Showing posts with label United Kingdom. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United Kingdom. Show all posts

Monday, 9 December 2013

November 2013 Thoughts: Some Ideas on Amphibious Armour

Reason for writing: I’ve been reading a lot of books on armoured warfare for various reasons lately, and combined with seeing many articles about this topic I decided to write some of my own ideas up.
Introduction:
The armour market is growing worldwide[i], this is not to say infantry are no more as some commentators assert[ii], but in all likelihood, there is going to be an increasing level of armouring of the vehicles those infantry use and a greater level of interconnection between the two. There is one area of warfare where this is especially true, amphibious warfare, with shrinking forces[iii] and an increasing reliance upon helicopters[iv] many could be excused for thinking that armour is not that bigger part of amphibious warfare. Certainly those who focus on the UK’s approach to amphibious warfare would notice a distinct disparity between the need, the theory and the reality of the situation. This lack of pre-eminence in portrayal though is not true to the actuality of operational requirements, as for units which are assaulting or holding an objective, taking part in Raiding, Expeditionary Warfare or Island Warfare armour provides a capability that enables them to move around the battlefield with a degree of protection (in some cases directly from ship to shore[v]), gives units fire support (sometimes used as a shield/base of fire to allow infantry to manoeuvre) and provides a large measure of auxiliary support by providing mobile command hubs, engineering support and supplies. However, the lack of pre-eminence could well be because of the factors which affect this area of warfare, and whilst much of the modern world has seen an increasing specialisation of equipment and multiplication of vehicles; whereas in amphibious warfare because of the constraints of logistics (literally space on the ships to fit everything) the vehicles need to be more flexible and are limited in number.
Outline of Operational Conditions:
One of the major advantages of an amphibious force over an airborne force is that when it arrives, it arrives in full force with all its heavy equipment, logistics, personnel and extensive support facilities with it. This does not mean it does not face a heft obstacle, just as airborne must run the gauntlet of fighters, surfaces to air missiles and artillery (along with the possibility of being dropped on a minefield or surrounded by an awake/alert enemy[vi]); a fleet must deal with the enemy naval forces, minefields, coastal batteries and the enemy air force, although of course this again will be a fleet on fleet operation. For example, in the Falkland’s war the Carrier Battle Group under Rear Admiral Woodward (flag in HMS Hermes[vii]) and the submarines under the Vice Admiral Herbert (flag in HMS Warrior – aka the Northwood Command Center[viii]) first cleared the area of enemy fleet activity, and then the Amphibious Task Group under Commodore Clapp (Pennant in HMS Fearless[ix]) came in to land 3rd Commando Brigade (commander Brigadier Julian Thompson[x]) – something they conducted in the face of almost constant heavy enemy air attacks[xi]. Coincidentally for this report, after the war was over many officers expressed their belief that more armour should have been taken with them as a force multiplier – that the eight light tanks they took were not enough[xii].
The principle types of warfare/missions expected by amphibious forces haven’t really changed in centuries, but they are each demanding in their own way[xiii]:
·         Expeditionary Warfare – this covers everything from opposed amphibious invasions, to administrative landings to reinforce allies; basically it’s anything where the purpose is to take or hold territory ashore.
·         Island Warfare – different from expeditionary in that, whilst expeditionary at some point (unless sea basing is preferred[xiv]) logistics will move ashore, in Island warfare the repeated assaults as a force moves along a chain and the limited room for manoeuvre means that sea basing will be a necessity for the operation as will a dependence upon sea power[xv] throughout to provide fire support.
·         Extractions – think Dunkirk, not something any modern commander is likely to want to discuss, as like then it’s not planned for – but, if it does happen the likelihood is that amphibious forces will not only be called upon to assist in the extraction, but maybe to provide cover for the extraction as such forces thanks to their training are certainly more suited as the final wave. This is especially true in the case of amphibious armour which can provide fire support/cover, and then ‘extract’ itself without having to wait for landing craft.  
·         Raiding – think Norway in World War II[xvi], Somalia counter-piracy[xvii], even Special Forces operations (although those are a smaller part of this than often imagined)
The fact is amphibious forces could be sent anywhere in the world and whilst infantry are all terrain/all environment mobile; vehicles as a rule are less so. A vehicle which is excellent for the terrain of Artic and Mountain warfare might be virtually useless in the environment of the dessert - a situation compounded by such vehicles often having small production runs that’s it difficult to justify the per unit expense of making them more flexible. In all these environments though armour plays similar but also different roles, whilst in the desert and grassy plains the greatest advantage armour offers is manoeuvre, in the similarly open expense of tundra that is less useful than the protection it offers against the elements. For amphibious armour this is complicated over and above by the necessity to be able to operate in the corrosive salt water environment, to have an ability to manoeuvre by water, which can confer advantages for land operations (i.e. not being stopped by river obstacles), but for which the principle function is to allow them to conduct their own assaults – in Island Warfare they might ‘hop’ directly from one island to another under their own power without using ships for the transit at all[xviii]. Of course not all nations have chosen to retain this attribute for their amphibious armour, some nations have (for want of a better word) regressed from the level they achieved during the Second World War whilst of course many others have pushed forward from no capability to a limited capability in that regard.
Outline of Design:
The core idea would be that this would be as closely inter-related a family vehicles of possible, allowing for the maximum amount of force and spares to be carried, whilst also fulfilling the roles required. What is important to remember with vehicles these days it’s not the weapons, the structure or the mechanics which cost the money it’s the electronics and the training – therefore the more economies of scale that can be built in to a force, the better it will be from a Treasury and Tax Payer perspective. Something which would hopefully be balanced with the ability of such a system to have more capability and versatility built into it – therefore the better for personnel in the forces that go to defend the national interests of a government and its taxpayers.
