders that would suggest more
orders will be forthcoming should a new variant of the class be the decision of
the British Government. This means that only two of these options are viable. A
general purpose Type 45 or the Type 26?
The Type 26 represents possibility;
could the RN really finally crack the formula of the perfect combination of
capability and cost that will satisfy the needs of Britain’s security? It has promise;
the separate/focused VLS is certainly a step in the right direction, and whilst
interest has not been more than just that – it’s as yet an unknown quantity and
those deciding might be waiting to see the final product before making a
decision.
The Type 45, well represents a
successful design, it works, it’s a known quantity, the problems and kinks have
either been well documented or solved. Further to all this a general purpose
version of the Type 45 would represent something that is known would attract interest+
from foreign buyers. For example the Saudis when considering the Type 45 for
their navy were put off by what they felt was over specialisation for the size
of the vessel; so a general purpose version especially if the mix and match
approach was taken with vessels of differing levels would offer buyers the
options it its believed will attract their money. Other considerations would be
the fact that it be larger resulting force; which thanks to its shared logistics
footprint would be far more deployable.
Conclusion:
in reality…
History can only provide an idea of
the future, not a definite path, and in reality it’s the type 26s which is the
most likely option to be built, the general purpose Type 45s would be of great
note and even greater use. An especial truth in the far reduced circumstance the
RN has found itself in post successive cuts. However, a new ship, a new design
is the apparent desire… so the challenge is to make that ship fit the role it’s
needed to fill, and that means that real thought has to go into it. It has to
be decided now, what it is wanted to do, what it is needed to do, and what it
has to do… these are not the same things, what it is wanted to do – is something that is rather
liked for the sake of providing options, what its needed do – well that is the
constraints of Britain’s strategic situation, what it has to do – that’s simple,
it has to be able to fight...it has to be worth the cost, or else a lot of
brave lives will be lost needlessly. Those decisions have to be made now, and
they have to be stuck to – or all that will happen are delays and a ship that
becomes a Christmas tree… with everyone hanging their pet project on it, and
therefore causing the cost to keep escalating and unit numbers to be forced
down by a penny conscious Treasury.
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| Figure 5. The Type 26 as revealed in an earlier graphic... arguably a junior Type 45 in much of its profile |
