August - December 2014: Published Elsewhere

Well it's been a productive couple of months... carrying on those journal articles I mentioned last time... and still trying to turn my thesis into books. However, even with all that research/writing, and some teaching, I've still been doing other projects and here are what's been published, so far...please go to the sites to read them in full, but where possible I have included some of the beginning of them to give a flavour...

European Geostrategy

Europe and the future of cruisers, 08/10/2014, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/10/europe-future-cruisers/

Definition of a Cruiser:

Oxford Dictionary – A relatively fast warship larger than a destroyer and less heavily armed than a battleship.

1992 Washington Naval Treaty – a warship of up to 10,000 tons displacement carrying guns no larger than 8 inches in caliber.

These two definitions of Cruisers are both illuminating, mainly because they are so wide and encompassing; traditionally a Cruiser had not been a class of ship, but a designation for ships which were below the Rate system of fleet ships. They were used for peacetime and wartime commerce protection, fleet scouting, inshore work, commerce raiding and (for want of a better phrase) ‘showing the flag’ or ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’. This meant in practice that the term ‘Cruisers’ referred to Frigates, Sloops, Brigs and all the other small ships. Cruisers were in reality first defined by the naval treaties of the 1920s; but with the growth of modern warships these no longer have any real meaning. For example, the Zumwalt class Destroyers that the United States Navy (USN) laid the keels down for in 2010 displace 14,798tons – well over the 1922 limit for Cruisers. However, despite this watering down the titles, Cruiser, Destroyer and Frigate still seem to have influence; hence the current debate taking place in America...

The US pivot: how far do European navies want to reach?, 28/09/2014, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/09/us-pivot-far-european-navies-want-reach/

During World War Two the United States Navy (USN) and the Royal Navy (RN) developed an amazing ability, it was called ‘Replenishment at Sea’ (RAS). Just as the name suggests, it allowed fleets to operate at sea unrestricted by using a combination of Auxiliary Tankers and Solid Stores (or Fleet Replenishment Ships) to refuel, restock food or rearm (although this is something which the missile age has reduced to a rarity). This is what enables fleets to be rapidly redeployed from one corner of the world to the other, to operate on the opposite side of the world from home and to conduct missions independent of Local Land-Based Support. It is therefore a critical mission, but uninterested observers could be excused for thinking that the ships that are used for it are far from critical, as they often do not receive the attention they warrant...

Europe and ship-to-shore manoeuvres, 28/10/2014, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/10/europe-ship-shore-manoeuvres/

Amphibious operations are a growing part of modern strategy, and the concept of sea-basing has added a further dimension to what was already a high value capability. The appreciation of the utility of amphibious warfare is most visibly demonstrated on a global scale by the amount of nations which are investing in it: some nations, such as Australia and Russia are seeking to enhance existing capabilities, whilst others like India are seeking to create the capability. The reasons for this acquisition are varied, as some nations are seeking strategic depth, whereas others are looking for an independent influence capability that is completely organic to them, and some are of course simply reacting to a change in threat, or national circumstance...

CIMSEC

Protecting the Exclusive Economic Zones – Part I, 18/11/2014, http://cimsec.org/protecting-exclusive-economic-zones-part/13637

Introduction

Maritime security is at its heart an exercise of risk reduction, action deterrence and event response – no nation ever has enough resources allocated to enable its forces to be everywhere they need to be all the time. So in reality defence and security has become a bit of a mirage; aiming to look more substantial and solid that it actually is. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the circumstance of maritime security, and the protection of a nations Exclusive Economic Zones, or EEZ. An EEZ is the area of sea/sea bed that a nation administers, for want of a better phrase ‘owns’, and therefore can control/monetize the extraction of resources (such as Fish, Gas, Gold or Manganese) from, and which are becoming increasingly important to national economies – in fact their societies as a whole. However, a nation cannot control or monetize anything if it doesn’t actually have control of it, and just as a city cannot be policed from the secured, nor a battlefield secured just from air[i], neither can an EEZ. Due to this, a specific type of vessel has not so much appeared (as navies have always fulfilled the role with other vessels) as evolved as the areas required to be patrolled have expanded. Although instead of reviving one of the old names, Brig, Sloop or Swan, as was done with ‘Frigate’ in WWII, a name based upon the role the vessel carries out has been generated; OPV...

