August - December 2014: Published Elsewhere

Well it's been a productive couple of months... carrying on those journal articles I mentioned last time... and still trying to turn my thesis into books. However, even with all that research/writing, and some teaching, I've still been doing other projects and here are what's been published, so far...please go to the sites to read them in full, but where possible I have included some of the beginning of them to give a flavour...

European Geostrategy

Europe and the future of cruisers, 08/10/2014, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/10/europe-future-cruisers/

Definition of a Cruiser:

Oxford Dictionary – A relatively fast warship larger than a destroyer and less heavily armed than a battleship.

1992 Washington Naval Treaty – a warship of up to 10,000 tons displacement carrying guns no larger than 8 inches in caliber.

These two definitions of Cruisers are both illuminating, mainly because they are so wide and encompassing; traditionally a Cruiser had not been a class of ship, but a designation for ships which were below the Rate system of fleet ships. They were used for peacetime and wartime commerce protection, fleet scouting, inshore work, commerce raiding and (for want of a better phrase) ‘showing the flag’ or ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’. This meant in practice that the term ‘Cruisers’ referred to Frigates, Sloops, Brigs and all the other small ships. Cruisers were in reality first defined by the naval treaties of the 1920s; but with the growth of modern warships these no longer have any real meaning. For example, the Zumwalt class Destroyers that the United States Navy (USN) laid the keels down for in 2010 displace 14,798tons – well over the 1922 limit for Cruisers. However, despite this watering down the titles, Cruiser, Destroyer and Frigate still seem to have influence; hence the current debate taking place in America...

The US pivot: how far do European navies want to reach?, 28/09/2014, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/09/us-pivot-far-european-navies-want-reach/

During World War Two the United States Navy (USN) and the Royal Navy (RN) developed an amazing ability, it was called ‘Replenishment at Sea’ (RAS). Just as the name suggests, it allowed fleets to operate at sea unrestricted by using a combination of Auxiliary Tankers and Solid Stores (or Fleet Replenishment Ships) to refuel, restock food or rearm (although this is something which the missile age has reduced to a rarity). This is what enables fleets to be rapidly redeployed from one corner of the world to the other, to operate on the opposite side of the world from home and to conduct missions independent of Local Land-Based Support. It is therefore a critical mission, but uninterested observers could be excused for thinking that the ships that are used for it are far from critical, as they often do not receive the attention they warrant...

Europe and ship-to-shore manoeuvres, 28/10/2014, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/10/europe-ship-shore-manoeuvres/

Amphibious operations are a growing part of modern strategy, and the concept of sea-basing has added a further dimension to what was already a high value capability. The appreciation of the utility of amphibious warfare is most visibly demonstrated on a global scale by the amount of nations which are investing in it: some nations, such as Australia and Russia are seeking to enhance existing capabilities, whilst others like India are seeking to create the capability. The reasons for this acquisition are varied, as some nations are seeking strategic depth, whereas others are looking for an independent influence capability that is completely organic to them, and some are of course simply reacting to a change in threat, or national circumstance...

CIMSEC

Protecting the Exclusive Economic Zones – Part I, 18/11/2014, http://cimsec.org/protecting-exclusive-economic-zones-part/13637

Introduction

Maritime security is at its heart an exercise of risk reduction, action deterrence and event response – no nation ever has enough resources allocated to enable its forces to be everywhere they need to be all the time. So in reality defence and security has become a bit of a mirage; aiming to look more substantial and solid that it actually is. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the circumstance of maritime security, and the protection of a nations Exclusive Economic Zones, or EEZ. An EEZ is the area of sea/sea bed that a nation administers, for want of a better phrase ‘owns’, and therefore can control/monetize the extraction of resources (such as Fish, Gas, Gold or Manganese) from, and which are becoming increasingly important to national economies – in fact their societies as a whole. However, a nation cannot control or monetize anything if it doesn’t actually have control of it, and just as a city cannot be policed from the secured, nor a battlefield secured just from air[i], neither can an EEZ. Due to this, a specific type of vessel has not so much appeared (as navies have always fulfilled the role with other vessels) as evolved as the areas required to be patrolled have expanded. Although instead of reviving one of the old names, Brig, Sloop or Swan, as was done with ‘Frigate’ in WWII, a name based upon the role the vessel carries out has been generated; OPV...

Protecting the Exclusive Economic Zone – Part II, 19/11/2014, http://cimsec.org/protecting-exclusive-ecconomic-zone-part-ii/13648

Geographical and Oceanographical Factors

When designing OPVs the core question a nation will need to ask itself is how big in terms of area, where the EEZ is (i.e. Northern waters, or Equatorial waters), how far is it that area from the nation’s bases and how much is the EEZ worth.  Vessels which are required to operate in stormy or icy waters (i.e. those operated by Denmark) will need to be as structurally strong and survivable as possible, with a high freeboard to help with large waves, as well as having as much of their equipment internalised as can be, and all equipment that can’t be internalised made easy to clear of ice. In contrast vessels which are to operate in warmer areas (i.e. to an extent France) will need enhanced cooling systems, not only to keep the personnel at a workable temperature, but also the computers and machines. A vessel which could find itself in both situations equally (i.e. those operated by Australia or Britain), will of course need both attributes; it is very difficult to retrofit sufficient cooling into a small ship built to be strong, equally it is very difficult to strength a ship that is not built to be strong. Simply put, a lot of thought needs to be placed at the very beginning of the conception and design process with OPVs as to what is needed, what is wanted and what is best to make sure: because there is not the space available to do much rectifying at a later date...

