August 2013 Thoughts: Sea Based Conventional Deterrence; more than just gunboat diplomacy!

There has been a growing vogue in some quarters of the internet to view every problem as being resolved by the deployment of a warship; and to a certain extent they are right. However, the problem would likely never have occurred if there had been a vessel there already; or more often if the other nation perceives that that vessel has nothing behind. A Gunboat works because of what it represents. Britain ruled the world with its fleet, because it had ships everywhere, therefore presence everywhere; but just as importantly it was realised that if anything happened to those ‘gunboats’ there was a big battle fleet and expeditionary ground forces sitting behind it ready to sail to battle. That is deterrence for a global super power; the trouble for a nation comes when it is challenged to satisfy the tenements of deterrence to achieve security when they have global commitments/interests, a status as a world power and the budget of medium power.  

Conventional Deterrence

Conventional Deterrence requires certain things in order for it to be viable:

·                      Overt strength and at least apparent capability – the best way for a nation to deter conflict is to maintain a force capability which is good enough most other nations and organisations will think twice about risking conflict, and will seek to carefully plan and prepare for any conflict which they might have decided upon giving time for the nation to discover their plans.

·                      Intelligence – a nation relying upon deterrence for its defence, most know what its friends and possible antagonists are thinking, preferably before they do anything.

·                      Pre-emption/Reaction – with good enough intelligence, then moves against the nation’s interests could be nipped in the bud with a quick pre-emptive move; alternatively if not seen coming then they need to be able to deploy forces quickly and in strength

·                      Scalability – to deter a small nation may only require a gunboat, a major power will require a fleet if perhaps (in local terms) not of equal strength in numbers, it definitely has to be equal (preferably superior) in capability and professionalism. 

In simple terms these could be summed up in three words; Presence, Potential and Perception. For a nation to be able to project overt strength it must have presence, the same thing which is starting point of scalability, of pre-emption and intelligence. Potential is all about capability, there is no point having a capability only part time; it’s the same as having a strategic deterrent, if it’s a constant it can act as a deterrent, if it’s something that’s deployed when tensions increase it can actually magnify those tensions. This is where Perception comes in, it’s not only what a nation thinks of it’s own strength but how others view it’s resolution to use that strength.  Perception leads into another issue often raised as a deterrent, that of collective security.

Collective Security

There is no Security on this Earth;

There is only opportunity.

General Douglas MacArthur

Interesting words from an interesting character but also very true, there is a lot of talk of collective security, of nations co-operating on security issues and that is true when there are opportunities for them to benefit. The problems comes that it’s not always in another countries interest to help, Britain fought the Falkland war alone, despite being in the Commonwealth, NATO and the 5 Power Agreement - whilst lots of kind words and even information was given, some technology & equipment proffered, no troops, no ships and no planes were sent to Britain’s aid. The case could be made it wasn’t needed in 1982, the trouble is it might be needed in the future and collective security only functions as a deterrence if it can be relied upon in times of crisis.

Therefore if countries can only be relied upon to act collectively when it is in their interests to do so, i.e. if their energy supplies are threatened, an over mighty neighbour throwing it’s weight around or similar pressures, then security becomes a balance between how a nation seek to deter threats to its commitments/interests itself and how well it can bind others to those preservation of those commitments/interests.

This though is not the biggest problem with collective security; that honour goes to a more complex proposition. Even if a nation can call upon the resources of it’s allies to defend it’s interests in times of conflict; will they share those same resources to prevent it? To deter the aggressor nation from initiating conflict of more than just words? When they have their own requirements for their resources; even if they did allow their vessels to be used would it have the same effect? To put it in less abstract way; would an American destroyer being sent to reinforce the Falklands have the same impact than a British destroyer? This is valid because despite Britain’s tradition of going to war alongside the other partner in what is sometimes called the ‘special relationship’, American diplomacy has often proved more schizophrenic than the British Foreign Offices on the subject of the Falkland Islands… so would Argentina believe the ship would be allowed to do more than show the flag? They might actually even count on that ship being used to implement a UN ‘peace zone’ allowing them time to consolidate their forces post invasion.

