August 2013 Thoughts: Ballistic Missile Defence

Ballistic Missiles are not a new threat any more, they have been a part of warfare since the V-2 first roared into the sky on a pillar of fire, smoke and anger at a world which refused to fit a dictator’s vision for it. Ever since that event the evolving forms of ballistic missiles have maintained a sort of sinister hold on the world and the public’s interpretation of international relations & global strategy. Even today the debate about them and their role as the method of delivery for Britain’s strategic deterrent; the only thing that cannot be doubted is there effectiveness as a method of delivery – in fact though the arguments for it’s continuation and the construction of a new class of Ship, Submersible, Ballistic Missile, Nuclear Powered (SSBN) to succeed the Vanguard class. However, whilst this funding is rightly being spent on this strategic deterrent; the procurement of a defence against these weapons is stagnated. 

Which is a problem as Britain has a lot to defend, and a lot to defend it against: America is not in range of Iranian missiles but the UK is, furthermore more nations are procuring them and as that happens there becomes greater risk of them falling into the hands on non-state actors (e.g. terrorists) who may not be deterred by theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) which works so well against state actors. Whilst such a system might not be the most deadly weapons a terrorist could use, the very ability to get hold of one and fire it would inflict a tremendous level of terror. This is a risk magnified when states with such weapons have internal conflicts erupt as it’s difficult to predict not just the winner, but who will control the weapons and what will happen to them. This is why it’s necessary to do a two pronged approach to Ballistic Missile Defence, maintaining the deterrent but also developing an intercept capability – for which there are multiple options.

The proposed defences against ballistic missiles are varied, using a laser fired from a Boeing 747, land based missiles (of course) and sea based missiles – the difference between all of them being the point  at which the aim to intercept the missile. The Boeing 747 is orientated dealing with the missiles in, although it’s still under development; the ground based missiles are mostly focused on either terminal or mid phase interception, and the sea based missiles are theoretically boost phase and terminal phase – but they are mainly focused on the latter. The sea based systems are currently the most proven, in that one of the systems, Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)/AEGIS,  have been used to intercept satellites & practice targets successfully and are based on a legacy design which is as close to a proven program as can be found in modern defence systems[1]. So which system would best fit Britain; well conceivably any of them, but as there are now existing land based long range air defence batteries within the UK armed forces, and the costs are still mounting on the airborne laser…furthermore there already in service capabilities which could be built upon.

For the sea based system there are the Type 45 Daring class Area Air Defence (AAD) Destroyers, these have two radars, a long range search radar, the S1850M  L-Band system which provides it with excellent long range warning; but it’s the other radar which is something special. The Royal Navy (RN) has possibly what is the best radar in service in the field of sea based Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), the Sampson radar, it is a two plane solid state phased array radar that rotates 30x a minute so that even without electronic steering of the beam (which it can do) no sector will escape scanning for more than a second. Therefore it builds a very accurate image of the world around it; well the over half a million kilometres squared. So with such a set of radars mounted on a vessel which also includes a very stable power supply and an extremely powerful set of computers; the RN would seem to have Britain in a position half way to the finish line.

There are problems though, the Type 45s are fitted for but not with 16 Strategic length Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells[2] – these are the length required to support a missile big enough to intercept Ballistic Missiles. There are two options for that VLS that would be compatible; the European Sylver A70 and the American Mk41/Mk57 VLS – however these systems themselves generate a further problem, as each system comes with it’s own range of other missiles that can be operated from it – not just BMD missiles, but also cruise missiles and more.

The Sylver A70 VLS would seem the obvious choice as it is the A50 which the Type 45s are already fitted with. However, it is only in service with one navy on one class of ship, the French FREMM Frigate, meaning that it isn’t widely tested nor widely resourced – making it more expensive long term as parts will be more specialist to procure. The biggest problem though is the fact that the BMD system that goes with it, doesn’t matter if it’s called Aster 45 or Aster 30 Block 2 BMD is still under development and everything is categorised as ‘potential contributor’ – it could be a really good system, but by the time it may enter service the Type 45s could have already served half their expected life… However, until then the RN could share a the 500km/270nautical mile range SCALP Naval (the surface launched version of the Storm Shadow which is expected in service with RAF Typhoons in 2014 – it’s already in service with RAF Tornadoes) to provide them with a tactical land attack capability. In summary, it’s a lot of promise, a lot of potential, a very big chance to spend money to not get much back…