Sea Control 62: 21st Century Fleet Design, Grand Vision or Ruthless Pragmatism: 08/12/2014, http://cimsec.org/sea-control-62-21st-century-fleet-design-grand-vision-ruthless-pragmatism/13864

An academic (Dr. Alexander Clarke), an operator (Cdr Paul Fisher, RN (ret)) and a builder (Douglas Clarke) discuss 21st Century Fleet Design and whether it should be driven by a ruthless pragmatism or a more grand design. Intelligent and all very British, they also mention Germany, The War, and railways. Well worth an hour of your commute this week!

DOWNLOAD: Sea Control 62 – 21st Century Fleet Design

Falkland's podcast series

Sea Control 48 (East Atlantic) – Falkland’s Series Introduction, 18/08/2014, http://cimsec.org/sea-control-48-east-atlantic-falklands-series-introduction/12679

Alex Clarke of Phoenix Think Tank discusses his upcoming Sea Control Falklands series with associate editor Chris Stockdale.

Sea Control 48: Falklands Series Introduction

Sea Control 51 (East Atlantic) – Falkands War and 45 Commando, 08/09/2014, http://cimsec.org/sea-control-51-the-falklands-series-1-ian-gardiner-45-commando/12929

Alex Clarke interviews Ian Gardiner about the Falklands War and 45 Commando Royal Marines. This is part of the ongoing Sea Control East-Atlantic series on the Falklands War.

DOWNLOAD:
Sea Control 51 – Falklands War and 45 Commando

Sea Control 55 (East Atlantic) – Falklands Series 2: The Parachute Regiment, 06/10/2014, http://cimsec.org/sea-control-55-falklands-series-2-parachute-regiment/13282

The Falklands Series continues with Alex Clarke’s panel with  of the Phoenix Think Tank continues the Falklands series with a small panel on the British Army’s involvement in the war. He is joined by:

1. Retired Lieutenant-General Sir Hew William Royston Pike KCB DSO MBE, who was Commanding Officer of 3PARA during the Falklands War. Author of “From the Front Lines.”

2.Maj. Philip Neame, whose exploits are mentioned in “Above All Courage” by Max Arthur.

DOWNLOAD: Falklands Series 2 – Parachute Regiment

Telegraph

I have been lucky enough to take part in the 'Big Question' program, and been successful a couple of times with articles...

Telegraph, What will Chuck Hagel's resignation mean for US defence policy?, 25/11/2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-politics/11253977/What-will-Chuck-Hagels-resignation-mean-for-US-defence-policy.html

How has Chuck Hagel performed as Defence Secretary?

Chuck Hagel has had the dubious honour of being a defence secretary at one of the worst times to be one, although historically the post, whichever nation it is in, has always been a problematic one.

During his 20 months, Mr Hagel has been faced by issues such as 'Gays in the Military' and 'Women on the Frontline'. The ongoing saga that is the F35 program, an aircraft which represents either the solution to everything, or a compromise too far depending upon the viewer's perspective; and the Littoral Combat ship which has, during Mr Hagel's tenure, due to the realisation of its limitations now spawned a frigate program. These are just two, of the many, multi-billion dollar programs that are on-going...

 

Telegraph, Will Britain's new base in Bahrain make any difference?, 08/12/2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/bahrain/11280192/Will-Britains-new-base-in-Bahrain-make-any-difference.html

In 1968, in the depths of the Cold War and a financial crisis, Britain announced it was withdrawing from the world.

No longer would the Union Jack be a presence in Far East, the Middle East or the Indian Ocean – it would concentrate on Europe, the Atlantic and the Central Front.

For a nation that had fought, and won, two World Wars, a nation which had then only very recently administered the largest empire the world has ever seen, such a voluntary surrender of influence was unprecedented.

The decision was perhaps a symptom of era, of a time Britain was lost as it searched inside itself trying to figure out what it would become.

Alternatively, it was a short sighted measure which governments quickly minimised, if not reversed. For example, in the case of ‘East of Suez’, the government of Heath (that succeeded Wilson), signed the Five Power Defence Arrangement with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore... 

May 2014: Published Elsewhere

Well since my computer troubles I'm still catching up some journal articles/conference papers (I was lucky enough to present to at the Global War Studies conference - now on the xx draft) that I need to have ready soon, so unfortunately have no written pieces finished for this blog; however I have one I did for British Naval History http://www.britishnavalhistory.com/sverdlov_class_rn_response/ which I recommend a read off - it's an interesting period of history.

Sverdlov Class Cruisers, and the Royal Navy’s Response

12 May 2014 Alex Clarke, Royal Navy, Soviet Navy by Samuel McLean

Alexander Clarke’s second article examines the Royal Navy’s reaction to the emergence of the USSR’s Sverdlov Class gun cruisers.