Presence & Potential

‘Gunboats’ are great, they don’t need to be expensive, they don’t need to have all the best equipment; what they do need is enough weaponry that they have the potential to cause trouble and the capability to defend themselves against limited threats[1].  These are vessels which do need range, and space for the crew to be comfortable on long voyages and entertain dignitaries when visiting ports. These are ships which like the ‘Gunboats’ of the late 19^th century and early 20^th century were the task group ships, the vessels which clustered together had Potential, when operating with larger ships had POTENTIAL, but alone just had potential. Modern equivalents are what nations must aspire to, instead of the current focus on building only the best the can, which can never be built enough numbers to achieve presence.

That’s not saying that the best does not have to be built, it is required for the major surface combatants, the aircraft carriers and amphibious ships which are the modern ‘battle fleet’; they are what allow for scalability of the response, sending a destroyer would be a physical re-affirming that a situation is being watched closely. The despatch of an amphibious ship, with suitable landing force would be a more a defensive gesture with more impact – as well as enabling the nation’s government to rapidly deploy supported land forces instead of just light forces should they decide it necessary. The deployment of carrier with it’s strike potential is a far more assertive gesture; it can do offensive operations and hit at the heart of the enemy – or provide an aerial shield of the allied nation. Beyond this is of course the Task Force, an Amphibious Task Group, Carrier Battle Group and extra escorts for outlying pickets can provide a total response scenario for short term crises.

Presence with sea based forces is far more effective than land based because of the reach of them; one ship with a helicopter could ‘wander’ around the Indian ocean visiting all the nations that share it’s shore and project a visible presence even beyond the shore with the aid of the helicopter and various other methods of naval diplomacy – before being relieved by the next ship which would continue again from the beginning. Furthermore in terms of deterrence, whilst sea based forces have the potential for a war fighting response they also have just as much potential for withdrawal should the situation improve. In comparison land forces are more expensive to deploy/redeploy and once deployed those forces are a more blatant threat because they have been deployed ‘on the ground’. This is because the ‘potential’ of land forces is more limited and are more binding for the deploying nation; whereas sea based forces whilst they are deployed they don’t have to be employed. For a long term commitment the deployment of land based forces could make more sense from a financial perspective – but then all sorts of questions have to be answered about the level of commitment which can vary from a trip wire/training force to a full scale British Army of the Rhine with schools, housing estates and a huge deployed civilian infrastructure as well as the military infrastructure.

Summary

Deterrence whether strategic or conventional is certainly from one perspective a house of cards, presence is all about maximising assets to make it look like a country has to ability to be everywhere it needs to be at the same time; this is of course impossible, but it’s impression, the perception which counts. However, just as important image is to presence, the reality is important to potential; there is no use having a part time capability a carrier battle group will require an aviation ship loaded with a carrier air group (i.e. Strike Aircraft, Air Defence Aircraft, AEW Aircraft and ASW/SAR Aircraft[2]) as well as escorts, an amphibious task group will require at least one vessel with a dock for landing craft and it’s own aviation ship loaded with an amphibious air group (troop transport helicopters, helicopter gunships/Close Air Support aircraft and possibly ASW aircraft).

This means that 2 aviation ships are required at all times, now in an ideal world a nation would allocate the money and build 3 amphibious aviation ships and 3 aircraft carriers and always guarantee those at least two aviation ships available (usually would be 3 – 4), however it can be done with five vessels. Under this circumstance one aviation vessel would be a swing one; for example a nation could build two carrier orientated ships, and 3 amphibious orientated ships – two of which would also have docks (making them LHDs, the amphibious ships with the most potential), but the third whilst being of the same design, would not have the dock, instead that space would be used for storage of fuel and supplies. The third vessel without the dock would by virtue faster and able to carry a wider range of aviation stores, meaning should a circumstance arise where one carrier orientated vessel is in deep refit and the other has an accident it could be used to cover for that carrier; just the same as it could be used if similar circumstances occurred to cover for an amphibious ship. Whilst of course a nation could make do with just 4 aviation ships and still achieve a similar effect, the benefit of 5^th vessel would be the guarantee of at least 2 aviation ships available, the flexibility that the possibility of 3^rd task group centred on an aviation ship being formed should circumstance require it.

