August 2013 Thoughts: Sea Based Conventional Deterrence; more than just gunboat diplomacy!

There has been a growing vogue in some quarters of the internet to view every problem as being resolved by the deployment of a warship; and to a certain extent they are right. However, the problem would likely never have occurred if there had been a vessel there already; or more often if the other nation perceives that that vessel has nothing behind. A Gunboat works because of what it represents. Britain ruled the world with its fleet, because it had ships everywhere, therefore presence everywhere; but just as importantly it was realised that if anything happened to those ‘gunboats’ there was a big battle fleet and expeditionary ground forces sitting behind it ready to sail to battle. That is deterrence for a global super power; the trouble for a nation comes when it is challenged to satisfy the tenements of deterrence to achieve security when they have global commitments/interests, a status as a world power and the budget of medium power.  

Conventional Deterrence

Conventional Deterrence requires certain things in order for it to be viable:

·                      Overt strength and at least apparent capability – the best way for a nation to deter conflict is to maintain a force capability which is good enough most other nations and organisations will think twice about risking conflict, and will seek to carefully plan and prepare for any conflict which they might have decided upon giving time for the nation to discover their plans.

·                      Intelligence – a nation relying upon deterrence for its defence, most know what its friends and possible antagonists are thinking, preferably before they do anything.

·                      Pre-emption/Reaction – with good enough intelligence, then moves against the nation’s interests could be nipped in the bud with a quick pre-emptive move; alternatively if not seen coming then they need to be able to deploy forces quickly and in strength

·                      Scalability – to deter a small nation may only require a gunboat, a major power will require a fleet if perhaps (in local terms) not of equal strength in numbers, it definitely has to be equal (preferably superior) in capability and professionalism. 

In simple terms these could be summed up in three words; Presence, Potential and Perception. For a nation to be able to project overt strength it must have presence, the same thing which is starting point of scalability, of pre-emption and intelligence. Potential is all about capability, there is no point having a capability only part time; it’s the same as having a strategic deterrent, if it’s a constant it can act as a deterrent, if it’s something that’s deployed when tensions increase it can actually magnify those tensions. This is where Perception comes in, it’s not only what a nation thinks of it’s own strength but how others view it’s resolution to use that strength.  Perception leads into another issue often raised as a deterrent, that of collective security.

Collective Security

There is no Security on this Earth;

There is only opportunity.

General Douglas MacArthur

Interesting words from an interesting character but also very true, there is a lot of talk of collective security, of nations co-operating on security issues and that is true when there are opportunities for them to benefit. The problems comes that it’s not always in another countries interest to help, Britain fought the Falkland war alone, despite being in the Commonwealth, NATO and the 5 Power Agreement - whilst lots of kind words and even information was given, some technology & equipment proffered, no troops, no ships and no planes were sent to Britain’s aid. The case could be made it wasn’t needed in 1982, the trouble is it might be needed in the future and collective security only functions as a deterrence if it can be relied upon in times of crisis.

Therefore if countries can only be relied upon to act collectively when it is in their interests to do so, i.e. if their energy supplies are threatened, an over mighty neighbour throwing it’s weight around or similar pressures, then security becomes a balance between how a nation seek to deter threats to its commitments/interests itself and how well it can bind others to those preservation of those commitments/interests.

This though is not the biggest problem with collective security; that honour goes to a more complex proposition. Even if a nation can call upon the resources of it’s allies to defend it’s interests in times of conflict; will they share those same resources to prevent it? To deter the aggressor nation from initiating conflict of more than just words? When they have their own requirements for their resources; even if they did allow their vessels to be used would it have the same effect? To put it in less abstract way; would an American destroyer being sent to reinforce the Falklands have the same impact than a British destroyer? This is valid because despite Britain’s tradition of going to war alongside the other partner in what is sometimes called the ‘special relationship’, American diplomacy has often proved more schizophrenic than the British Foreign Offices on the subject of the Falkland Islands… so would Argentina believe the ship would be allowed to do more than show the flag? They might actually even count on that ship being used to implement a UN ‘peace zone’ allowing them time to consolidate their forces post invasion.

Presence & Potential

‘Gunboats’ are great, they don’t need to be expensive, they don’t need to have all the best equipment; what they do need is enough weaponry that they have the potential to cause trouble and the capability to defend themselves against limited threats[1].  These are vessels which do need range, and space for the crew to be comfortable on long voyages and entertain dignitaries when visiting ports. These are ships which like the ‘Gunboats’ of the late 19^th century and early 20^th century were the task group ships, the vessels which clustered together had Potential, when operating with larger ships had POTENTIAL, but alone just had potential. Modern equivalents are what nations must aspire to, instead of the current focus on building only the best the can, which can never be built enough numbers to achieve presence.