“Although the Russian lack of aircraft carriers would make it hazardous for their Cruisers to operate outside the range of shore based fighter cover, the presumed long range of the Sverdlov Class makes it possible for them to operate as ocean raiders, particularly if the Russians have reason to believe that Allied carriers will not be met.”[i]

Surface raiders were a potentially deadly threat to a global trading nation such as Britain; whilst submarines were a problem, they were a containable problem – especially before the development of nuclear power. However, as had been demonstrated by Admiral Graf Spee of River Plate fame [ii] and others, surface raiders were for more unrestricted – hence killing them became such a priority. [iii] Therefore when the Soviets [iv] were seen to be constructing a similar capability a reaction was only a matter of time.

Figure 1.The Cruise of the Admiral Graf Spee, illustrating not only the number of its success but the range and breadth of them (Image from National Archives).[v]

The most commonly referenced British reaction to the emerging Soviet surface raider threat is the Buccaneer bomber, which were of course principally focused on not only low level nuclear strike of ground targets, but also the hunting down and destruction of surface raiders. [vi] The Royal Navy’s (RN) response though was not simply limited to this one thing, and in fact whilst carriers were focused on as the premier tool of global reach, it was realised there would never be enough available for the RN to achieve the global presence which would be required to protect the arteries of trade & supply from raiders/hunt those raiders down.[vii] Therefore just as it had during the 1920s and 1930s the RN turned to surface combatants.

Upgrade, Rebuild or New Build? For furture of Britain's escort force that really is the question...

The more that comes about the Type 26 Global Combat Ship program, the more I worry whether all the options have been considered. So that’s where this post comes from, a simple enquiry is the government making the right decision? Is the Type 26 in its current form, in any form, going to provide what Britain needs? Or is perhaps it better to follow the American example of building an improved existing design?

What Britain needs…

To start with there is the obvious, whatever vessels are built, they will be called upon to participate in a wide variety of war fighting missions – primarily as Type 23 replacements Anti-Submarine warfare is going to be a prominent function, considering the reduction in Type 45 numbers  Air Defence is also going to be a key capability, further to these support of Amphibious warfare and long range strike capability would of course provide for them to function as force multipliers in key RN missions.  But ships don’t pay for themselves in war; it’s in ‘peace time’ patrolling, policing and presence missions which justify them.

Britain maintains due to its global interests, mainly trade and legacy alliances, many patrols worldwide. Ranging from counter piracy of the coast of East Africa to South Atlantic Guard Ship, from Counter Drugs Operations in the Caribbean to NATO standing patrols… and none of this takes into account the various exercises and port visits which the fleets escorts take part in/carry out as part of Britain’s extensive diplomatic actions.

Figure 1. The original pre SDSR future fleet...

To do all these things Britain needs numbers, not World War II number but more than are currently in service. A like for like replacement on the Duke class would provide 13 vessels, and after the 2010 SDSR there is not even the prospect of the Type 27 to make up the numbers. Yet all political parties and defence experts are in pretty much agreement that there are not enough vessels to carry out all the missions that are required… so the obvious question is, are 13 enough? Would even 16, the number of Duke class originally built for RN be enough? It’s a no, there was a reason that originally the Type 45 was going to be a class of 12, the C1 was going to be a class of 10, and the C2 a class of 8; 30 escorts was the accepted minimum. Now talk is of the 2,500ton vessels of the Mine Countermeasures, Hydrography and Patrol Capability program making up the difference – and they will be able to do so in constabulary duties…the drugs patrols, but they won’t be able to South Atlantic Guardship, they won’t be able to do NATO patrols and they will not be able take a lead in more weapons intensive war fighting roles as they are simply not big enough to carry all the equipment. Therefore a criterion has to be to build as many as possible, the Type 26 is to have a unit price of around £350million pounds; but the costs don’t stop there, development, logistics, training and infrastructure are all things which have to be paid for. So out of a £10billion program, only £4.55 billon is going to go on buying the units – even when leveraging from 80% known technologies, it still costs money in development to make sure those technologies work together in the way they are planned to...after all nasty surprises are not welcomed in battle, especially when it’s something which works in theory but in practice lets the crew down. It’s the numbers which produce the question as to whether the Type 26 is the way to go for Britain and its strategic needs. 

However this is not the final requirement; whatever option is chosen it must be capable of generating export orders – i.e. it must bring in work and money for the UK. This is a bigger ask than at first glance it may look; successive governments whilst achieving sales of ‘used’ equipment, regularly ‘barely used’ equipment, sometimes to the detriment of Britain’s capabilities, have proved themselves unable to sell new equipment… or rather new pieces of large equipment. The Type 26 is also proving pretty difficult to sell, no matter how much hawking on international street corners our ministers seem to try. Which is a problem, because the reason its marketed as the ‘global combat ship’ rather than the Type 26, the reason its versatility and adaptability are being stressed, the reason the vessel being proposed is in many ways closer to being a small destroyer rather than a large frigate is to make it sell; to make it attractive to nations seeking either the modern equivalent of the American 18 pounder frigates that fought in the 1812 War, small fleet flagships, or those nations looking for an escort that can punch above its weight and give them maximum capability for minimum numbers.

Figure 2. The Type 26 as currently presented

What are the options?