A similar policy would be the most practical in terms of other vessels, general purpose/multi-role or easily adaptable vessels are far more useful to a small navy than focused ones; although more difficult to sell to Treasuries in times of peace/economic stringency, when lack of a clear mission to highlight their necessity can leave them open to accusations of no mission.

The fact is that whilst the construction necessary to have the forces for these missions, and the maintenance of those forces would cost money. The question is though, is it cheaper to deter a war or fight it? Is it better to expend treasure at a measured & controlled rate or have to splurge it under the pressure of an emergency? Finally is it better to raise a little more money in tax to fund all this, or to suffer the economic disruption (damage to trade, higher insurance premiums, damage to property, ect) that conflict brings?

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[1] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/july-2013-notes-corvettes-chance-to.html                                                     

[2] In 1982 the RN was without a proper carrier battle group, it had Sea Harriers which were very capable air defence aircraft, and it had aircraft carriers, small ones but serviceable – so the question is why did the Argentinian government perceive Britain as lacking the necessary aircraft to mount a response? Well for starters it was numbers, the Argentines doubted there would be enough aircraft carriers available capable of heading south, more importantly they felt that whatever was sent if anything was (and they sincerely doubted the resolution or the capability of Britain to send anything) it would lack any AEW and despite having the (for the time) excellent Type 42s this would leave whatever was sent at a massive disadvantage against air attacks. Now it’s well known, that their calculations proved false, but how much money would have been saved if the RN had had an AEW aircraft in service, if the Invincibles had been slightly bigger and carried a slightly larger air group? Would the Argentinian’s have made the same calculations?

August 2013 Thoughts: Network Centric Warfare and the Royal Navy

Networked warfare is nothing new as a concept or practicality; a hunting party of early homo-sapiens using grunts to communicate could be considered to be working in a network. At Sea there have been many famous examples of networked warfare; Nelson’s Band of Brothers communicating by flag, hailer and shot – the different ships working in harmony, the frigates which before battle were charged with finding the enemy, during the battle became communication nodes repeating signals for the Admiral to the other ships which might not be able to see the flagship as it would be obscured by cannon smoke. During World War I the entire British war plan at sea was based upon a network of distributed different components working together in harmony thanks to the magic of radio telegraphy. In the Falkland’s war that network was to an extent regressed by the fortunes of fate and the bugbear of necessity; with some ships having to receive their orders by helicopter dropped ‘chit’ as they either were not fitted with, did not have a working set of or was so ancient it would be more dangerous to use communications system; but still it was a network. So if there have been so many networks, and it’s been around for so long, what is network centric warfare and why is it different?

Well, whereas it used to be that the network was just part of the force, a fabric of the structure but not something concentrated on itself, now it is. The idea goes that with all the parts of a network exchanging information with each other it allows all the ships commanders and most importantly the force command to achieve a level of knowledge of the battlefield, and therefore ability to co-ordinate their forces to best deal with the enemy that will revolutionise wars. The idea has been taken by some theorists to mean that it no longer matters how capable any ship is in any specific area as it is the capability of the ‘network’ as a whole which will win the battle. It’s a great theory, and when on land where resupply/replacements/reinforcements are just down the road must make a lot of sense especially for officers and ministers in charge of a cash strapped military. However, at sea ships are often on their own, thousands of miles from home and resupply, let alone replacements or reinforcements, is days if not weeks away. So upon that point network centric warfare would seem to have nothing to offer a fleet- but in reality it does, it’s just some of its principles have to be flipped. 