In contrast the Mk41/Mk57 VLS (Mk57 is supposed to be its new & improved successor, it’s currently looking like a Fairey Albacore situation, better than its predecessor but not by enough to be really desired) is possibly the widest employed VLS in service today, serving 13 countries & 22 different classes of ship. Furthermore, it’s the system which has always been given as what the Type 45 had the space for – something which is not just due to its credentials for launching the SM-3 BMD system, which as has already been discussed is in service with two nations, has shot down satellites (a very useful secondary capability considering the reliance modern warfare has on them) and is in use by two navy’s with another looking into it, so the RN would not be left to carry the costs on its own…and there would be other nations with which to pool supplies in emergencies. The reason it was in the frame from the beginning was because the Mk41/Mk57 brings flexibility, it brings the RUM-139 Vertically Launched - Anti-Submarine Rocket (VL-ASROC) which can assist tremendously with Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) as when the helicopter runs out of torpedoes, instead of it having to fly back and loose the target in order to reload, the ship launches the torpedo using the data from the helicopter. Most importantly though the Mk41/Mk57 is the system that launches the 1,700 km/900nautical mile ranged Block IV Tomahawk cruise missile (that’s over 3x the range of Storm Shadow), a system which is already used by RN submarines. Simply put the MK41/57 would turn the Type 45 from an AAD into a General Purpose Missile Destroyer (GPMD).

Even if 16 cells are all that can be fitted the Mk41 VLS would be useful, as 16 cells could be translated into 6 SM-3’s, 2 ASROCs and 8 Tomahawk TLAMs which would be a very good addition to the Type 45’s already capable 48 SAMs; something which could also be changed should CAMM replace the Aster 15, after all four CAMM can fit in the same cell as one ASTER 15 meaning the missile load could become 37 Aster 30, 36 CAMM for the same 48 cells. However, this would not be it’s only form/load; if going to sea as UK Patrol ship (where the vessel would be unlikely to use TLAMs) the destroyer might be loaded as a BMD/ASW vessel with 10 SM-3s and 6 ASROCs alongside the 37 Aster 30s & 36 CAMMs; or alternatively she might be part of a task group being sent to launch a strike, in which case whilst one vessel might carry 12 SM-3s and 4 TLAMs, the others would carry 16 TLAMS[3]. Finally, there is the black scenario – a RN destroyer operating in the pacific far from resupply uses up all it’s missiles, with a MK41 VLS that’s already fitted for SM-3 missiles she could be reloaded (conceivably with minor modifications) with SM-6 missiles the new standard missile air defence system. It’s not a full proof solution, but it provides an option for worst case scenarios. This is why that while Sylver does offer some capability, the Mk41 beats it as a strategic VLS for procurement by the RN because of the diversity of weapons.  

The radars & design make them perfect vessels for BMD – which would give them another role they could excel at; the choice of VLS could make the Type 45s so much more. The Sylver locks it in, whereas the MK 41 allows it to evolve. Furthermore it would set a precedence and maybe that would help with future arguments over escort numbers, because with 6 ships for AAD/BMD/Strike it could well seem sensible to expand building plans and at least provide more extensive numbers for AAD & Strike; perhaps increasing the Type 26s, or building a lot more general purpose Type 45s. Britain is an island nation, so often that is left as some de-facto reason to invest in a navy; not in this case though, the sea is Britain’s strategic depth, we don’t have Marshal Winter we have Admirals Storm & Wave – BMD making use of that depth is the best way to provide Britain and our overseas territories which depend upon us (as we benefit from the resources within their domain) to provide security for Britain.

Further Reading:                             

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/630a858923ec

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[1] The system is already in service with the United States Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force, with Turkey considering it.

[2] This would be in addition to their 48 Air Defence length Sylver A50 Cells + some sources have said in the past it was up to 24 cells – whatever the truth, between the current VLS and the superstructure where currently the Harpoon SSMs would go, but conceivably they could be moved, and in fact two of the class already aren’t fitted with them.