Ideally, because of the problem limited space and distance, the system designed/chosen should be as homogenous a system as possible. For example it might be worthwhile looking into having one wheeled and one tracked chassis: with the track taking medium to heavy roles – Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), Tank, Artillery and Engineering (both Combat and Recovery), and the wheeled taking light to medium roles – Armoured Personal Carrier (APC)/Scout, Command(Radios that move in formation), Anti-Air, Radar, Medical and Logistics. They could be adapted so that they all used combinations of the same power pack; just whereas the Scout/APC vehicle might have just two power packs, the tank, Artillery and Engineering would all need perhaps four to move the weight. This would work by having a fuel tank with multiple connections slots for the power packs, and each drive wheel (whether tracked or wheeled) would have its own independent electric drive engine, which could draw power from the circuit the power packs would slot into. This would offer great resilience against damage, as if drive engines or even power packs went down there would be capability retained to allow for some movement.
The design could go even further that just chassis as with both vehicles being modular, allowing them to be converted in the field from one type to another (perhaps the engineering vehicle would carry a crane that could do the job); preferably this would include to the ability for the ‘modules’ to be switched between chassis[xix]. This would mean that if necessary a tracked chassis could be used for logistics if the terrain demanded or a wheeled used as an engineering vehicle – for this reason both sets of vehicles would have to have space built in for maximum power packs, space which could be used for extra storage (something no APC could ever have enough off) when not needed for power.
In terms of weaponry/turrets this interchangeability could go further with for example the APC/Scout and IFV could using the same turret. Beyond this the same gun, although different turret might well be used for the tank and artillery vehicle, although that would involve some standardisation that might be difficult. This would be because tank guns are currently 120mm calibre and self-propelled artillery is usually 155mm calibre; the obvious solution would be to go down to 105mm, which is the standard for light artillery and was until fairly recently used as a tank calibre, it would also have the benefit of allowing more rounds to be carried. This is important, especially when the primary role of any tank in amphibious operations is fire support rather than anti-tank, meaning rounds is more important than tank killing – in other words what increased calibre gives a tank is not so important. Added to this anti-tank missile capability could be more usefully given APC/Scouts because as well as giving them an anti-armour capability it would give them anti-installation capability. Therefore providing extra fire support for troops, as well as providing a practical ambush tool for raids and fighting withdrawals; in addition to the offensive power they would confer on the units.
Air defence in the case of UK, and perhaps other nations could copy, would of course offer the most utility thanks to the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile (CAMM)[xx]; a system which is going to be deployed upon aircraft, ships and vehicles. This system is therefore perfect for amphibious warfare from a logistical point of view, as the ships could in emergencies directly support the maintenance. So of course this would be perfect air defence missile for the Air Defence module of this family of vehicles to use. Although undoubtedly in time other nations will develop similar systems.
Finally there is armour, modular additions of armour are nothing new, but it being designed in from the very beginning as part of a completely modular vehicle set would be useful; especially if different types of armour were available. For example if light Kevlar plates were able to be added on where the terrain was soft, heavy armour available for when lower speed urban warfare  was likely, and a medium type of armour for when manoeuvre warfare is the likely operational scenario. These of course are not the only options, reactive armour with blast panels might be the desired option for facing opponents with large numbers of anti-tank missiles; or electrical armour – the point is that this would be another adaptable, tailor-able part of each vehicle.  
Fundamentally what is proposed is a family; no one vehicle is a panacea for all the problems that will be faced, but every one of the vehicles will be able to be adapted to what is needed – most importantly for an amphibious force the logistics, maintenance and training would be simplified allowing for focus on more important operational matters.  
Summary:
The second question (the first being “do we really need it?”) which seems to come after any examination of modern equipment, is “will it have an export market?” - The answer in this case would be unequivocally yes. For those nations seeking cost effective specialisation with future proofing, for those nations with large areas of low infrastructure, for coastal nations with limited strategic depth/room for manoeuvre and of course nations wishing to expand/develop a regional or global amphibious capability.
The purpose of these thoughts was to look at an idea for a modular amphibious armour system that would encompass both wheeled and tracked vehicles, light, medium or heavy, and every task from battlefield taxi to the firepower backbone, from command hub to scout, heavy mover to medical and all the rest. It is an idea which would not be easy to implement, it would be revolutionary but it would also be dangerous as it could of course leas to one company getting a monopoly on armoured production; unless the patent was owned by the government and the rights to build modules/components to that design was opened to all bidders, would (conversely) in all probability actually diversify supply because not all companies could compete to build a whole vehicle, but a module would be less of a challenge for smaller company to take on.
The final capability which such a system would bring, and probably it’s most important attribute would be adaptability – no longer would a force go to war with eight tanks, thirty two APCs, and so on, instead a commander would have X number of tracked and X number wheeled vehicles to be adapted (within reason) as required by circumstance (especially with the cranes aboard the amphibious ships they could be adapted en route). This would mean a brigade commander could look at the terrain and then orientate the vehicles for weight criteria, manoeuvrability, firepower – whatever they decide is necessary. Something which would a tremendous advantage for the forces being sent and a complication for the enemy as it would be virtually impossible for them to predict what was going to be coming at them in anything but the broadest of terms.