Instead of a fleet of specialists, interlinked together but facing the constant risk that if one ship is sunk it’s no more air defence; the network centric fleet is a four tier fleet of: 

·         ‘Capitals’; the Aviation & Amphibious ships – they are adaptable but require escorts, and mainly exist to exert direct influence on land events, although in the case of aviation ships can of course, providing they have the right aircraft, directly affect events at sea as well,

·         ‘Generalists’; the larger surface warships – which are flexible in terms of being quite good in all roles,

·         ‘Adaptables’; the smaller surface warships – which can be fitted with some sort of modular system allowing them to be easily adapted to specific roles; these are instead of having minor warfare specialist ships (i.e. Mine Counter-Measures vessels, Ocean Patrol Vessels, Oceanography Vessels and Littoral War Fighting units)

·       ‘Focuseds’; these are vessels like Submarines and Auxiliaries, but also the Aircraft that operate with the fleet - flexible within their brief but are confined within that, i.e. a Submarine can do Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Land attack if fitted with Tactical Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs), it can do them all but it can’t be easily changed or even easily integrated within the network.

If a networked Task Force/Group[1] were a human body, then the Capital ships which are the nodes of any networked fleet would be its brain, receiving and communicating with all the other units. The Generalists are the bones around which the body is formed it’s strongest parts, they provide the core structure from which all operational strength will at some point spring from and depend upon. The Adaptables are the fleets muscle, they work in a symbiotic relationship with the Generalists relying upon their strength to support their movement, whilst the Generalists rely upon them provide flexibility & dexterity. Focuseds are the eyes, the ears and the organs of the fleet, they are key to providing it with information about what’s going on around it, and are also capable of producing an impact in a more limited way…just like a glance of the eyes can silence a room. The point is all are capable and in their own way flexible, but most importantly they all need to be present for the body to work.

The point is though that all these vessels have a role when not in the task group, an Adaptable is perfectly useful as a presence/patrol ship[2], the Generalists are useful as Guardships[3]/medium status visitors, the Capitals are of course high status visitors[4] and the Focuseds; well, what they do in war time is just a faster paced higher stakes version of what they do in ‘peace’ time. The point is also that none of them are specialists, none of them if absent due to destruction, damage, or delay would cripple a fleet’s capability to act; yet when combined by the multi-bit communications systems the cumulative sum is far greater than the constituent parts on their own. However, this is a situation which is now thanks to developments in technology can be replayed upon a lower level as well.

With the development of modern unmanned systems, every ship can become a ‘capital’ with mini-task group. Unmanned Aviation Vehicles (UAVs) whilst not making every vessel an aircraft carrier can provide enough aviation capability (in terms of numbers/reach) to allow them to maintain a real time picture of what is going on beyond the horizon, unaffected by the curvature of the earth. Further to this they can of course provide communications without the need to use satelites, enabling the vessel to use ultra-secure line of sight communication systems to communicate with allies and its unmanned systems. Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) enable the ship to expand its ‘bubble of security’; they are a weapons platform that moves so can provide a ship with a second towed array for it to work with and double up the data for ASW, or another Close in Weapon System (CIWS) that can be deployed up threat to chew into any Anti-Ship Missiles (ASMs) that get through the Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) screen – simply put they are an Escorts Escort; possibly thanks to jammers and other Electronic Wizardry (more usually referred to as Electronic Countermeasures or ECM) fool the incoming attack into thinking it is the ship. These unmanned systems multiply the impact of a single ship, they can’t at the moment replace the ships (for some roles they never will), but they can give it a better chance of success in its mission.

Fitting these mini-networks into the larger Task Group Network will be complex; blue-on-blue issues have always been a problem, thankfully the real-time data network should work with this to help it. Although that itself could present a problem of data management and raise the very real possibly of information overload[5]. The reality hopefully will be the maximisation of defensive and offensive layers[6]; multiplying the probability of interception of enemy attacks and therefore the likelihood of their defeat. A result which of course in turn increases the likelihood of the naval force succeeding in its mission.

