Showing posts with label bases. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bases. Show all posts

Tuesday, 1 October 2013

September 2013 Thoughts: Sea Basing


Global interests[1] require a global presence to protect them; which means a nation that has such interest’s needs to find a way of supporting operations globally. This can be done by forward basing, setting up establishments & agreements with allies to allow for support – i.e. a large footprint, or by using vessels such as aircraft carriers and amphibious ships to provide air support, maintenance, logistical hubs, command & control with small staging facilities ashore – i.e. a small footprint. Now both options have advantages and disadvantages; for forward basing those facilities & agreements bind nations together for good and bad (which can be potentially be embarrassing should the regime do something which does not fit with the basing nations preferred rules of conduct) but they are also a permanent platform which doesn’t need to return home for maintenance or be redeployed to a more pressing system. However, the biggest problem is that the use of those facilities can be denied at any time by the host nation – it’s not uncommon because they have to consider their own security and their own politics before anything else.

Sea basing in comparison is more complicated to set up and run; but it is also more flexible in that it can be redeployed from region to region depending upon changing operational focus, furthermore it could never be denied for use by another nation except by enemy action. A scenario is which sea basing has an advantage as it can’t be profiled, mapped and targeted using information available to anyone with access to Google maps. However, whilst an aircraft carrier or large amphibious ship, escorts and auxiliaries do cost a little more than an air base, a battalion or so of troops to secure it, a fleet of ships & trucks to supply it: the cost differences between the two systems shift though when the issues of establishing, securing & supplying multiple bases to achieve equivalent levels of global reach as the sea based system are taken into account; not to mention the political capital that would have to be expended, and the fact the sea based systems[2] are procured from within keeping the money within the national economy, rather being spent to support another’s. Sea basing though is about more than global reach, and it is because of its other geo-strategic attributes that it is of use to all nations, whatever they size/form.

From a strategic perspective countries can be profiled to fall into five categories of nation state – although they can prefaced with either the phrase aspiring or declining if that’s the case:

·         Super Power

·         Global Power

·         Regional Power

·         Local Power

The old classification of medium power is really no more; as a category it has divided into two based upon national interests/willing. A nation which used to fit in that category now is either a global power, which is a nation that needs to be able to project itself and defend its interests globally, or is a regional power, which is a nation allowed the luxury by its interests of being able to focus on the events within its region/continental area. Local Powers are small states which are mainly interested in self-defence and national security rather than national interests. A super power is of course a nation which like a global power thinks globally, but thinks it on a far bigger scale; whereas a global power will seek to react with force but maintain presence as much as possible everywhere, a super power will maintain force as much as possible everywhere. For all these nations Sea Basing can be a very useful system; even for the nations not seeking a global reach.

For smaller countries like Estonia & Israel, nations which in their strategic situation are facing at least a theoretically numerically superior land force, the sea, and sea basing, offers something which they are lacking – strategic depth. There is no space for a strategic reserve, no secure routes for it to utilise to move to be moved to position, no space for the frontline to withdraw it if becomes necessary to sacrifice space for time. The sea offers this and more, for example an amphibious vessel the size of the Canberra class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), 27,500tons, which are currently under construction by the Royal Australian Navy(RAN)[3], can provide the base for 18 aircraft and up to 1000 troops which can be moved by those aircraft or by landing craft that it also carries; therefore it has the ability to pick up and deposit troops and equipment at will.

The ship would be the strategic depth of the nation, and it’s not only in moving ships that the ‘strategic depth’ can be useful for; large enough warships carry what are called Strategic Length Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) – this means they can carry Ballistic Missile Defence Missiles (like the Raytheon SM-3) or Tactical Land Attack Missiles (like the Tomahawk), along with powerful radar’s and other sensors. Providing the nation with the capabilities necessary not only to detect and defend itself even should positions be overrun by advancing enemy, but also the ability to strike back. Now it’s not cheap and a ~£1.7billion (for both ships) is more than likely out of the range of Estonia (Defence Budget £200million), even if the Baltic powers clubbed together and bought them as a group – but the Royal Navy (RN) Bay class Landing Ship Logistics Dock (LSL(D))[4] cost £127million. Now with a hangar, increased defences and sensors that could well push £200million; so buying 2 such vessels, over 4-5 years between the defence and emergency service budgets of all Baltic states (combined defence budget of £695million, combined ministry of interior budget of ???) would be possible.