Protecting the Exclusive Economic Zone – Part II, 19/11/2014, http://cimsec.org/protecting-exclusive-ecconomic-zone-part-ii/13648

Geographical and Oceanographical Factors

When designing OPVs the core question a nation will need to ask itself is how big in terms of area, where the EEZ is (i.e. Northern waters, or Equatorial waters), how far is it that area from the nation’s bases and how much is the EEZ worth.  Vessels which are required to operate in stormy or icy waters (i.e. those operated by Denmark) will need to be as structurally strong and survivable as possible, with a high freeboard to help with large waves, as well as having as much of their equipment internalised as can be, and all equipment that can’t be internalised made easy to clear of ice. In contrast vessels which are to operate in warmer areas (i.e. to an extent France) will need enhanced cooling systems, not only to keep the personnel at a workable temperature, but also the computers and machines. A vessel which could find itself in both situations equally (i.e. those operated by Australia or Britain), will of course need both attributes; it is very difficult to retrofit sufficient cooling into a small ship built to be strong, equally it is very difficult to strength a ship that is not built to be strong. Simply put, a lot of thought needs to be placed at the very beginning of the conception and design process with OPVs as to what is needed, what is wanted and what is best to make sure: because there is not the space available to do much rectifying at a later date...

Sea Control 62: 21st Century Fleet Design, Grand Vision or Ruthless Pragmatism: 08/12/2014, http://cimsec.org/sea-control-62-21st-century-fleet-design-grand-vision-ruthless-pragmatism/13864

An academic (Dr. Alexander Clarke), an operator (Cdr Paul Fisher, RN (ret)) and a builder (Douglas Clarke) discuss 21st Century Fleet Design and whether it should be driven by a ruthless pragmatism or a more grand design. Intelligent and all very British, they also mention Germany, The War, and railways. Well worth an hour of your commute this week!

DOWNLOAD: Sea Control 62 – 21st Century Fleet Design

Falkland's podcast series

Sea Control 48 (East Atlantic) – Falkland’s Series Introduction, 18/08/2014, http://cimsec.org/sea-control-48-east-atlantic-falklands-series-introduction/12679

Alex Clarke of Phoenix Think Tank discusses his upcoming Sea Control Falklands series with associate editor Chris Stockdale.

Sea Control 48: Falklands Series Introduction

Sea Control 51 (East Atlantic) – Falkands War and 45 Commando, 08/09/2014, http://cimsec.org/sea-control-51-the-falklands-series-1-ian-gardiner-45-commando/12929

Alex Clarke interviews Ian Gardiner about the Falklands War and 45 Commando Royal Marines. This is part of the ongoing Sea Control East-Atlantic series on the Falklands War.

DOWNLOAD:
Sea Control 51 – Falklands War and 45 Commando

Sea Control 55 (East Atlantic) – Falklands Series 2: The Parachute Regiment, 06/10/2014, http://cimsec.org/sea-control-55-falklands-series-2-parachute-regiment/13282

The Falklands Series continues with Alex Clarke’s panel with  of the Phoenix Think Tank continues the Falklands series with a small panel on the British Army’s involvement in the war. He is joined by:

1. Retired Lieutenant-General Sir Hew William Royston Pike KCB DSO MBE, who was Commanding Officer of 3PARA during the Falklands War. Author of “From the Front Lines.”

2.Maj. Philip Neame, whose exploits are mentioned in “Above All Courage” by Max Arthur.

DOWNLOAD: Falklands Series 2 – Parachute Regiment

Telegraph

I have been lucky enough to take part in the 'Big Question' program, and been successful a couple of times with articles...

Telegraph, What will Chuck Hagel's resignation mean for US defence policy?, 25/11/2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-politics/11253977/What-will-Chuck-Hagels-resignation-mean-for-US-defence-policy.html

How has Chuck Hagel performed as Defence Secretary?