So what are the options available to decision makers – the first is of course carry on build the new design, the Type 26 Global Ships. Even in this there are options, they could be built as currently planned, or they could be adapted…here are some possible mods:

·         Type 26 Mod 1 – 3 Phalanx (replacing 30mms aft), 32 cell MK41 VLS, 2x 8 cell Sylver A30 VLS forward (flanking ‘B’ position), 4x Stan Flex modules (2 amidships, and 2 aft atop hangar), 4.5in DG

·         Type 26 Mod 2 – 4 Oerlikon Millennium 35mm (replacing 30mm & Phalanx – forward flanking the ‘B’ position, replacing the 30mm), 4 StanFlex modules (2 amidships flanking Sylver A30, and 2 aft atop hangar), 32 cell Mk 41 VLS, 2x 8 cell Sylver A30 VLS forward (in ‘B’ position and amidships), 4.5in DG

·         Type 26 Mod 3 – 2 Phalanx (replacing 30mms aft), BAE MK110 57mm (‘B’ position), 32 cell MK41 VLS, 2x 8 cell Sylver A30 VLS forward (flanking ‘B’ position),  4.5in DG

The stanflex system could be a good idea, as instead of being fitted for not with, British ships could be ‘moded for not with’ – it would actually mean building a vessel closer in spirit to the C2, but with it having the ability to be rapidly turned into something more.  Plus it’s a proven, off the shelf system, which is buying in, like the MK 41 VLS to a wide range of development partnerships reducing long term costs on the British Taxpayer. Everything is still to play for with this design, because no one as yet has made any decisions about the engines baring that there will be a range of options available and they will generate enough power to get the ship to 28+ knots. However, an educated guess would assume that the British ones are most likely to be powered by the fruits of Rolls Royce… at least in part. Until the engines are selected everything else which will be put in round them (even in the days of fully electric systems, the sheer weight of the power plants still has a massive impact on how equipment is distributed around the ship) is not certain.  The Type 26 can be whatever its wanted to be; but that will cost and this will be a new system.

The other options are taking a leaf out of the USN’s book, and like they did with the Arleigh Burke / Zumwalt decision, build a modified/improved version existing, already supported and costed design. So the options are Type 23 or Type 45?

Figure 3. HMS Marlborough in Portsmouth dockyard.

The Type 23s already do the role, their design is functional and proven, the final units built cost under £100million per unit, a new upgraded version would probably be able to be brought in at £175million unit, allowing for the purchase of 26 for the same £4.55billion Unit purchase outlay as the Type 26. It won’t be as good as the Type 26 is proposed to be; but at 2 units for the price of 1 it would allow for a lot more operational flexibility. It could still carrying the new CAMM missile, a large amount of equipment is going to be transition from the Type 23s anyway – this would make the transition easier. A modified Type 23 could have CIWS fitted, all the problems/weakness in capabilities which the RN knows as fully as it can after operating the class for over 20 years; with a better power plant/drive train and improved sensors.

Figure 4. HMS Daring from every cubic angle but underneath

A more logical option perhaps, because they have finished being built would be to continue the Type 45s, and just expand there already developed/in place support systems – as well as capitalise on the logistics and training savings by using more of the money to purchase units. After all at £500million a unit (based on the AAD version), the £4.55billion could only buy 9 units, but the savings and synergies brought about by having a fleet of ‘one type’ would probably allow for an £3billion to be freed to purchasing units, allowing for a total purchase of 15 vessels and fleet which would have 21 vessels using the same engines, the same spare parts, the same systems… allowing for a far more operational productive structure than two classes of 13 and 6 vessels would. An example of this would be, an Auxiliary only has to carry one set of spare parts, so it can carry more of them, as well as components which go wrong less often, allowing for a higher level of frontline support to be achieved – maximising the force on station.

There is also the fact that the version produced to fulfil the ‘brief’ would have to be general purpose, i.e. it could have a cheaper less AAD focused radar such as the Artisan 3D radar already proposed for the Type 26, it already has space in its design for drones but if necessary an adaption to the superstructure or even a lengthening/broadening of the design could be included as the RN has done with previous designs. It’s understood from the most recent design that two types of VLS are desired, and the Type 45 does have the space for 2 8 cell A30 Sylver systems for the Sea Ceptors be put in… they could be inserted either side of the stack between the 30mm and phalanx mounts, whilst instead of just a 24 cell ‘attack’ VLS, a 48 cell system could be fitted.

Another option would be for the RN to keep to the existing radar set up, or possibly just the Sampson and use some of the ‘attack’ VLS cells to carry extra Area Air Defence weapon or even Anti-Ballistic Missile systems such as the SM-3; an option made more possible by the larger ‘attack’ VLS able to be carried by the destroyer. Its more money per unit but the program overall would not be more expensive; or it could mix and match, build some with the Sampson as ABM vessels that can also reinforce the existing AAD vessels, and build the rest with the Artisan radar… the fact is that with the same engines, layout and broadly speaking design, the changes would be relatively cosmetic in equivalence to the complexity of a modern warship.

What is the Best fit?