For Israel with no local ally to club together with this could be more difficult, as it is in fact virtually surrounded. However a budget of ~£9billion makes a partner less of issue; although again they might prefer something smaller than the Canberra, perhaps something like the San Giorgio class LJD[5] of the Marina Militare Italiana (MMI). These vessel displace ~8,000tons; due to this they can only accommodate only 350 soldiers, 30 tanks & 3 medium helicopters, as well as carrying 3 large landing craft and 3 small landing craft – but the design is small enough and similarly sized/equipped vessels would conceivably be cheap enough for Israel to afford 3 or even 4 to provide for her ‘strategic depth’. Allowing for rapid redeployment of armour + personnel, perhaps enabling a withdrawal – more likely considering historical Israeli strategic thinking, a daring counter attack behind the enemy front; the point is all would be enabled by the flexibility such vessels would bring the Israeli forces- as well as in times not war, supporting a global reach capability to support small operations worldwide.

It’s not only small nations which have need for such mobility and deploy-ability though; Australia, a regional power in South East Asia, if not soon the Far East as has been highlighted is building 2 medium sized LHDs.  Another example is Brazil, which not only possess a carrier and amphibious ships, but is seeking to maintain that level of force for the future[6]. Whilst both of these countries are resource exporting economies and have largish EEZs[7]; these are all concentrated – they are mainly contiguous to their coastline, they don’t include islands at the opposite end of the earth as does the UKs (which is the 5th largest EEZ in the world, and which in fact makes up ~96% of its sovereign territory[8]). So the sea basing capability is not primarily a response to those security needs; they are though a response to a problem which is the opposite of the smaller nations previously discussed, they are really big but their population and infrastructure is concentrated in specific areas meaning to support operations around their own country mobile infrastructure (such as sea basing) is of a necessity. Furthermore, these nations are seeking to project power within their region, mostly for the protection of their security and interests or to support the cause of stability and peace; which is in their interest as such conditions provide the best circumstance for trade and therefore to support economic growth. For these nations the global reach that such a system also provides is a benefit but not a primary requirement; although there is a nation which is an exception to this generalisation, Russia.

The former Superpower still has a lot of commitments, interests and the fact it spans so much of the world’s surface as well as being a link between Europe and Asia it could be argued to be a Global power; however, the political transition since the fall of communism and economic troubles of redeveloping it’s industry/economic restructuring have led to a level of investment more in keeping with it being a regional power - although it is now starting to rebuild those capabilities. It’s building up its amphibious force with French Mistral class LHDs[9] as well as launching corvettes[10] & other small ships, flexing its muscles by deploying its aircraft carrier[11] & several other ships to the Mediterranean[12] in response to the recent crisis and is announcing plans build new carriers[13] along with other ships. It’s doing this all because it’s a big country, which like Australia & Brazil does not have total infrastructural coverage[14]; but unlike them it has been a Superpower, and it liked the status, power and global resonance that came with that – Russia sees itself as a major player on the world stage, and it knows that the thing that matters in world events is being there and taking part. A nation which isn’t there isn’t involved, and if it isn’t involved then no matter how much diplomatic noise it makes it can’t really affect anything. Sea basing is an effective method of being able to turn up, to have an impact without having to take an overt and binding action which they might later regret.

Super Powers & Global powers are combined because they’re the same only one is bigger; furthermore in the current mono-polar world, whilst other nations are coming on there is still only one superpower, America. Nation & Nations which fit in these categories are all extremely ‘plugged in’ to the existing world order, this is both as a protection for their interests – which are stability, trade and adherence to the norms of international behaviour. For them the ability to operate and influence events globally is not a desire but a necessity; for them disruption in world trade could equal devastation, economically if not other forms as well.

Sea Basing is more expensive in simple terms, an aircraft carrier does cost more than an air base; the question is do 3 aircraft carriers cost more than 20-30 airbases needed to cover the world with similar coverage – and this of course is not placing a value on the fact that those bases could be denied at any time by the host government, that those bases will have to be supplied, that heavy equipment will still have to be moved by sea rather than air which will require some security of the sea and that any money spent on an air base in a foreign country is automatically go out of the source nation’s economy, whereas building a ship keeps it within the source nation’s economy; as well as serving as mobile advertisement for the source nation’s skill base & industry. This though is the accounts and the real reason to choose sea basing is the strategy, the reach, the flexibility it provides the nation possessing it with.