Chuck Hagel has had the dubious honour of being a defence secretary at one of the worst times to be one, although historically the post, whichever nation it is in, has always been a problematic one.

During his 20 months, Mr Hagel has been faced by issues such as 'Gays in the Military' and 'Women on the Frontline'. The ongoing saga that is the F35 program, an aircraft which represents either the solution to everything, or a compromise too far depending upon the viewer's perspective; and the Littoral Combat ship which has, during Mr Hagel's tenure, due to the realisation of its limitations now spawned a frigate program. These are just two, of the many, multi-billion dollar programs that are on-going...

 

Telegraph, Will Britain's new base in Bahrain make any difference?, 08/12/2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/bahrain/11280192/Will-Britains-new-base-in-Bahrain-make-any-difference.html

In 1968, in the depths of the Cold War and a financial crisis, Britain announced it was withdrawing from the world.

No longer would the Union Jack be a presence in Far East, the Middle East or the Indian Ocean – it would concentrate on Europe, the Atlantic and the Central Front.

For a nation that had fought, and won, two World Wars, a nation which had then only very recently administered the largest empire the world has ever seen, such a voluntary surrender of influence was unprecedented.

The decision was perhaps a symptom of era, of a time Britain was lost as it searched inside itself trying to figure out what it would become.

Alternatively, it was a short sighted measure which governments quickly minimised, if not reversed. For example, in the case of ‘East of Suez’, the government of Heath (that succeeded Wilson), signed the Five Power Defence Arrangement with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore... 

September 2013 Thoughts: Sea Basing

Global interests[1] require a global presence to protect them; which means a nation that has such interest’s needs to find a way of supporting operations globally. This can be done by forward basing, setting up establishments & agreements with allies to allow for support – i.e. a large footprint, or by using vessels such as aircraft carriers and amphibious ships to provide air support, maintenance, logistical hubs, command & control with small staging facilities ashore – i.e. a small footprint. Now both options have advantages and disadvantages; for forward basing those facilities & agreements bind nations together for good and bad (which can be potentially be embarrassing should the regime do something which does not fit with the basing nations preferred rules of conduct) but they are also a permanent platform which doesn’t need to return home for maintenance or be redeployed to a more pressing system. However, the biggest problem is that the use of those facilities can be denied at any time by the host nation – it’s not uncommon because they have to consider their own security and their own politics before anything else.

Sea basing in comparison is more complicated to set up and run; but it is also more flexible in that it can be redeployed from region to region depending upon changing operational focus, furthermore it could never be denied for use by another nation except by enemy action. A scenario is which sea basing has an advantage as it can’t be profiled, mapped and targeted using information available to anyone with access to Google maps. However, whilst an aircraft carrier or large amphibious ship, escorts and auxiliaries do cost a little more than an air base, a battalion or so of troops to secure it, a fleet of ships & trucks to supply it: the cost differences between the two systems shift though when the issues of establishing, securing & supplying multiple bases to achieve equivalent levels of global reach as the sea based system are taken into account; not to mention the political capital that would have to be expended, and the fact the sea based systems[2] are procured from within keeping the money within the national economy, rather being spent to support another’s. Sea basing though is about more than global reach, and it is because of its other geo-strategic attributes that it is of use to all nations, whatever they size/form.

From a strategic perspective countries can be profiled to fall into five categories of nation state – although they can prefaced with either the phrase aspiring or declining if that’s the case:

·         Super Power

·         Global Power

·         Regional Power

·         Local Power

The old classification of medium power is really no more; as a category it has divided into two based upon national interests/willing. A nation which used to fit in that category now is either a global power, which is a nation that needs to be able to project itself and defend its interests globally, or is a regional power, which is a nation allowed the luxury by its interests of being able to focus on the events within its region/continental area. Local Powers are small states which are mainly interested in self-defence and national security rather than national interests. A super power is of course a nation which like a global power thinks globally, but thinks it on a far bigger scale; whereas a global power will seek to react with force but maintain presence as much as possible everywhere, a super power will maintain force as much as possible everywhere. For all these nations Sea Basing can be a very useful system; even for the nations not seeking a global reach.