That’s not saying that the best does not have to be built, it is required for the major surface combatants, the aircraft carriers and amphibious ships which are the modern ‘battle fleet’; they are what allow for scalability of the response, sending a destroyer would be a physical re-affirming that a situation is being watched closely. The despatch of an amphibious ship, with suitable landing force would be a more a defensive gesture with more impact – as well as enabling the nation’s government to rapidly deploy supported land forces instead of just light forces should they decide it necessary. The deployment of carrier with it’s strike potential is a far more assertive gesture; it can do offensive operations and hit at the heart of the enemy – or provide an aerial shield of the allied nation. Beyond this is of course the Task Force, an Amphibious Task Group, Carrier Battle Group and extra escorts for outlying pickets can provide a total response scenario for short term crises.

Presence with sea based forces is far more effective than land based because of the reach of them; one ship with a helicopter could ‘wander’ around the Indian ocean visiting all the nations that share it’s shore and project a visible presence even beyond the shore with the aid of the helicopter and various other methods of naval diplomacy – before being relieved by the next ship which would continue again from the beginning. Furthermore in terms of deterrence, whilst sea based forces have the potential for a war fighting response they also have just as much potential for withdrawal should the situation improve. In comparison land forces are more expensive to deploy/redeploy and once deployed those forces are a more blatant threat because they have been deployed ‘on the ground’. This is because the ‘potential’ of land forces is more limited and are more binding for the deploying nation; whereas sea based forces whilst they are deployed they don’t have to be employed. For a long term commitment the deployment of land based forces could make more sense from a financial perspective – but then all sorts of questions have to be answered about the level of commitment which can vary from a trip wire/training force to a full scale British Army of the Rhine with schools, housing estates and a huge deployed civilian infrastructure as well as the military infrastructure.

Summary

Deterrence whether strategic or conventional is certainly from one perspective a house of cards, presence is all about maximising assets to make it look like a country has to ability to be everywhere it needs to be at the same time; this is of course impossible, but it’s impression, the perception which counts. However, just as important image is to presence, the reality is important to potential; there is no use having a part time capability a carrier battle group will require an aviation ship loaded with a carrier air group (i.e. Strike Aircraft, Air Defence Aircraft, AEW Aircraft and ASW/SAR Aircraft[2]) as well as escorts, an amphibious task group will require at least one vessel with a dock for landing craft and it’s own aviation ship loaded with an amphibious air group (troop transport helicopters, helicopter gunships/Close Air Support aircraft and possibly ASW aircraft).

This means that 2 aviation ships are required at all times, now in an ideal world a nation would allocate the money and build 3 amphibious aviation ships and 3 aircraft carriers and always guarantee those at least two aviation ships available (usually would be 3 – 4), however it can be done with five vessels. Under this circumstance one aviation vessel would be a swing one; for example a nation could build two carrier orientated ships, and 3 amphibious orientated ships – two of which would also have docks (making them LHDs, the amphibious ships with the most potential), but the third whilst being of the same design, would not have the dock, instead that space would be used for storage of fuel and supplies. The third vessel without the dock would by virtue faster and able to carry a wider range of aviation stores, meaning should a circumstance arise where one carrier orientated vessel is in deep refit and the other has an accident it could be used to cover for that carrier; just the same as it could be used if similar circumstances occurred to cover for an amphibious ship. Whilst of course a nation could make do with just 4 aviation ships and still achieve a similar effect, the benefit of 5^th vessel would be the guarantee of at least 2 aviation ships available, the flexibility that the possibility of 3^rd task group centred on an aviation ship being formed should circumstance require it.

A similar policy would be the most practical in terms of other vessels, general purpose/multi-role or easily adaptable vessels are far more useful to a small navy than focused ones; although more difficult to sell to Treasuries in times of peace/economic stringency, when lack of a clear mission to highlight their necessity can leave them open to accusations of no mission.

The fact is that whilst the construction necessary to have the forces for these missions, and the maintenance of those forces would cost money. The question is though, is it cheaper to deter a war or fight it? Is it better to expend treasure at a measured & controlled rate or have to splurge it under the pressure of an emergency? Finally is it better to raise a little more money in tax to fund all this, or to suffer the economic disruption (damage to trade, higher insurance premiums, damage to property, ect) that conflict brings?

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[1] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/july-2013-notes-corvettes-chance-to.html                                                     

[2] In 1982 the RN was without a proper carrier battle group, it had Sea Harriers which were very capable air defence aircraft, and it had aircraft carriers, small ones but serviceable – so the question is why did the Argentinian government perceive Britain as lacking the necessary aircraft to mount a response? Well for starters it was numbers, the Argentines doubted there would be enough aircraft carriers available capable of heading south, more importantly they felt that whatever was sent if anything was (and they sincerely doubted the resolution or the capability of Britain to send anything) it would lack any AEW and despite having the (for the time) excellent Type 42s this would leave whatever was sent at a massive disadvantage against air attacks. Now it’s well known, that their calculations proved false, but how much money would have been saved if the RN had had an AEW aircraft in service, if the Invincibles had been slightly bigger and carried a slightly larger air group? Would the Argentinian’s have made the same calculations?