Well the sheer numbers offered by the Type 23 is attractive; but in reality it’s almost a 40 year old design, and its not big enough to do the mission profiles which will be expected of the future escorts. There is also the manning issue; manning 26 rather than 13 ships would be a big strain on the RN under its current size. Also whilst 3 ‘used’ units were sold to Chile, that’s not the sort of orders that would suggest more orders will be forthcoming should a new variant of the class be the decision of the British Government. This means that only two of these options are viable. A general purpose Type 45 or the Type 26?

The Type 26 represents possibility; could the RN really finally crack the formula of the perfect combination of capability and cost that will satisfy the needs of Britain’s security? It has promise; the separate/focused VLS is certainly a step in the right direction, and whilst interest has not been more than just that – it’s as yet an unknown quantity and those deciding might be waiting to see the final product before making a decision.

The Type 45, well represents a successful design, it works, it’s a known quantity, the problems and kinks have either been well documented or solved. Further to all this a general purpose version of the Type 45 would represent something that is known would attract interest+ from foreign buyers. For example the Saudis when considering the Type 45 for their navy were put off by what they felt was over specialisation for the size of the vessel; so a general purpose version especially if the mix and match approach was taken with vessels of differing levels would offer buyers the options it its believed will attract their money. Other considerations would be the fact that it be larger resulting force; which thanks to its shared logistics footprint would be far more deployable.

Conclusion: in reality…

History can only provide an idea of the future, not a definite path, and in reality it’s the type 26s which is the most likely option to be built, the general purpose Type 45s would be of great note and even greater use. An especial truth in the far reduced circumstance the RN has found itself in post successive cuts. However, a new ship, a new design is the apparent desire… so the challenge is to make that ship fit the role it’s needed to fill, and that means that real thought has to go into it. It has to be decided now, what it is wanted to do, what it is needed to do, and what it has to do… these are not the same things, what it is  wanted to do – is something that is rather liked for the sake of providing options, what its needed do – well that is the constraints of Britain’s strategic situation, what it has to do – that’s simple, it has to be able to fight...it has to be worth the cost, or else a lot of brave lives will be lost needlessly. Those decisions have to be made now, and they have to be stuck to – or all that will happen are delays and a ship that becomes a Christmas tree… with everyone hanging their pet project on it, and therefore causing the cost to keep escalating and unit numbers to be forced down by a penny conscious Treasury.

Figure  5. The Type 26 as revealed in an earlier graphic... arguably a junior Type 45 in much of its profile

Cruisers; The Big Boys? Or Just Really Big Toys?

This might seem a strange topic for consideration, after all the total number of cruisers within the worlds navies are very small, in fact there is only one in service outside of the realm of the Superpowers – and even with this it is only the navies of Russian and United State which posses and operate them

The superpower cruisers are:
United States Navy:

• Twenty Two Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers.

Russian Navy:

• Two Kirov-class large missile cruisers (sometimes referred to as battle cruisers due to their size),
• Two Slava-class missile cruisers (further one at reduced readiness, further one under construction, transferred from Ukrainian Navy to Russian Navy),
• Two(one) Kara-class.
  

The only other navy;
Peruvian Navy: One De Zeven Provinciën-class cruiser, the world's last operational gun cruiser.

Now in complete opposite to the list above, I will start off with Peru’s entry into the world of cruisers. Almirante Grau’s (formerly De Ruyter of the Royal Netherlands Navy), for deck pictured to the right, is has not only the title of the largest weight of shot fired currently in the world it is also the most powerful mobile artillery unit in the world. The De Zeven Provinciën class (pictured below) was a fairly effective design of cruiser which was built by both sides but never finished in time to serve either during World War II, but upon reaching active service provided the command ship elements in many NATO deployments after hostilities were over.

The Almirante Grau has been updated with Otomat Surface to Surface Missiles (SSM) – which puts in front of the brand new Type 45 Daring class destroyers of the Royal Navy; however I am still not going to examine to depth of the other classes, for one reason it is not fair as it is so much older, secondly it is really not the purpose of this entry to compare cruisers of World War II to cruisers of the modern era but to compare those of the modern era. It was though worthy of a mention.

Now for the beginning of the meat and bones of this entry; the Kara Class of Russian Navy. The `Kara' class design is generally similar to that of the Kresta II cruisers which preceded them, but the Kara’s are longer and are powered by gas rather than steam turbines; which perhaps is an explanation for the Kresta’s rapid disappearance post cold-war opposed to the slow continuance of Kara construction. Originally the Kara’s mounted two SA-N-3 launchers fore and aft, with their associated Head Lights fire-control systems; which are perhaps the most dominant feature of the ship to look at. The large mainmast supports the very large Top Sail radar. As in the Kresta II there are four SS-N-15 launchers either side of the bridge – a similar configuration to the Sovremenny Class destroyers. Unusually for an escort the helicopter is raised to flight deck level by a lift; something which is more associated with carriers and amphibious ships than an escort. The guns mounted on the `Kara' class include two twin main 76.2 mm guns. As in the earlier ships, however, these are cited at the waist and have an arc of fire of some 150o on the beam; different from that of Sovremenny and Udaloy class destroyers where they are mounted centreline; this may of course reflect Russian Naval doctrine on the purpose of cruisers within task groups; but it also seems a reflection of the fact that the guns are not of primary importance in these vessels. Similarly, the 30 mm CIWS turrets are sited in two pairs either side of the stack covering their respective beams, but unable to cover the forward or after arcs; although how significant this might seem in action depends on the ships ability to manoeuvre within the situation the attack finds it. RFS Kerch, which is the only vessel in a state of true active service, entered refit in the late 1980s, which included the installation of a Flat Screen radar, in place of the Top Sail. Whilst, it is logical that this would have been installed in other remaining ship, the Ochakov, however as far as I know this is not the case.