For smaller countries like Estonia & Israel, nations which in their strategic situation are facing at least a theoretically numerically superior land force, the sea, and sea basing, offers something which they are lacking – strategic depth. There is no space for a strategic reserve, no secure routes for it to utilise to move to be moved to position, no space for the frontline to withdraw it if becomes necessary to sacrifice space for time. The sea offers this and more, for example an amphibious vessel the size of the Canberra class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), 27,500tons, which are currently under construction by the Royal Australian Navy(RAN)[3], can provide the base for 18 aircraft and up to 1000 troops which can be moved by those aircraft or by landing craft that it also carries; therefore it has the ability to pick up and deposit troops and equipment at will.

The ship would be the strategic depth of the nation, and it’s not only in moving ships that the ‘strategic depth’ can be useful for; large enough warships carry what are called Strategic Length Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) – this means they can carry Ballistic Missile Defence Missiles (like the Raytheon SM-3) or Tactical Land Attack Missiles (like the Tomahawk), along with powerful radar’s and other sensors. Providing the nation with the capabilities necessary not only to detect and defend itself even should positions be overrun by advancing enemy, but also the ability to strike back. Now it’s not cheap and a ~£1.7billion (for both ships) is more than likely out of the range of Estonia (Defence Budget £200million), even if the Baltic powers clubbed together and bought them as a group – but the Royal Navy (RN) Bay class Landing Ship Logistics Dock (LSL(D))[4] cost £127million. Now with a hangar, increased defences and sensors that could well push £200million; so buying 2 such vessels, over 4-5 years between the defence and emergency service budgets of all Baltic states (combined defence budget of £695million, combined ministry of interior budget of ???) would be possible.

For Israel with no local ally to club together with this could be more difficult, as it is in fact virtually surrounded. However a budget of ~£9billion makes a partner less of issue; although again they might prefer something smaller than the Canberra, perhaps something like the San Giorgio class LJD[5] of the Marina Militare Italiana (MMI). These vessel displace ~8,000tons; due to this they can only accommodate only 350 soldiers, 30 tanks & 3 medium helicopters, as well as carrying 3 large landing craft and 3 small landing craft – but the design is small enough and similarly sized/equipped vessels would conceivably be cheap enough for Israel to afford 3 or even 4 to provide for her ‘strategic depth’. Allowing for rapid redeployment of armour + personnel, perhaps enabling a withdrawal – more likely considering historical Israeli strategic thinking, a daring counter attack behind the enemy front; the point is all would be enabled by the flexibility such vessels would bring the Israeli forces- as well as in times not war, supporting a global reach capability to support small operations worldwide.

It’s not only small nations which have need for such mobility and deploy-ability though; Australia, a regional power in South East Asia, if not soon the Far East as has been highlighted is building 2 medium sized LHDs.  Another example is Brazil, which not only possess a carrier and amphibious ships, but is seeking to maintain that level of force for the future[6]. Whilst both of these countries are resource exporting economies and have largish EEZs[7]; these are all concentrated – they are mainly contiguous to their coastline, they don’t include islands at the opposite end of the earth as does the UKs (which is the 5^th largest EEZ in the world, and which in fact makes up ~96% of its sovereign territory[8]). So the sea basing capability is not primarily a response to those security needs; they are though a response to a problem which is the opposite of the smaller nations previously discussed, they are really big but their population and infrastructure is concentrated in specific areas meaning to support operations around their own country mobile infrastructure (such as sea basing) is of a necessity. Furthermore, these nations are seeking to project power within their region, mostly for the protection of their security and interests or to support the cause of stability and peace; which is in their interest as such conditions provide the best circumstance for trade and therefore to support economic growth. For these nations the global reach that such a system also provides is a benefit but not a primary requirement; although there is a nation which is an exception to this generalisation, Russia.