[i] (Elwell 2013, DefenceIQ 2013, ASDReports 2012)


[ii] Rather strangely because a tank cannot (for example) take or protect a building, there are other things as well and as long as these missions need to be done, infantry will be needed.



[iv] (Federation of American Scientists 1998, Gertz 2013)



[vi] (Ryan 1974)


[vii] (Woodward and Robisnon 1992, paperback edition 2003)


[viii] (Clapp and Southby-Tailyour 1997)


[ix] (Clapp and Southby-Tailyour 1997)


[x] (Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands 2007)


[xi] (Clapp and Southby-Tailyour 1997, Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing, A Commando's view of the Falklands War 2003)


[xii] (Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands 2007, Clapp and Southby-Tailyour 1997)


[xiii] (Lovering 2007)




[xvi] (Lovering 2007)


[xvii] (The Telgraph 2011, Williams and Drury 2011)


[xviii] This of course raises the question whether or not the operations is actually an amphibious operation, because if D-Day doesn’t qualify because it was launched from UK’s southern coast with ship’s merely acting as ferries (in fact is considered a rather large ‘river’ crossing), then an operation where the armour takes itself and infantry from one island to another without even involving a ship would seem to be iffy. The key criteria though is that they are supported by ship logistics, command and most often ‘artillery’ wise, which lends it amphibious attributes, that combined with it being conducted by amphibious forces is why it is put under Amphibious Warfare.


[xix] This is nothing new suggesting this, but it has yet to be turned into reality (Kable Intelligence Limited 2013, Army Recognition 2013, Kable Intelligence Limited 2013, Army Recognition 2013, Canadian American Strategic Review 2012, Greg 2010, ArmyGuide 2008)


[xx] (MBDA Missile Systems 2013)



Bibliography


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—. "Havoc 8X8 Armoured modular vehicle personnel carrier." Army Recognition. 2013. http://www.armyrecognition.com/us_army_wheeled_and_armoured_vehicle_uk/havoc_apc_8x8_modular_armoured_personnel_carrier_vehicle_technical_data_sheet_specifications_picture.html (accessed December 08, 2013).