[1] These interests could relate to Diplomatic Commitments, Trade, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)/Resources and Strategic requirements, or of course any combination of two, three or even all.
[2] Recent procurement of MARS vessels in South Korea notwithstanding
[7] Australia’s is 8,505,348km2, and Brazil’s is 3,660,955km2 (so Australia’s is ~25% bigger than the UKs, 6,805,586km2, whilst Brazil’s ~46% smaller)
[14] It’s even building mobile nuclear reactors, an interesting way of getting round planning, security and safety issues, which countries like the UK might also want to consider. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_floating_nuclear_power_station (28/09/2013) although possibly a very high risk strategy dependent upon the regions they will be in for their security…
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Monday, 22 June 2009

The Logic of Cuts....not that logical

In the current debate on cuts, all that is spoken about are Carriers, Typhoon fighters and other major projects; but is the right place to look? Britain maintains at great expense bases in Germany, Saudi Arabia and many others; but do we need them? And if not; why have these bases at all? These bases are cold war relics, the aircraft carriers are not – the RN needed them in the cold war but the RAF and Army vetoed them; hence the Falklands War problems. Even worse the bases in Germany are still defended with the visage of Hitler...if we leave he may rise up again; he won’t, he is dead; we do not need them anymore. What about the bases in Saudi Arabia, surely with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq they are worth the money...the short answer is no. Britain and the US were not allowed to use them in either conflict, and in fact Saudi Arabian bases are too far away to be of much use, if any, in Afghanistan. So to sum up these bases; they provide a rallying call for Islamic extremists, they provide no tactical assistance at all, with bases in Iraq they have lost their strategic value, and they cost money! These bases are of course the only ones; there are a multitude of Airbases and other facilities around the world that Britain purchases access to through the expenditure of hard currency. These bases, which may well never be used, but if such facilities were needed could be far more cost effectively provide by an aircraft carrier; after all aircraft carriers are built and maintained in Britain, their crews live in Britain, they do not employ foreign citizens in foreign lands, they do not take funds out of the nations own economy, in fact they often stimulate growth in the home technology and service industries.

The other accusations thrown at the Royal Navy is its fighting the last war...always an interesting accusation, this though should not be considered always a bad thing as it is represented; it is considered a sign of good character to learn from ones past actions, to not do so is a sign of immaturity. Therefore, learning from past actions:

  • 1982 Falklands War, dependent on naval airpower for the entire campaign, one must ask the question...what would the outcome have been had the RN had a decent carrier? Would the war have taken place in the first place?
  • 1991 Gulf War, carrier based aircraft provide arguably the most efficient 50% of the tactical air support, as well as also provide
  • 1995 Bosnia & 1999 Kosovo, whilst being peacekeeping operations the preferred air support for the Peacekeepers was called from carriers...the reason being that it was felt the nice safe USAF and RAF bases in Italy damaged moral by bringing down massive airstrikes of a strategic nature, and then leaving, going home nice and safe and beyond easy call back range (unlike their carrier counterparts); whilst the peacekeepers were taken hostage or fired at by angry participants.
  • 2001 Afghanistan, beyond the range of many land bases, the key troops were inserted by helicopter from amphibious ships, and whilst air support was provided by USAF from bases in central Asia, those bases themselves are now being closed by internal politics of host nations.
  • 2003 Gulf War 2, due to the denial of land bases to USAF and RAF, the USN were the key providers of air support, providing at times up to 90% of the tactical air support, and with cruise missiles included a minimum of 54% of the strategic air strikes.