The former Superpower still has a lot of commitments, interests and the fact it spans so much of the world’s surface as well as being a link between Europe and Asia it could be argued to be a Global power; however, the political transition since the fall of communism and economic troubles of redeveloping it’s industry/economic restructuring have led to a level of investment more in keeping with it being a regional power - although it is now starting to rebuild those capabilities. It’s building up its amphibious force with French Mistral class LHDs[9] as well as launching corvettes[10] & other small ships, flexing its muscles by deploying its aircraft carrier[11] & several other ships to the Mediterranean[12] in response to the recent crisis and is announcing plans build new carriers[13] along with other ships. It’s doing this all because it’s a big country, which like Australia & Brazil does not have total infrastructural coverage[14]; but unlike them it has been a Superpower, and it liked the status, power and global resonance that came with that – Russia sees itself as a major player on the world stage, and it knows that the thing that matters in world events is being there and taking part. A nation which isn’t there isn’t involved, and if it isn’t involved then no matter how much diplomatic noise it makes it can’t really affect anything. Sea basing is an effective method of being able to turn up, to have an impact without having to take an overt and binding action which they might later regret.

Super Powers & Global powers are combined because they’re the same only one is bigger; furthermore in the current mono-polar world, whilst other nations are coming on there is still only one superpower, America. Nation & Nations which fit in these categories are all extremely ‘plugged in’ to the existing world order, this is both as a protection for their interests – which are stability, trade and adherence to the norms of international behaviour. For them the ability to operate and influence events globally is not a desire but a necessity; for them disruption in world trade could equal devastation, economically if not other forms as well.

Sea Basing is more expensive in simple terms, an aircraft carrier does cost more than an air base; the question is do 3 aircraft carriers cost more than 20-30 airbases needed to cover the world with similar coverage – and this of course is not placing a value on the fact that those bases could be denied at any time by the host government, that those bases will have to be supplied, that heavy equipment will still have to be moved by sea rather than air which will require some security of the sea and that any money spent on an air base in a foreign country is automatically go out of the source nation’s economy, whereas building a ship keeps it within the source nation’s economy; as well as serving as mobile advertisement for the source nation’s skill base & industry. This though is the accounts and the real reason to choose sea basing is the strategy, the reach, the flexibility it provides the nation possessing it with.

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[1] These interests could relate to Diplomatic Commitments, Trade, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)/Resources and Strategic requirements, or of course any combination of two, three or even all.

[2] Recent procurement of MARS vessels in South Korea notwithstanding

[3] https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-canberra-class-lhds-03384/, http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd & http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/canberra-class-landing-helicopter-docks-lhds/ (all retrieved 26/09/2013)

[4] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/april-may-2013-notes-relocating.html, http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/august-2013-notes-can-usvs-and-uuvs-be.html, http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/bay-classbrilliant-motherships-or-just.html & http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/bay_class/ (26/09/2013)

[5] http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/san_giorgio/ & although their successors are planned to be bigger http://www.defenceiq.com/naval-and-maritime-defence/articles/italy-paves-the-way-for-new-amphibious-assault-ves/ (both retrieved 26/09/2013)

[6] http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/laad-2013-dcns-reveals-brazilian-carrier-design/ & http://combatfleetoftheworld.blogspot.co.uk/2011/05/future-of-brazilian-navy.html (both retrieved 27/09/2013)

[7] Australia’s is 8,505,348km², and Brazil’s is 3,660,955km² (so Australia’s is ~25% bigger than the UKs, 6,805,586km², whilst Brazil’s ~46% smaller)

[8] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/august-2013-thoughts-naval-diplomacy.html, http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/july-2013-notes-corvettes-chance-to.html & http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/june-2013-quick-notes-britains-energy.html

[9] http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/russia-to-order-french-mistral-lhds-05749/ & http://rt.com/news/mistral-ship-stern-russia-261/ (both retrieved 30/09/2013)

[10] http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130725/182416825.html (30/09/2013)

[11] http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20071113/87843710.html, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2010/russia-100802-rianovosti03.htm & http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110630/164924604.html (all retrieved 30/09/2013)

[12] http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2013/09/04/russias-aircraft-carrier-to-visit-syrian-naval-base/ (30/09/3013)

[13] http://rt.com/news/russia-navy-mediterranean-yamal-936/ (30/09/2013)

[14] It’s even building mobile nuclear reactors, an interesting way of getting round planning, security and safety issues, which countries like the UK might also want to consider. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_floating_nuclear_power_station (28/09/2013) although possibly a very high risk strategy dependent upon the regions they will be in for their security…

April 2013 Notes: French Defence Cuts

I feel I should start off by appologising, I really do try to blog - but I get so busy doing longer works that I often forget to post things here; and things I do write for here end up going elsewhere... anyway, lately I have been on occassion writing some 'notes', and I thought when I have a few stored up I would start loading them up online - I hope their of use.