[3] if just 3 Type 45s were present that would be 44 TLAMs or more than the collective TLAM load out of the RN submarines

The Logic of Cuts....not that logical

In the current debate on cuts, all that is spoken about are Carriers, Typhoon fighters and other major projects; but is the right place to look? Britain maintains at great expense bases in Germany, Saudi Arabia and many others; but do we need them? And if not; why have these bases at all? These bases are cold war relics, the aircraft carriers are not – the RN needed them in the cold war but the RAF and Army vetoed them; hence the Falklands War problems. Even worse the bases in Germany are still defended with the visage of Hitler...if we leave he may rise up again; he won’t, he is dead; we do not need them anymore. What about the bases in Saudi Arabia, surely with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq they are worth the money...the short answer is no. Britain and the US were not allowed to use them in either conflict, and in fact Saudi Arabian bases are too far away to be of much use, if any, in Afghanistan. So to sum up these bases; they provide a rallying call for Islamic extremists, they provide no tactical assistance at all, with bases in Iraq they have lost their strategic value, and they cost money! These bases are of course the only ones; there are a multitude of Airbases and other facilities around the world that Britain purchases access to through the expenditure of hard currency. These bases, which may well never be used, but if such facilities were needed could be far more cost effectively provide by an aircraft carrier; after all aircraft carriers are built and maintained in Britain, their crews live in Britain, they do not employ foreign citizens in foreign lands, they do not take funds out of the nations own economy, in fact they often stimulate growth in the home technology and service industries.

The other accusations thrown at the Royal Navy is its fighting the last war...always an interesting accusation, this though should not be considered always a bad thing as it is represented; it is considered a sign of good character to learn from ones past actions, to not do so is a sign of immaturity. Therefore, learning from past actions:

• 1982 Falklands War, dependent on naval airpower for the entire campaign, one must ask the question...what would the outcome have been had the RN had a decent carrier? Would the war have taken place in the first place?
• 1991 Gulf War, carrier based aircraft provide arguably the most efficient 50% of the tactical air support, as well as also provide
• 1995 Bosnia & 1999 Kosovo, whilst being peacekeeping operations the preferred air support for the Peacekeepers was called from carriers...the reason being that it was felt the nice safe USAF and RAF bases in Italy damaged moral by bringing down massive airstrikes of a strategic nature, and then leaving, going home nice and safe and beyond easy call back range (unlike their carrier counterparts); whilst the peacekeepers were taken hostage or fired at by angry participants.
• 2001 Afghanistan, beyond the range of many land bases, the key troops were inserted by helicopter from amphibious ships, and whilst air support was provided by USAF from bases in central Asia, those bases themselves are now being closed by internal politics of host nations.
• 2003 Gulf War 2, due to the denial of land bases to USAF and RAF, the USN were the key providers of air support, providing at times up to 90% of the tactical air support, and with cruise missiles included a minimum of 54% of the strategic air strikes.
  

Finally I put forward these figures for your consideration before conclusion:
But he has a problem: so much of what the Navy does is invisible. Be it anti-drugs patrols in the Caribbean, anti-piracy patrols off Somalia, mine clearance in the Persian Gulf or intelligence gathering by nuclear-powered attack submarines, naval operations rarely make the news. The Royal Marines, the Navy's infantry, have distinguished themselves in Afghanistan but when a television viewer sees a Marine he or she is likely to think Army. The contribution of Fleet Air Arm Harrier and helicopter pilots to the campaign is also rarely noted. If it flies it must be RAF.
When the Navy did make the headlines in March 2007 it was in the most humiliating circumstances. Fifteen Marines and sailors from the frigate Cornwall were captured by the Iranians while inspecting vessels in the Persian Gulf. Images of detainees smiling their way through captivity were compounded by the inexplicable decision to allow several to sell their stories. Nelsonian it was not.
But public relations are only a part of it. Why does Britain, which shed its global empire nearly a half a century ago, need a blue-water Navy? Why not a brown-water one, a vestigial coastal defence force? The answer lies in some figures.
The United Kingdom remains a crowded archipelago of 61 million people reliant on maritime traffic for its survival. Shipping carries 92 per cent of British trade, as compared to less than one per cent carried by air. Tanker traffic – oil, chemicals and liquefied natural gas (LNG) – accounts for nearly 40 per cent of total maritime trade movements. LNG is central to future energy needs, with imports expected to rise by half in three years. The British-owned merchant fleet may not be the colossus it once was but still weighs in at 20 million tons. The raw materials and finished goods on which the UK depends must use nine global choke points which are easily blocked, and the country is still enmeshed in a network of treaties and informal arrangements requiring a naval presence. There is also the nuclear deterrent, a naval responsibility for 40 years..
"All truly great powers are maritime powers," says Lee Willett, senior naval analyst at the Royal United Services Institute. "Navies allow you to operate when and where you want, over the horizon or as a visible presence helping to prevent conflict."
From an Article in the Telegraph by Neil Tweedie (The Navy strikes back)
Published: 7:00AM BST 18 Jun 2009