ArmyGuide. "Panther MLV (LMV) ." ArmyGuide. 2008. http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product1594.html (accessed December 08, 2013).

ASDReports. "Global Armoured Vehicle Upgrade & Retrofit Market 2013-2023." ASDReports. May 01, 2012. https://www.asdreports.com/shopexd.asp?id=14855 (accessed December 08, 2013).

Canadian American Strategic Review. "Background – TAPV Project – BAE Systems HΓ€gglunds Alligator." Canadian American Strategic Review. June 08, 2012. http://www.casr.ca/bg-army-tapv-bae-alligator.htm (accessed December 08, 2013).

Clapp, Michael, and Ewen Southby-Tailyour. Amphibious Assault Falklands, The Battle of San Carlos Water. London: Orion Books, 1997.

DefenceIQ. "Asia driving global armoured vehicle market growth." DefenceIQ. 2013. http://www.defenceiq.com/amoured-vehicles/articles/asia-driving-global-armoured-vehicle-market-growth/ (accessed December 08, 2013).

Elwell, Andrew. "Summary of global armoured vehicle market report 2013." DefenceIQ. January 01, 2013. http://www.defenceiq.com/amoured-vehicles/articles/summary-of-global-armoured-vehicle-market-report-2/ (accessed December 08, 2013).

Federation of American Scientists. "Amphibious Forces." FAS Military Analysis Network. December 07, 1998. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/amphibious.htm (accessed December 08, 2013).

Gertz, Bill. "Tensions Rise Between China, Japan; China Alarmed over U.S.-Japan tiltrotor aircraft exercise." The Washington Free Beacon. July 12, 2013. http://freebeacon.com/osprey-shown-off-in-military-exercises-with-japan/ (accessed December 08, 2013).

Greg. "First Look: BAE’s New Ground Combat Vehicle." Defencetech. July 30, 2010. http://defensetech.org/2010/07/30/first-looks-northrops-new-ground-combat-vehicle/ (accessed December 08, 2013).

Haarr, Geirr H. The Battle for Norway, April - June 1940. Barnsely: Seaforth Publishing, 2010.

Kable Intelligence Limited. "Patria AMV Armoured Modular Vehicle, Finland." Army-Technology.com. 2013. http://www.army-technology.com/projects/patria/ (accessed December 08, 2013).

—. "SEP Modular Armoured Tactical System, Sweden." Army - Technology.com. 2013. http://www.army-technology.com/projects/sep/ (accessed December 08, 2013).

Lovering, Tristan, ed. Amphibious Assault: Manouvre from the Sea. Woodbridge: Seafarer Books, 2007.

MBDA Missile Systems. "CAMM Family." MBDA Missile Systems. 2013. http://www.mbda-systems.com/products/air-dominance/camm-family/55/ (accessed December 08, 2013).

Paul, James, and Martin Spirit. "The Helicopter in Suez." Assault on the Canal. 2008. http://www.britains-smallwars.com/suez/helo.html (accessed November 25, 2013).

Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge Too Far - The Classic History of the Greatest Battle of World War II. London: A Touchstone Book published by Simon & Schuster, 1974.

Southby-Tailyour, Ewen. 3 Commando Brigade, Sometimes the best form of defence is attack. London: Random House, 2009.

—. HMS FEARLESS; The Mighty Lion. Barnesly: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2006.

—. Reasons in Writing, A Commando's view of the Falklands War. London: Leo Cooper, 2003.

The Telgraph. "Marines in daring amphibious raid in Somalia." The Telegraph. October 29, 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8857071/Marines-in-daring-amphibious-raid-in-Somalia.html (accessed December 08, 2013).

Thompson, Julian. 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands. London: Pen & Sword Military, 2007.

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Williams, David, and Ian Drury. "Elite commandos storm lawless Somali war zone to snatch tribal leader." MailOnline. October 29, 2011. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2054936/Somalia-Commandos-storm-war-zone-snatch-tribal-leader.html (accessed December 08, 2013).

Woodward, Sandy, and Patrick Robisnon. One Hundred Days, The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander. London: Harper Collins, 1992, paperback edition 2003.