Finally I put forward these figures for your consideration before conclusion:
But he has a problem: so much of what the Navy does is invisible. Be it anti-drugs patrols in the Caribbean, anti-piracy patrols off Somalia, mine clearance in the Persian Gulf or intelligence gathering by nuclear-powered attack submarines, naval operations rarely make the news. The Royal Marines, the Navy's infantry, have distinguished themselves in Afghanistan but when a television viewer sees a Marine he or she is likely to think Army. The contribution of Fleet Air Arm Harrier and helicopter pilots to the campaign is also rarely noted. If it flies it must be RAF.
When the Navy did make the headlines in March 2007 it was in the most humiliating circumstances. Fifteen Marines and sailors from the frigate Cornwall were captured by the Iranians while inspecting vessels in the Persian Gulf. Images of detainees smiling their way through captivity were compounded by the inexplicable decision to allow several to sell their stories. Nelsonian it was not.
But public relations are only a part of it. Why does Britain, which shed its global empire nearly a half a century ago, need a blue-water Navy? Why not a brown-water one, a vestigial coastal defence force? The answer lies in some figures.
The United Kingdom remains a crowded archipelago of 61 million people reliant on maritime traffic for its survival. Shipping carries 92 per cent of British trade, as compared to less than one per cent carried by air. Tanker traffic – oil, chemicals and liquefied natural gas (LNG) – accounts for nearly 40 per cent of total maritime trade movements. LNG is central to future energy needs, with imports expected to rise by half in three years. The British-owned merchant fleet may not be the colossus it once was but still weighs in at 20 million tons. The raw materials and finished goods on which the UK depends must use nine global choke points which are easily blocked, and the country is still enmeshed in a network of treaties and informal arrangements requiring a naval presence. There is also the nuclear deterrent, a naval responsibility for 40 years..
"All truly great powers are maritime powers," says Lee Willett, senior naval analyst at the Royal United Services Institute. "Navies allow you to operate when and where you want, over the horizon or as a visible presence helping to prevent conflict."
From an Article in the Telegraph by Neil Tweedie (The Navy strikes back)
Published: 7:00AM BST 18 Jun 2009

So what am I saying with all this? I am saying that if the reason you have a base is political commitment it is cheaper for a ship to make a port call every so often than to maintain a base which is a tie to a particular regime, a particular set of commitments and of course a far larger cost; after all a corvette could visit many countries in an 18 month period, hold many drinks parties, and cause many occasions for everyone to get dressed up; but most importantly if you don’t like that countries human rights, or the current government it can skip past and visit their next door neighbour whom you do like.
I am saying that before the RAF and Army go pointing the finger at the RN they should take a look at their own budgets, and ask if they really need multiple jungle training bases, when most of the army is so over stretched I am surprised they still have time for basic training.
However what I am really trying say is you cannot fight 2 Major Regional Conflicts, 1 Minor Regional Conflicts and have commitments numbered in the double figures each requiring the maintenance of garrisons numbered in treble figures on a budget which is actually less than the average peace time commitment of funds; when compared to comparative powers, whose governments sign them up for less resource drains.

The simple fact I am arguing therefore, is that the forces need more funds not less, they need to stop fighting each other, and fight together to get these funds. I am arguing the Navy needs 3 aircraft carriers* (but it is just getting 2 and only half of the JSFs deployed on them will belong to it), 18 destroyers (it asked for 12 but it is getting 6) and at least 48 corvettes (asked for none, but they are cheaper and if you have 18 destroyers to provide core of escort fleet will do all that needs to be done whilst providing increased worldwide presence); the Army needs an extra 16 battalions of mechanised infantry (with decent armoured vehicles), an extra 8 squadrons of attach choppers as well as transport helicopters and they need new vehicles...desperately; the Air Force has fared the best in some ways under the current climate, but it is still suffering, it might have got its Typhoons but they need to be modified to Tranche 3 level to be able to carry the bombs and other munitions they need to support the army on the ground, they need helicopters to support the troops as well (if they don’t want them then they should allow the other services to buy them). I am also for the greater building of UAVs and amphibious forces; as I believe and will be posting on this in the future that sea basing is the future of humanitarian intervention, due to the benefits for keeping western troops especially out off bases which are surrounded by groups whom may turn hostile at any moment; however this article is focusing on the procurement of the platforms those systems would operate off.

The conclusion is this, the forces have been cut, further than they should of been, further than they would have been if the government had actually thought about more than the cost before making decsions. There is an old saying 'the price of everything and the value of nothing' well successive British governments have fitted this addage, they no price of armoured vehicle but not its value to the men sheltering behind it as they try their uptmost to carry out orders which will make their political masters happy, the know price of destroyer but they don't understand why the navy needs them, they don't think...what will that be used for? these masters know the cost of every nut and bolt of the aircraft they purchase, yet still they do not think...if that will be used for Combat Air Support...why did we not order the fittings for bombs to be attached? The unfortunate thing is this is likely to continue, until someone listens, and I don't mean to bloggers, to senior officers and former grandees, I mean to the facts, to the actual facts that are presented to them when they are presented honestly; and instead of just hearing the price tag they might hear what it does, and then might just buy what the forces need, rather than buying what looks good and costs right.


*3 carriers actually work out better value for money than 2, especially if the bases are closed, as they provide a guarantee of at least one read for operations immediately, and one either on operations or able to come online within 2 days.

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singing to the choir is good...as long as you can get the choir to sing to other people as well

yours sincerly

Alex

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