So in summary Network Centric Warfare and the Royal Navy means change, since the 1920s its has been a force growing in specialisation, with increase percentage of the force being specialist vessels with a strongly defined purpose. This is great for arguments with the Treasury and other departments of state when it comes fighting for the limited available funds as it provides an easy metric by which each ship and each class can be measured; but for ‘peace time’ patrolling, guarding, presence/diplomacy, trade protection & conflict deterring this provides a very mixed capability which is not helpful and in war time it producing an unbalanced force – high tech world beating destroyers that are only capable of Area Air Defence[7], frigates which are worn out and submarines which are world leading but are so advanced & focused they rely upon their torpedo tubes to launch TLAMs instead of Vertical Launch System and are so expensive that the fleet is shrinking dramatically. What the fleet needs, and what network centric warfare will enable it to utilise best is force of  Generalists and Adapabtles built around enough Capitals for a flexible force to be in place and with enough Focuseds that it can accomplish its mission.

Further Reading:

·         Hill, J. R. Air Defence at Sea. Shepperton: Ian Allan Ltd, 1988.

·         The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Transforming Naval Anti-air Warfare - Case Studies in National Security Transformation Number 11, William D. O’Neil, August 2007

·         https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/cec-coooperative-enagagement-for-fleet-defense-updated-03120/

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=325&ct=2

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[1] A Task Force is the entirety of the vessels sent – these will be divided into Task Groups each formed around a Capital ship for their role, i.e. the Carrier Battle Group is centred on a Carrier, an Amphibious Task Group will be centred on an Amphibious Aviation Ship (either a Landing Platform Helicopter, LPH, a Landing Helicopter Attack, LHA, or a Landing Helicopter Dock, LHD) and a Landing Platform Dock (LPD) plus assorted Landing Ship Logistics (LSLs – basically Auxiliary LPDs that focus on specialist troops, specialist amphibious functions or logistics), a Raiding or Stabilisation Task Group would be centred on (preferably) a LHD or an anti-submarine/trade protection group would be centred on a Carrier with a different Air Group

[2] For the RN this would be the Caribbean, the East Coast of Africa, Indian Ocean and maybe South East Asia & Australasia to demonstrate UK commitment to the 5 Power Alliance and the nations continued interest in such an important economic, cultural and strategic region. Further they may well be used to increase the level of presence where a Guardship is, such as in the Gulf and the UK.

[3] For the RN this would be the Falklands, Gulf and the UK (of course), although possibly it might be sensible to add the Mediterranean (Gibraltar) to the list.

[4] Even in peace time at least one Generalist and a couple of Adaptables would be kept with; forming a ‘mini task group’ for training with allies.

[5] Good warfare and intelligence officers are going to be more important than ever to sift through the data and bring important/overlooked things to the attention of commanders.

[6] Something which would make hill very happy, POST ON ANGLOSPHERE THEORISTS

[7] These have the capacity built into them to become generalists, they just need the 16 MK41 VLS cells to be added in, and it could carry the Anti-Ballistic Missile SM-3, or more importantly for recent missions the Tomahawk (& and it’s successor) TLAM.

June 2013 Notes: Some Examples of ‘Anglosphere’ Naval Theorists

Reason for writing: Britain by tradition has only had a small army (some would say it’s returning to that state), so it was dependent upon its navy to defend its vast empire, its trade and the Island it & it’s live upon… therefore to use the correct description it was a a thassalocracy[1].

Context:

The books in full are all worth a read, but these notes are to serve as quick guide with a little explanation to make it easier to find the one that suits the situation best:

 

Cable, James. Britain's Naval Future. London: Macmillan Press, 1983.

—. Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979. London: Macmillan Press, 1981.

Corbett, Julian S. England in the Seven Years War. Vol. II. II vols. London: Elibron CLassics, 2005.b.

—. England in the Seven Years War. Vol. I. II vols. London: Elibron Classics, 2005.a.

—. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 1911.

Corbett, Julian S., and H. J. Edwards, . The Cambridge Naval and Military Series. London: Cambridge University Press, 1914.

Cresswell, John. Naval Warfare. London: Sampson Low, Marston & CO., LTD, 1936.

Harding, Richard. Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650-1830. London: Routledge, 1999.

Harding, Richard, ed. The Royal Navy, 1930 - 2000, Innovation and Defence. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2005.