The missile armament is these ships, like all modern cruisers, is their reason for being; starting out they have 2 quad SS-N-14 Silex anti-submarine missiles, the same armament as is fitted the Udaloy class anti-submarine destroyers. Added to this is the fairly impressive by soviet standards SA-N-3 Goblet surface to air missile launchers – with 80 missiles reportedly carried they were in some ways the equivalent of the early Ticonderoga class cruisers – which will be discussed later, the similarity of the level of importance attached to the air defence role is the fact they also pack the SA-N-4 Gecko surface to air missile launchers – with reportedly 40 reloads. This all fits in with a fairly potent radar system (according to all reports, if anyone can actually tell me the definitive Russian name for them I would be most impressed and grateful – I am not putting Owl Screech in my blog entry – it sounds way to much like a Bill Oddie nature documentary).

The Slava Class are different again, for starts the main guns have returned to the centreline, and its visual presence is dominated by the 16 (4 double launchers either sides of the main structure) for the P-500 Bazalt surface to surface missiles(SSMs) otherwise known as the SS-N-12 Sandbox missile. This system, the forerunner of the Shipwreck which is mounted on the Kirovs and will discussed later, is a system which is worthy of great respect. In the history of Russian made anti-ship missiles, this system has definite status. The reason for this status, I hear you ask? Simple, with a range in excess of 550km, a 950kg semi-armour-piercing high explosive warhead, and a speed measuring greater than 2.5 times the speed of sound - it is a weapon system which certainly puts the harpoon to shame, and doesn’t exactly cast the Exocet in a shining light. Added to this impressive system is the S-300F or as NATO calls it SA-N-6, its upgrade missile (compared to the land based version) with range extended to 90 km and maximum target speed of Mach 4; although it does have a more limited engagement altitude compared to its land counterpart, only 25-25,000 m. The radar system attached to this is the TOP PAIR – that is a TOP SAIL teamed with a BIG NET; a comprehensive system if not the technological equal of the of the American SPY Aegis system.

This system is itself further reinforced by the SA-N-4 Gecko system, as is also fitted in the Kara class; this system is aimed at far closer range system than the SA-N-6, only 15km, but it covers this range at 1020 m/s, so it is less than 15s from launch to maximum range – making it a useful system; although not quite on par with the British Seawolf. The missile systems on the Slava class are augmented by 1 twin AK-130 130mm/L70 dual purpose guns; as I have mentioned previously mounted centreline forward, this is supplement by 6 AK-630 close-in weapons systems. As is usually with Soviet era ships of this size it carries a comprehensive anti-submarine outfitting, 2 RBU-6000 anti-submarine mortars, and 10 (2 quin) 533mm torpedo tubes; along with a helicopter as well; although at current it seems to be whichever one can be found that works. There are not unsupported rumours that the final vessel of this class, which is still under construction in the Ukraine, will be sold to Chinese; surely a prospect they must be considering in light of their expressed desire to have 6 carrier groups in service by 2020; cruisers as the Russians, and the Americans acknowledge are important to such groups successful operations.

Undoubtedly, with this in mind, the Soviet navy commissioned the largest class of cruisers to ever be constructed, weighing in at 28,000tons fully loaded, 4 of the class were completed and off these (Kirov) Admiral Ushakov has been inactive since the early 1990s; in fact slated for scrapping as of 2000, (Frunze) Admiral Lazarev has been laid up in Severomorsk, technically in reserve since 2004 – but is being worked on with a view to selling it too the Chinese, (Kalinin) Admiral Nakhimov has been undergoing repairs at Sevmash since 1999, but is not expected to rejoin the navy before 2012 if not 2015, and finally (Yuri Andropov) Pyotr Velikiy (pictured above) is active and serving as the flagship of the Northern fleet, something its namesake Peter the Great would have been proud off.