 

Sunday, 1 September 2013

August 2013 Thoughts: Network Centric Warfare and the Royal Navy


Networked warfare is nothing new as a concept or practicality; a hunting party of early homo-sapiens using grunts to communicate could be considered to be working in a network. At Sea there have been many famous examples of networked warfare; Nelson’s Band of Brothers communicating by flag, hailer and shot – the different ships working in harmony, the frigates which before battle were charged with finding the enemy, during the battle became communication nodes repeating signals for the Admiral to the other ships which might not be able to see the flagship as it would be obscured by cannon smoke. During World War I the entire British war plan at sea was based upon a network of distributed different components working together in harmony thanks to the magic of radio telegraphy. In the Falkland’s war that network was to an extent regressed by the fortunes of fate and the bugbear of necessity; with some ships having to receive their orders by helicopter dropped ‘chit’ as they either were not fitted with, did not have a working set of or was so ancient it would be more dangerous to use communications system; but still it was a network. So if there have been so many networks, and it’s been around for so long, what is network centric warfare and why is it different?

Well, whereas it used to be that the network was just part of the force, a fabric of the structure but not something concentrated on itself, now it is. The idea goes that with all the parts of a network exchanging information with each other it allows all the ships commanders and most importantly the force command to achieve a level of knowledge of the battlefield, and therefore ability to co-ordinate their forces to best deal with the enemy that will revolutionise wars. The idea has been taken by some theorists to mean that it no longer matters how capable any ship is in any specific area as it is the capability of the ‘network’ as a whole which will win the battle. It’s a great theory, and when on land where resupply/replacements/reinforcements are just down the road must make a lot of sense especially for officers and ministers in charge of a cash strapped military. However, at sea ships are often on their own, thousands of miles from home and resupply, let alone replacements or reinforcements, is days if not weeks away. So upon that point network centric warfare would seem to have nothing to offer a fleet- but in reality it does, it’s just some of its principles have to be flipped. 

Instead of a fleet of specialists, interlinked together but facing the constant risk that if one ship is sunk it’s no more air defence; the network centric fleet is a four tier fleet of: 

·         ‘Capitals’; the Aviation & Amphibious ships – they are adaptable but require escorts, and mainly exist to exert direct influence on land events, although in the case of aviation ships can of course, providing they have the right aircraft, directly affect events at sea as well,

·         ‘Generalists’; the larger surface warships – which are flexible in terms of being quite good in all roles,

·         ‘Adaptables’; the smaller surface warships – which can be fitted with some sort of modular system allowing them to be easily adapted to specific roles; these are instead of having minor warfare specialist ships (i.e. Mine Counter-Measures vessels, Ocean Patrol Vessels, Oceanography Vessels and Littoral War Fighting units)

·       ‘Focuseds’; these are vessels like Submarines and Auxiliaries, but also the Aircraft that operate with the fleet - flexible within their brief but are confined within that, i.e. a Submarine can do Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Land attack if fitted with Tactical Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs), it can do them all but it can’t be easily changed or even easily integrated within the network.

If a networked Task Force/Group[1] were a human body, then the Capital ships which are the nodes of any networked fleet would be its brain, receiving and communicating with all the other units. The Generalists are the bones around which the body is formed it’s strongest parts, they provide the core structure from which all operational strength will at some point spring from and depend upon. The Adaptables are the fleets muscle, they work in a symbiotic relationship with the Generalists relying upon their strength to support their movement, whilst the Generalists rely upon them provide flexibility & dexterity. Focuseds are the eyes, the ears and the organs of the fleet, they are key to providing it with information about what’s going on around it, and are also capable of producing an impact in a more limited way…just like a glance of the eyes can silence a room. The point is all are capable and in their own way flexible, but most importantly they all need to be present for the body to work.

The point is though that all these vessels have a role when not in the task group, an Adaptable is perfectly useful as a presence/patrol ship[2], the Generalists are useful as Guardships[3]/medium status visitors, the Capitals are of course high status visitors[4] and the Focuseds; well, what they do in war time is just a faster paced higher stakes version of what they do in ‘peace’ time. The point is also that none of them are specialists, none of them if absent due to destruction, damage, or delay would cripple a fleet’s capability to act; yet when combined by the multi-bit communications systems the cumulative sum is far greater than the constituent parts on their own. However, this is a situation which is now thanks to developments in technology can be replayed upon a lower level as well.