Hill, J. R. Air Defence at Sea. Shepperton: Ian Allan Ltd, 1988.

—. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Mahan, A.T. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. 5th Edition. New York: Dover Publications Inc, 1987.

Richmond, Herbert W. National Policy and Naval Strength. London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co, 1934.

Richmond, Herbert W. "Naval Officers Point of View." In The Cambridge; Naval and Military Series, edited by Julian S. Corbette and H. S. Edwards, 39-54. London: Cambridge University Press, 1914.

Roosevelt, Theodore. The Naval Operations of the War Between Great Britain and the United States 1812-1815. London: Elibron Classics, 2007.

The Lord Tedder. Air Power in War. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948.

 

 

 

Key Points:

Alfred Thayer Mahan. Source Wikipedia

·         Mahan

·         Main Works:

·         The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783

·         Quote:

·         “There was a period during the reign of the former (Louis XIV.) and the downfall of Napoleon. There was a period during the reign of the former in which the French navy was superior in number and equipment to the English and Dutch; but the policy and ambition of the sovereign was always directed to continental extension, and his naval power, resting on inadequate foundations, was ephemeral.”[2]

·         “In a war undertaken for any object, even if that object be the possession of a particular territory or position, an attack directly upon the place coveted may not be, from the military point of view, the best means of obtaining it”[3]

·         “For two hundred years England has been the great commercial nation of the world. More than any other her wealth has been intrusted to the sea in the war as in peace; yet of all nations she has ever been most reluctant to concede the immunities of commerce and the rights of neutrals. Regarded not as a matter of right, but of policy, history has justified the refusal; and if she maintain her navy in full strength, the future will doubtless repeat the lesson of the past”[4]

·         Key Points:

·         The battle is supreme – therefore it is the battle fleet which is supreme; for it is only by winning the battle that a national will gain control of the sea.

·         Points of Interest:

·         Mahan was a great salesman for naval power, who can be credited with having done much to enhance the position of the USN and to provide many of the words behind its modern self-image.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, one of the key texts written by Julian Corbett

·         Julian Corbett

·         Main Works:

·         Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

·         Quote:

·         Naval Strategy, which is commonly and conveniently confined to the movements of the fleet in a theatre of war, is really a form of minor strategy; and while tactics are concerned with the arena of a battle, and minor strategy with the arena of a campaign, so the study of the functions of the fleet is concerned with the whole arena of an international struggle.[5]

·         “The last thing that an explorer arrives at is a complete map that will cover the whole ground he has travelled, but for those who come after him and would profit by and extend his knowledge his map is the first thing with which they will begin. So it is with strategy” [6]

·         “You cannot conquer sea because it is not susceptible to ownership, at least outside territorial waters. You cannot as lawyers say ‘reduce it into possession,’ because you cannot exclude neutrals from it as you can from territory you conquer. In the second place you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can enemy’s territory. Clearly, then, to make deductions from an assumption that command of the sea is analogous to  conquest of territory is unscientific, and certain to lead to error”[7]

·         “For clearness we may summaries the whole in tabulated analysis, thus: -

1.      Methods of Securing Command

a.      By obtaining a decision

b.      By blockade

2.      Methods of Disputing Command

a.      Principle of ‘the fleet in being’

b.      Minor counter-attacks

3.      Methods of Exercising Command

a.      Defence against invasion

b.      Attack and defence of commerce

c.       Attack, defence and support of military expeditions”

·         Key Points:

·         It use of the sea which matters, the nation which can make best use of the sea will win the war.

·         Points of Interest:

·         Julian Corbett was an excellent historian, and his works on the Seven Years War, as well as the official history of the War at Sea during World War I are all worth reading.

Theodore Roosevelt, President, Rough Rider, NYPD Commissioner and Naval Theorist – to name just some of the things he did in his very packed life.