These goliaths of the escort world pack a very powerful punch centred on the massive P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 20 of which are carried. With a speed of 4.5x the speed of sound, a range of 625km, and capable of pulling manoeuvres of 16g; this is possibly the most dangerous anti-ship missile in the world; it packs the standard issue 750kg high explosive warhead, this is not a let down however as it is a very good warhead, and certainly can do what its intended. Of course however the real threat of this weapon is that like almost all soviet weapons it can have a nuclear warhead fitted – hence the NATO designation of Shipwreck is inappropriate it should ‘Carrier Battle group Wreck’ rather than mere shipwreck. It is role as Battle Group BFG (Big Freidly Giant - Ronald Dahl) it also carriers a very impressive, by any standard (and really it can afford to – it’s not lacking in space to put it) air defence arrangement. Working out in range from the ship, the SA-N-9 Gauntlet, which uses the same 9M330 missile as its land based version. They are stored within rotary VLS modules, the missiles are positioned in 4 clusters of launchers comprising of six modules, totalling 192 missiles (each module contains 8 missiles), and mounted flush to the deck. Fire control is handled by the 3R95 multi-channel FC system (Cross Swords). This system is comprised of two complimenting radar sets, a G-band target acquisition radar and a K-band target engagement radar. This gives the system a good degree of flexibility because the G-band is constantly scanning the area even when the K-band is focused on a target. To maintain its 360 degree view it the G-band part of the system is actually two mechanically scanned (so quite a slow system when compared to Aegis) parabolic mounted radars. However, the K-band is electronically scanned phased array reflection type antenna, which is closer to the Aegis, the best thing about this technology though is that it can track and guide eight missiles to four targets simultaneously. These missiles have a maximum range of 12km, but a speed of 850m/s, not as fast as some but with accuracy, the time it takes too travel this distance is about 14s, whilst not as fast the Seawolf or SMs it is not a system a pilot or an officer planning a missile strike can discount.

The next envelope out from this is that created by the constant throughout these Russian cruisers, the SA-N-6 Grumble, however the Kirov’s got a special version, or rather RFS Pytor Velikiy did – the others will probably be upgrade, in the fullness of time, with full consideration of all economic strictures and work labour contexts. This is the S-300FM Fort-M sometimes referred to as SA-N-20, it introduced the new 48N6 missile. This has a speed of Mach 6, compared to Mach 4.5 of the original, and is capable of a maximum engagement speed of up to Mach 8.5. Added to this the warhead size has been increased to 150 kg; most importantly though the maximum engagement range was increased to 150 km as well as opening the altitude envelope to 10m-27 km; time therefore from launch to maximum range is 72.5s. Another advantage of the upgrade missiles was that they introduced the best so far track-via-missile guidance method, which brought with it the ability to intercept short-range ballistic missiles.

However, this system would be useless with bad information, therefore it is combined with the TOMB STONE MOD radar, rather than TOP DOME radar used in the previous. As an added layer of insurance both naval versions of this system are believed to include a secondary infrared terminal seeker, similar to the newer US Standard missile system, probably to reduce the system's vulnerability to saturation. This would also have the theoretical capability of allowing the missile to be used to engage contacts over the radar horizon, such as warships or sea-skimming anti-ship missiles – although there have been no reports of this being the case.

Added to all this, RFS Pytor Velikiy, and one must presume the others of the class once they are back in service. Like all large Soviet designed ships, and something which has carried on into the new Russian navy, the anti submarine armament is almost over the top; they mount the SS-N-15 Starfish rocket torpedo, 2x RBU-1000 305 mm ASW rocket launchers, 2x RBU-12000 (Udav-1) 254 mm ASW rocket launchers, and 10 533 mm ASW/ASuW torpedo tubes. Centreline aft, overlooking the helicopter deck is a twin AK-130 130 mm/L70 dual purpose gun.
The level of CIWS varies between the vessels, for example Nakhimov & Pytor Velikiy have 6 separate CADS-N-1 Kashtan missile/gun system whilst Lazarev, the one apparently destined for the Chinese mounts 8 of the AK-630 hex Gatling 30 mm/L60 PD guns. Both these systems are fairly comprehensive in the cover they afford their vessels, however the Kashtan system is considered to be a very innovative and effective design by all whom have come in close contact with it.

The last class to be considered is that which makes up almost 75% of the cruisers in the world, this class is of course the almost ubiquitous (as far as their presence in conflict goes) Ticonderoga class of US Navy. USS Port Royal CG-73

They were revolutionary when they were first launched with SPY-1 electronically scanned phased array radar; although originally they were classified as destroyers, it was only after the capability of the Aegis combat system was realised that the class was reclassified as cruisers. In addition to the added radar capability, the Ticonderoga class built after the 5th in class, Thomas S. Gates, are outfitted with two then revolutionary VLS. Theses allow the ship to have 122 launch tubes that can carry a wide variety of missiles, including the Tomahawk cruise missile, the Standard surface-to-air missile(SM-1 & 2, and apparently the future 3 & 6), the Evolved Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile, and the ASROC anti-submarine missile. More importantly, the VLS enables all missiles to be on full stand-by at any given time, shortening the ship's response time. The original five ships, including the Thomas S. Gates, had MK. 26 twin arm launchers which limited their missile capacity to a total of 88 missiles, and could not fire the Tomahawk missile. After the end of the Cold War, the lower capabilities of the original five ships limited them to home-waters duties. The classes rather overcrowded superstructure (in fact it is a very ‘fiddly’ design), inherited from the Spruance class destroyers, required two of the radar transceivers to be mounted on a special pallet on the portside aft corner of the superstructure, with the other two mounted on the forward starboard corner. This meant that the weight of the ships, 1,500 tons heavier than the Spruance’s, and more importantly the position of the weight in the vessel; resulted in a highly-stressed hull and some structural problems in early service, although these were mostly corrected before the 1st Gulf War. Due to the differences between the first 5 of the class and the rest, they are sometimes treated as almost separate classes the Mark 26 (or just 26), and the Mark 41 (or just 41). For the purposes of this blog I will also treat them thus, with the intent of using their differences to examine further the role of the cruiser in the modern naval force.