August 2013 Thoughts: Naval Diplomacy – from the Amerigo Vespucci to a Royal Yacht

In August of this year the Amerigo Vespucci, one of the Italian’s navy’s three sail training ships (the others being the Italia and the Palinuro[1]), docked in South Quay near Canary Warf its purpose was multi-layered. The most obvious reasons being a nice stop for the officer cadets and crew, a visit to an allied major/capital city to strengthen ties, and in the name of those ties to hosting a series of tours, dinners and talks. In broad terms it was exactly what the Royal Yacht used to be used for by British governments, but trading on Italian chic rather than the majesty of British royalty. This was the colourful pageantry side of naval diplomacy at work (as was highlighted by the Captain as its primary role), and it was good; the Italian navy pulling out all the stops to accomplish the missions that are the bread and butter of these vessels, and highlighting all the good the ship does, the Marina Militare does, and Italy does & produces.

What is Naval Diplomacy?

In one sentence its ‘diplomacy which is carried out from the sea or upon the sea’; the trouble is that one sentence whilst accurate, also covers so much but gives so little. For starters whilst it encompasses that which is usually considered Maritime Diplomacy & the Law of the Sea, i.e. what happens at sea, it in fact goes further as it also includes the use of the sea as a medium to convey an effect on the land. Broadly speaking naval diplomacy fits into four areas, which define not only how the approach the type of vessel which is best:

Area	Explanation	Vessel
Presence/Deterrence	Presence is about making it known that your nation has an interest in the events that are taking place it that area; the larger the steak a nation has in the events the more significant the presence required. Deterrence is about achieving a level of force present that will make any actions country to the will of the nation deploying that force, either likely to take too high a losses or be defeated entirely.	Presence is about ‘Gunboats’ but it can grow as it moves from a watching/waving the flag role to a more forceful ‘no’ which will require ships of greater ‘potential’. Furthermore larger ships should have spaces aboard for conferences – after all holding talks to prevent a conflict aboard a warship at sea, could not be on more neutral ground or in a more secure space.
Relationships	When ships pass at sea they acknowledge each other; even at the height of the Cold War the ships of the rival alliances would still say interact. These contacts will often grow when vessels find themselves working nearby each other- perhaps conducting counter-piracy or some other similar mission. These interactions build bridges which the pomp, formality, rigidity and posturing of land borders do not – a fact which is sometimes ascribed to the simple truth that all sailors risk more from the sea than enemy action.	Any ship will do, but warships are usually better for interacting with other warships on an ‘equivalency’.
Alliances	These can vary from simple accords to full treaty organisations; but whatever the form they require maintenance like any relationship. They require exercises to keep allies familiar and up to standard that operational co-operation/co-ordination is already practiced so as to allow for smooth operation.	Again it’s a combination in that a constant regional presence by a single vessel, with regular visits by more powerful vessels for training.
Trade	A ship turning up and hosting events can draw interest in the goods of the nation that sends it. When the Royal Yacht motored into port, even without any royalty aboard, it would host contract signing events, trade fares and lots of meet & greet events. At the Amerigo Vespucci everything is done to make visits memorable, the food, the drink and the ceremonies are all of the highest quality Italian products.	For this status is everything, a flagship such as an aircraft carrier, or a ship which has cache because it’s special – i.e. a Royal Yacht or sail training ship, are best as they will garner the most attention, interest and most importantly attendance.

Despite the fact that it can be fit into just four rough areas, Naval Diplomacy is one of the most subtle forms of international relations as a single gesture can carry multiple messages on different levels of analysis; which in turn have a differing impact/weight depending upon the tool used to do it. A warship hosting an event will have a different impact from an auxiliary, and again to a geo-strategic/tactical or status ship; the latter group will always carry the most weight although depending on which they are that can be read differently. A status ship will usually be seen as a projection of power but with less militaristic overtones – usually more friendly so is excellent for building economic alliances, supporting trade and making ‘first contact’. Whereas a geo-strategic/tactical vessel such as an aircraft carrier will always have the visible ‘potential’ for military action, so whilst again it can be used to support trade by hosting suitable events, it is excellent when used for building strategic alliances and for highlighting intent for action. Smaller ships are again capable of these things, but of course on a smaller scale; a single helicopter popping around a country with some personnel in can highlight presence, multiple helicopters makes that presence tangible – but also represents the commitment of a large volume of resources.  