 

·         Theodore Roosevelt

·         Main Works:

·         The Naval Operations of the War Between Great Britain and the United States 1812-1815

·         Quote:

·         “Fatuously unable to learn the lesson taught by the revolutionary contest, he hoped to find in levies of untrained militia a substitute a regular army. As for the navy, he at one time actually hoped to supply its place by a preposterous system of what may be called horse-gunboats, that is, gunboats which could be drawn ashore and carried on wheeled vehicles to any point menaced by a hostile fleet. Men who get discouraged by the attitude of latter-day politicians may draw some hope and comfort from the reflection that the nation actually lived through the experiment of trying Jefferson’s idea. Nevertheless, the trial of this same experiment caused bitter loss and mortification”.[8]

·         “At the present day no student of international law would justify the attitude of Great Britain in the quarrel; but the international standard was different among nations at the beginning of the nineteenth century; and, moreover, Great Britain was fighting for her life, and nice customs curtsey to great crises as well as to great kings”.[9]

·         Key Points:

·         Access/use of the sea, it is ok to be a medium power, it is ok to be an emergent power but a nation has to build it fleet to match its requirements… not try

·         Points of Interest:

·         Whilst as Assistant secretary for the navy he did a lot to prepare the USN for the war with Spain, but when war came he preferred to leave his office behind and join the volunteer Calvary to fight with distinction in Cuba.

·         Richmond

·         Main Works:

·         National Policy and Naval Strength

·         Quote:

·         “To the naval officer, naval history can be of great value, provided it is so treated that some practical end is served”[10]

·        “Strength at sea is a compound of many elements, of which ships of war spring first to the mind: and ships must have seamen, they must have harbours, they need supplies. But a navy has also frontiers. Just as a continental nation strives to achieve secure and strong frontiers – a range of mountains, a river, a buffer state, or a desert – so a maritime nation directs its attention to a corresponding problem. Its interests are in the sea highway; and any territory from which those interests can be reached constitutes a frontier. Therefore, so far as is practicable, the maritime nation is anxious that the territory on the other sides of a highway, or in the neighbourhood of it, belongs rather to a friend, or an innocuous power, than to a prospective enemy or one  that has the capacity to act at sea. Ships or seamen may indeed be increased by the internal efforts of a country; but frontiers are international questions with which external policy has to deal. So too alliances and questions of rights at sea are matters external, very essential to sea-power and therefore objects to which the efforts of Policy are directed”.[11]

·         Key Points:

·         A nation should never discard advantage of existing technology for the promise, but unknown, of new technology.

·         Points of Interest:

·        Quote from Sir Walter Raleigh: What is England’s interest? Security. In what manner can her security be lost? ‘There are,’ he says, ‘two ways in which England may be afflicted. The one by invasion, being put to the defensive in which we shall cast lots for our own garments. The other by impeachment of our Trades by which Trades all Commonwealths flourish and are enriched.’ We are, in fact, comparable to a fortress which can be subjected only by assault or investments, and it is by sea alone that we can be made to suffer these afflictions. ‘Invaded or impeached we cannot be except by sea.’ Commerce, he points out, is essential to us, for it is the strength of nations, for money, the first and most forcible of the five means by which power is attained, is derived from commerce. Commerce requires great quantities of shipping and fighting, and these represent our strength. Therefore he concludes that in our foreign relations that country which is strongest in shipping ‘is most to be suspected and feared’.[12]

·         James Cable

·         Main Works:

·         Gunboat Diplomacy

·         Britain’s Naval Future

·         Quote:

·         “Indeed, the more one considers actual cases the more one is driven to the reluctant conclusion that the peaks of undoubted war and demonstrable peace are separated by a valley of uncertainty where the classical definitions offer no guidance that is either absolute or précises. ‘An act of violence intended to compel our opponents fulfil our will’ includes an Arab bomb in a London store; ‘armed conflict between nationals’ almost justifies those journalists, who in 1958, talked of Britain’s ‘Fish War’ with Iceland”[13]

·         “An act of coercive diplomacy, on the other hand, is intended to obtain some specific advantage from another state and forfeits its diplomatic character if it either contemplates the infliction of injury unrelated to obtaining that advantage or results in the victim attempting the infliction of injury after the original objective has been either achieved or abandoned. Coercive diplomacy is thus an alternative to war and, if it leads to war, we must not only hold that it has failed: we may even doubt whether it deriver the name.”[14]

·         Key Points:

·         It’s not how much a nation has, as long as it has enough to fulfil its needs, but it’s how it uses it, and peacetime is just as important as war time.