So what am I saying with all this? I am saying that if the reason you have a base is political commitment it is cheaper for a ship to make a port call every so often than to maintain a base which is a tie to a particular regime, a particular set of commitments and of course a far larger cost; after all a corvette could visit many countries in an 18 month period, hold many drinks parties, and cause many occasions for everyone to get dressed up; but most importantly if you don’t like that countries human rights, or the current government it can skip past and visit their next door neighbour whom you do like.
I am saying that before the RAF and Army go pointing the finger at the RN they should take a look at their own budgets, and ask if they really need multiple jungle training bases, when most of the army is so over stretched I am surprised they still have time for basic training.
However what I am really trying say is you cannot fight 2 Major Regional Conflicts, 1 Minor Regional Conflicts and have commitments numbered in the double figures each requiring the maintenance of garrisons numbered in treble figures on a budget which is actually less than the average peace time commitment of funds; when compared to comparative powers, whose governments sign them up for less resource drains.

The simple fact I am arguing therefore, is that the forces need more funds not less, they need to stop fighting each other, and fight together to get these funds. I am arguing the Navy needs 3 aircraft carriers* (but it is just getting 2 and only half of the JSFs deployed on them will belong to it), 18 destroyers (it asked for 12 but it is getting 6) and at least 48 corvettes (asked for none, but they are cheaper and if you have 18 destroyers to provide core of escort fleet will do all that needs to be done whilst providing increased worldwide presence); the Army needs an extra 16 battalions of mechanised infantry (with decent armoured vehicles), an extra 8 squadrons of attach choppers as well as transport helicopters and they need new vehicles...desperately; the Air Force has fared the best in some ways under the current climate, but it is still suffering, it might have got its Typhoons but they need to be modified to Tranche 3 level to be able to carry the bombs and other munitions they need to support the army on the ground, they need helicopters to support the troops as well (if they don’t want them then they should allow the other services to buy them). I am also for the greater building of UAVs and amphibious forces; as I believe and will be posting on this in the future that sea basing is the future of humanitarian intervention, due to the benefits for keeping western troops especially out off bases which are surrounded by groups whom may turn hostile at any moment; however this article is focusing on the procurement of the platforms those systems would operate off.

The conclusion is this, the forces have been cut, further than they should of been, further than they would have been if the government had actually thought about more than the cost before making decsions. There is an old saying 'the price of everything and the value of nothing' well successive British governments have fitted this addage, they no price of armoured vehicle but not its value to the men sheltering behind it as they try their uptmost to carry out orders which will make their political masters happy, the know price of destroyer but they don't understand why the navy needs them, they don't think...what will that be used for? these masters know the cost of every nut and bolt of the aircraft they purchase, yet still they do not think...if that will be used for Combat Air Support...why did we not order the fittings for bombs to be attached? The unfortunate thing is this is likely to continue, until someone listens, and I don't mean to bloggers, to senior officers and former grandees, I mean to the facts, to the actual facts that are presented to them when they are presented honestly; and instead of just hearing the price tag they might hear what it does, and then might just buy what the forces need, rather than buying what looks good and costs right.

*3 carriers actually work out better value for money than 2, especially if the bases are closed, as they provide a guarantee of at least one read for operations immediately, and one either on operations or able to come online within 2 days.

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singing to the choir is good...as long as you can get the choir to sing to other people as well

yours sincerly

Alex