With the development of modern unmanned systems, every ship can become a ‘capital’ with mini-task group. Unmanned Aviation Vehicles (UAVs) whilst not making every vessel an aircraft carrier can provide enough aviation capability (in terms of numbers/reach) to allow them to maintain a real time picture of what is going on beyond the horizon, unaffected by the curvature of the earth. Further to this they can of course provide communications without the need to use satelites, enabling the vessel to use ultra-secure line of sight communication systems to communicate with allies and its unmanned systems. Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) enable the ship to expand its ‘bubble of security’; they are a weapons platform that moves so can provide a ship with a second towed array for it to work with and double up the data for ASW, or another Close in Weapon System (CIWS) that can be deployed up threat to chew into any Anti-Ship Missiles (ASMs) that get through the Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) screen – simply put they are an Escorts Escort; possibly thanks to jammers and other Electronic Wizardry (more usually referred to as Electronic Countermeasures or ECM) fool the incoming attack into thinking it is the ship. These unmanned systems multiply the impact of a single ship, they can’t at the moment replace the ships (for some roles they never will), but they can give it a better chance of success in its mission.

Fitting these mini-networks into the larger Task Group Network will be complex; blue-on-blue issues have always been a problem, thankfully the real-time data network should work with this to help it. Although that itself could present a problem of data management and raise the very real possibly of information overload[5]. The reality hopefully will be the maximisation of defensive and offensive layers[6]; multiplying the probability of interception of enemy attacks and therefore the likelihood of their defeat. A result which of course in turn increases the likelihood of the naval force succeeding in its mission.

So in summary Network Centric Warfare and the Royal Navy means change, since the 1920s its has been a force growing in specialisation, with increase percentage of the force being specialist vessels with a strongly defined purpose. This is great for arguments with the Treasury and other departments of state when it comes fighting for the limited available funds as it provides an easy metric by which each ship and each class can be measured; but for ‘peace time’ patrolling, guarding, presence/diplomacy, trade protection & conflict deterring this provides a very mixed capability which is not helpful and in war time it producing an unbalanced force – high tech world beating destroyers that are only capable of Area Air Defence[7], frigates which are worn out and submarines which are world leading but are so advanced & focused they rely upon their torpedo tubes to launch TLAMs instead of Vertical Launch System and are so expensive that the fleet is shrinking dramatically. What the fleet needs, and what network centric warfare will enable it to utilise best is force of  Generalists and Adapabtles built around enough Capitals for a flexible force to be in place and with enough Focuseds that it can accomplish its mission.

Further Reading:

·         Hill, J. R. Air Defence at Sea. Shepperton: Ian Allan Ltd, 1988.

·         The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Transforming Naval Anti-air Warfare - Case Studies in National Security Transformation Number 11, William D. O’Neil, August 2007

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=325&ct=2



[1] A Task Force is the entirety of the vessels sent – these will be divided into Task Groups each formed around a Capital ship for their role, i.e. the Carrier Battle Group is centred on a Carrier, an Amphibious Task Group will be centred on an Amphibious Aviation Ship (either a Landing Platform Helicopter, LPH, a Landing Helicopter Attack, LHA, or a Landing Helicopter Dock, LHD) and a Landing Platform Dock (LPD) plus assorted Landing Ship Logistics (LSLs – basically Auxiliary LPDs that focus on specialist troops, specialist amphibious functions or logistics), a Raiding or Stabilisation Task Group would be centred on (preferably) a LHD or an anti-submarine/trade protection group would be centred on a Carrier with a different Air Group
[2] For the RN this would be the Caribbean, the East Coast of Africa, Indian Ocean and maybe South East Asia & Australasia to demonstrate UK commitment to the 5 Power Alliance and the nations continued interest in such an important economic, cultural and strategic region. Further they may well be used to increase the level of presence where a Guardship is, such as in the Gulf and the UK.
[3] For the RN this would be the Falklands, Gulf and the UK (of course), although possibly it might be sensible to add the Mediterranean (Gibraltar) to the list.
[4] Even in peace time at least one Generalist and a couple of Adaptables would be kept with; forming a ‘mini task group’ for training with allies.
[5] Good warfare and intelligence officers are going to be more important than ever to sift through the data and bring important/overlooked things to the attention of commanders.
[6] Something which would make hill very happy, POST ON ANGLOSPHERE THEORISTS
[7] These have the capacity built into them to become generalists, they just need the 16 MK41 VLS cells to be added in, and it could carry the Anti-Ballistic Missile SM-3, or more importantly for recent missions the Tomahawk (& and it’s successor) TLAM.