·         Points of Interest:

·         James Cable was a career diplomat, who brought the experience of diplomacy and the perspective it gives use of navies – producing some very interesting points.

·         J.R. Hill  (usually called Richard)

·         Main Works:

·         Air Defence at Sea

·         Quote:

·         “In essence, air defence at sea is ‘layered’ from the point of origin of the threat to its intended point of impact. Attack at sources is part of the process, the outer layers if you like; the principles are complementary, not separate.”[15]

·         “In this sudden, hard-hitting world the offence must have built-in advantages. For medium powers as well as superpowers, the attractions of attack at source, particularly pre-emptive attack, will be great. But the political situation, reflected in Rules of Engagements, may not permit it. Some governments may be confident enough, or reckless enough, to plan on the assumption that they can get away with pre-emptive action. Others will be constrained to plan so because that is the only thing their resources will allow them to do. But forces designed for such action only, without the defence ability to take a counter-attack, will have no staying power. This can only be acquired by translating into materiel, training and organisation the principles of this most difficult and demanding art, air defence at sea.”[16]

·         Key Points:

·         That a fleet is not the value of its individual units, but the sum of the whole they build when working together; it’s a very technologically focused work.

 

·         Points of Interest:

Some key diagrams of the layered defence[17]

Wars in quick:

·         World War I

·         Was Mahanian framed, in that the big battle fleets/risk fleet were focused on its concepts, but in reality it was Corbettian in practice, as the battles of the convoys, the blockade and the global operations testify to.

·         World War II

·         The battles of the pacific would look fairly Mahanian, it certainly was with the Japanese expectations of Pearl Harbour; unfortunately the war as whole was more Corbettian and Teddian (Rooseveltian didn’t seem right) with victory in the end going to the navies which built the most, built the best suited for the war, and which focused on winning the wars not necessarily every battle which won it.

·         Cold War

·         Whilst Mutually Assured Destruction was the order of the day, the navies seemed to be constructed along Corbettian lines - where it was use of the sea that mattered. Yet concepts like the strike fleet were Mahanian – focused on winning a battle, and winning it as close to the soviet homeland as possible so that sea control could be established early.

·         Falklands War

·         If Cable had been followed it might never of happened as Britain would have kept enough slack to be able to react in time with force to deter; the Argentines certainly took a more Mahanian approach, and structure their defences upon that perspective

Summary:

Theorists are interesting, they often reveal more about the age they live in rather than the age they are ‘studying’ to put across their points – yet still they produce interesting histories. More importantly these theorists whilst not being an exhaustive list are capable together of providing a place to start from when analysing navies and the duties they carry out for their governments.

 

“It behoves countries whose people, like all free peoples, object to paying for large military establishments, to see to it that they are at least strong enough to gain the time to turn the spirit and capacity of their subjects into the new activities which war calls for”[18]

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[1] (Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650-1830 1999, 2 & 297)

[2] (Mahan 1987, 505)

[3] (Mahan 1987, 507)

[4] (Mahan 1987, 540)

[5] (J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years War 2005.a, 2)

[6] (Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 1911, 11)

[7] (Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 1911, 79)

[8] (Roosevelt 2007, 10-1)

[9] (Roosevelt 2007, 11)

[10] (Richmond, Naval Officers Point of View 1914, 40)

[11] (Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength 1934, 1-2)

[12] (Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength 1934, 4)

[13] (Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979 1981, 37)

[14] (Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979 1981, 38)

[15] (Hill, Air Defence at Sea 1988, 50)

[16] (Hill, Air Defence at Sea 1988, 111)

[17] (Hill, Air Defence at Sea 1988, 52-3)

[18] (The Lord Tedder 1948, 15)