The 26’s had to Mk26 double arm missile launchers, and carried a total of 88 SM-2 reloads, added to this impressive air defence capability, and against the decisions of the British MOD 20 years later, they were also fitted with two quad launchers of RGM-84 Harpoons. To supplement the missile armament the type 21s were also fitted with 2 single mounting deck guns Mark 45 5 in / 54 cal lightweight gun (fore and aft), 4 .50cal guns, and 2 Phalanx CIWS all situated to provide converging fields of fire in the event that the SM2s failed to intercept. Finally an addition any soviet designed would have been proud of 2 triple torpedo launchers mount MK32 ASW torpedoes.

The mark 41 cruisers differ only slightly on the surface, but majorly in capability. The primary difference is the use of this blogs old favourite, the Type 41 VLS, it carries in fact to 61 cell VLS, which carry any combination of RIM-66 SMs, TIM-162 ESSMs, BGM-109 Tomahawk, or RUM-139 VL-ASROC (I will explain these in further detail a bit further on). Again, like the 26s, they are fitted with the 2 quad Harpoon launchers, and have a similar gun and torpedo outfit, the only difference being the addition of 2 single 25mm cannon.

The missile systems are extensive on the Type 41, but I will start with looking at the Standard Missile or SM-2/3/6. SM-2 is the originally SAM fitted to these vessels and has a long history, so long in fact I could very easily write another blog entry on it alone, but for reasons of not wanting to make this piece to long, I will just examine a few of the variants. The first one, is the now truly ‘standard’ standard missile; the SM-2 Medium Range Block IIIB or RIM-66M, with a range of about 160km, it has more advanced targeting system than the previous versions, which included a dual semi-active/infrared seek for terminal guidance; a system which is optimised to cope with the high levels of jamming, and decoying used by modern combat aircraft. Combined with all this technology is a speed of Mach 3.5, and an unspecified G capability; but it’s probably not that low. Unfortunately though, this missile system good though it is does not even begin to take full advantage of the Aegis’s radar capability. The RIM-156 SM-2 Extended Range (SM-2ER) Block IV has an extended range of 185.2km, something which will built on again by the SM-6 generation of missiles (even though this will probably be classified as MR, compared the next). The SM-3 (pictured left launch from USS Lake Erie to destroy the statelite), is the fullest development of the Aegis system, with operational range of 500km, and ceiling of 250km, the SM-3 is not only a ship based anti-ballistic missile, an anti-satellite weapon (as long as they are in a low earth orbit), it is also a very capable, typically American, Surface to Air Missile. This system makes all previous weapons mounted by Aegis ships look like the really were, an average weapon attached to a very much above average detection system.

The Ticonderoga cruisers do of course not only stop aircraft, unlike the Royal Navy’s Type 45 Daring class destroyers, they also stop ships, and for this they use they primarily use Harpoon, although of course the Type 41s can use Tomahawks – but I will get those in a second. Both the 26s and the 41s mount the Harpoon, with a speed of 850km/h or 236m/s, a range of 75km, and warhead of 221kg, it hardly matches up to the Shipwreck, but it is a capability, and Harpoon has proved itself a reliable and capable weapon.

The Type 41s of course gain to weapons with their Type 41 VLS, the Tomahawk and the Asroc. The Asroc or more precisely the RUM-139 VL-ASROC, which carries a Type 46 torpedo – it has a range of 28kms, and provides a measure of extended support the vessels ASW helicopters; something which the Russians had always done, and the Americans perfected. The party piece that practically everyone knows about, thanks in large part to the prolific way the Americans wage war, is the Tomahawk, possibly the best know cruise missile ever made. Its rasin d’etra is that it has a range of 2,500km, and all though its not fast (only 30km/h faster than the Harpoon), the range combined with the accuracy had made it a war winner. A note which I am adding, in contrast to what the Wikipedia entry for the Tomahawk claims, the Sylver A70 launcher can carry the new French cruise missile, the Daring class mount the Sylver A50 which can’t, none of the Sylver launchers can accommodate the Tomahawk.

This weaponry is, as is usual, dependent on that which sees for it, unfortunately I am not able to talk much about it, as not much is available for certain (and I prefer to report facts as a rule). What is known is the AN/SPY-1 is primarily a phased array 3D Air-search radar transmitting an S band frequency, with a detection range well in excess of a hundred nautical miles, and is considered the most powerful radar afloat.

So cruisers, the weapons suggest that they are multi-role combatants, and this is true, they are often the pickets or core ships of naval task force; they are big escorts which support all others, in the cases of the Kirov and Ticonderoga classes, they mobile ABM weapon platforms, something for which their size and the power systems it can accommodate are necessary. The range of weaponry they carry also shows, the range of wartime roles they will fill – picket and core ship sounds so limiting, compared to primary strike co-ordinator, principle air-warfare vessel, command ship, and my personal favourite lone ranger. That cruisers are useful is beyond doubt, that China and maybe other nations will consider joining this at the moment very exclusive band is also beyond doubt; the more important question to my mind, is why wouldn’t a nation which is building every other component of a naval force build a cruiser? It would seem to my humble mind a error of tactical judgement to not do so; although strategic judgement might find the cost an issue.