French Defence Cuts; effects on the Royal Navy, and the wider British Armed Forces/Strategic situation

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/9955667/French-defence-cuts-could-harm-British-military-partnership.html

This is actually bigger than it looks; but here it is part by part...

Analysis

Missiles

• By going the Sylver VLS/Aster missile system route, we have tied ourselves to the European...mainly French missile research/production, that means any cuts in that then we are left on our own funding research - when the whole point of going into an alliance was to pool the cost.
• The MBDA was supposed to make the Sylver a capable land attack/anti-ship system...without it the only option under development is the son of tomahawk/son of Harpoon, both of which are orientated on the MK41 VLS... i.e. the only chance of making the Type 45s have a land attack capability greater than that provided by their main gun is more than likely going to be delayed and cancelled eventually, or cancelled out right.
• under the SDSR/concordant we have agreed to pool our Trident maintenance program, this is not going to be unaffected by this decision; in fact all the money we planned on saving we could end up having to spend to keep open a French facility employing French workers.

Procurement

·         A400M Transport aircraft… if the French decide to cancel or delay the procurement of this then the cost for the UK will go up, this is pointed out in the article, but the article misses that for the British this had been a leap of faith getting this type of aircraft from Europe, as the Hercules and Galaxy fleets testify to the RAF is more often equipped with American made transport aircraft… rather than paying the increase cost, it might be an option to cut our losses and instead increase these fleets of aircraft.

Long Term Strategic

• Carriers – space aboard Charles De Gaulle to provide for training of RN pilots in operations from carriers, was a key plank of the concordant, and is important the speed of regeneration of the RN’s own carrier capability in the future…whilst the USN should still make places available as agreed, without the extra spaces offered by the French it will off course slow it down. The fact is most like the integrated carrier strike group will most likely be a lot less integrated and a lot less common than envisaged.
• Escorts – the French are being relied upon at the moment to provide those extra escorts (along with the Americans) for task groups when we need them, the American’s cannot be expected to fill the gap and the other European nations are either themselves cutting or do not have the escorts of the required type/level of capability to be useful… putting us in a position of weakness we would not have been in had the full number of Type 45s been built and the Greeks not been sold 3 Type 23s, that we now need and they can’t afford to operate properly.
• Research; especially in the areas of Satellite Communications and Unmanned Air Systems, all of which are at critical junctures at the moment, funding if cut by the French, if its wished to keep them on track,

Short Term Strategic

• Asia – the French do supply support troops in Afghanistan, this logistical element may not seem significant… but if its contribution has to be filled by British and American troops and short notice, after recent cuts there is not much slack available.
• Africa – the French are a key intelligence source for northern Africa, and their deployments of legion units around the Sahara, as well as their commitments to the anti-piracy operations of the coast of Somalia are important contributors to stability in the region… loss of their escorts off Somalia and reduction in troop presence could destabilise the fragile peace of the post-Arab spring states; as well as calling upon resources that post-SDSR are already limited. 
• Middle East – Syria is still in the middle of a civil war, Iran is always ready for trouble, the French might not always be reliable allies, but they were burden sharers and at the least might have been able to provide support, maybe even combat troops for an intervention should that become necessary.

Conclusion: how big are the consequences for the UK?

·         Potentially massive, whatever the scale of the cuts there will be an effect… whatever the effect is though it will be cumulative, it will be felt in different ways short term and long term depending upon the severity of the cuts.

·         Worst case: Britain is going to be forced to spend a lot of money, buying a transport plane no one else wants, buying more escorts to make up the shortfall, retrofitting existing escorts with Mk41 VLS to enable them to carry a modern land attack/anti-ship missile system, as well as buying SM-3 ABMs/SM-6s rather than take on development of the Aster alone and will have five years added on to the time it takes to get the carrier operational, and the Ocean/Illustrious/Argus replacement program becomes even more important… Britain is forced by having to secure its own strategic position/necessities itself to become the major military power in Europe, and more than likely with America’s withdrawal/”Re-Balancing” from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the major Atlantic power.

·         Best case: France does a minimal cut, the other European nations also do a minimal cut and whilst Britain has to provide more money into research than it was expecting the programs are not significantly delayed and the other nations still bare some of the burden. We have to order an extra batch of Type 26s and manage to still get some spaces upon French Carrier operations to supplement those provided by the USN.

·         Likely scenario: hopefully something in between… but only time will tell, and with the French focus on nuclear power stations, combined with their Eurozone integration, their requirement for armed forces therefore  could be argued to perhaps come down to one more of national pride than perhaps of national necessity, making the worst case scenario more likely.

 

Extra Info

For your own consideration, please examine the summary of the Downing Street declaration (taken from Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_forces_in_Afghanistan ) below:

Downing Street Declaration

The 2 November 2010 Downing Street declaration^[4] by President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron. The elements of this declaration are as follows.

Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty

The purpose of this is to develop co-operation between British and French Armed Forces, the sharing and pooling of materials and equipment including through mutual interdependence, the building of joint facilities, mutual access to each other’s defence markets, and industrial and technological co-operation.

Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship

Collaboration on the technology associated with nuclear stockpile stewardship in support of both countries independent nuclear deterrent capabilities, including a new joint facility at Valduc in France that will model performance of nuclear warheads and materials to ensure long-term viability, security and safety – this will be supported by a joint Technology Development Centre at Aldermaston in the UK.

Operational Matters

It was decided to sign a Letter of Intent, creating a new framework for exchanges between UK and French Armed Forces on operational matters.

Industry and Armaments

It was decided to direct the UK-France High Level Working Group to strengthen its work on industrial and armament cooperation.

Operations and training

Combined Joint Expeditionary Force

It was decided to develop a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force suitable for a wide range of scenarios, up to and including high intensity operations. It will involve all three armed Services: there will be a land component composed of formations at national brigade level, maritime and air components with their associated Headquarters, and logistics and support functions. It will not involve standing forces but will be available at notice for bilateral, NATO, European Union, United Nations or other operations. It will begin with combined air and land exercises during 2011 and will develop the concept before the next UK-France Summit and progress towards full capability in subsequent years. The Force is intended to stimulate greater interoperability and coherence in military doctrine, training and equipment requirements.

Aircraft carriers

The UK had earlier announced that it had decided to install catapults and arresting gear to its future operational aircraft carrier, creating opportunities for UK and French aircraft to operate off carriers from both countries. Building primarily on maritime task group co-operation around the French carrier Charles de Gaulle, the UK and France will aim to have, by the early 2020s, the ability to deploy a UK-French integrated carrier strike group incorporating assets owned by both countries. This is to ensure that the Royal Navy and the French Navy will work in the closest co-ordination.

Equipment and capabilities

They agreed cooperation in the following areas.

• A400M support and training.
• Submarine technologies and systems
• Maritime mine countermeasures
• Satellite communications
• Air to air refuelling and passenger air transport
• Unmanned air systems
• A 10 year strategic plan for the British and French Complex Weapons sector.
• Research and technology
• To continue with their significant R&T co-operation, devoting an annual budget of €50m each to shared research and development, with the aim of increasing this where possible.
• To focus on a set of 10 priority areas that will include time critical research support to satellite communications, unmanned systems, naval systems and complex weapons. including new areas of critical industrial importance such as sensors, electronic warfare technologies, and materials, as well as novel areas such as simulation and a jointly funded PhD programme.
• Cyber security. France and the UK agreed a framework which will govern their enhanced co-operation in this area, leading to strengthened individual and common resilience.

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this is especially interesting in light of this... http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21955839