How Maritimes & International Law affect Naval Diplomacy

In the modern world nothing exists in a complete vacuum from words and even the sea has some rules & regulations; however the vast majority of international law has yet to be written, and international maritime law is even more sparsely populated. This is mainly due to the difficulty of having to get every nation to agree to it; even the United Nations has only accomplished so much. The main laws that affect naval diplomacy, and using naval forces for conventional deterrence are the those which effect the Territorial Waters (TW), those which affect the Contiguous Zone (CZ) and those affecting the Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ); all but the first 12 nautical miles from the coast, the TW, are considered International Waters under which access of vessels cannot be restricted accept under circumstance of war.

EEZs cover the area of water out to 200nautical miles from the coast, although it can also extend further if the continental shelf is proved to be contiguous to a nation’s EEZ. Within this area that nation has complete authority over all resources contained in the sea or under it. Put like this it sounds simple, but most countries EEZs are to a greater or lesser extent comprises or contested; the current troubles in the South China Sea, the Cod Wars in the North Atlantic, some of the current issues over Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands are about nations wanting the resources (fish, fossil fuels, ores and all the rest) that are under the sea around them.  TW and the CZ are where a nation can enforce civil laws as well as control resources; TW as has been said are where freedom of the seas do not apply, and a ship needs permission to enter. It was a figure fixed before the missile age, before 12 nautical miles was no longer a barrier to enemy attack and which was the area visible from land by the naked eye so was therefore considered to be ‘practical’.

Monitoring and exercising control over these areas requires more than just a cursory glance on occasion; for starters the shear area they cover makes a constant presence necessary. For example the UK has an EEZ of 6,805,586km² (not including Gibraltar or any Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus)[2] compared to a Total Internal Area (basically the land + plus lakes) of just 242,900km², or in simple terms the sea area which is the responsibility of the British government is a little over 28x the size of the land under its charge[3]. It is the responsibility of the government to monitor fishing & fish stocks, study & preserve the ecology & bio-diversity, prevent piracy and basically police the waters; furthermore considering the level of resources contained within, protect it from avaricious neighbours. Presence is therefore not only about supporting allies, but also key to protecting national ‘territory’ & interests.  

What makes the Sea special?

The sea is next to impossible to construct anything on so it cannot be held in a conventional sense the same way land can, even the mightiest warships can be driven from their stations by fierce storms that can ravage oceans. The resources are very difficult and expensive to get to and fish stocks are depleted. So there is a reasonable case for why bother?

Well, for starters whilst the resources are difficult & expensive to get at, they are reachable, technology is improving every day and the market is such that the profit from getting to them is more than worth it. Furthermore, whilst the sea may make the internet look positively controllable in terms of a medium for flow of information it also carries 70% of the world’s surface. Plus unlike the internet which is restricted to data movement, the sea also allows for the physical movement of goods and people between nations, i.e. trade. In fact, more trade and goods go buy sea than any other method, principally because as a sheer function cost & volume sea trade is worth it.  Fish stocks are improving, as better management is put in place; and whilst construction of a ‘border’ is not really possible, and whilst it can be argued that countries don’t own the sea merely act as it’s guardians.

It’s special because whilst all the above and on the previous pages is true, the fact is the sea is an international free for all; which is why ships of opposing nations bump into each other and can’t ignore each other so have to behave in cordial manner.

Summary

Naval diplomacy is not just about the sea, although it’s the sea which gives it a lot of its capabilities; at its heart naval diplomacy is about utilising the advantages of the sea for strategic national gains, whether that is selling a nations goods or selling a nation as an ally. However, like conventional deterrence it is something which is best built on firm foundations rather than sand; a sufficiently supported program of naval diplomacy can provide bountiful opportunities for the country that wields it. Deploying a land force can be expensive, complicated and binding, a ship just docking on it way past is just maximising the opportunity; but to do it well the ships and embassies have to be prepared for it.

For example if Nation 1 wishes to maximise the effect of one of it’s destroyers (chosen for the example as it’s a large escort, but not a geo-strategic/tactical vessel or a status vessel) visiting Nation 2 then the embassy of Nation 1 must have an up to date a list of ministers/opposition, dignitaries, business people and opinion formers ready to go so that invites can be issued – not just to locals from Nation 2, but from other nations diplomatic corps and of course representatives of Nation 1’s firms that have dealings in the area, turning each ship visit into a must attend opportunity for great food, great opportunity and great experience; all things navies as a tradition do well. The result of such an evening will be closer relationships built between Nation 1’s diplomatic corps & navy and all of the visiting persons, if handled right this will not only provide what the 2012 Olympics provided the UK with (on a smaller scale of course) – the general feeling that Nation 1 is really quite good, but also provide contacts which lead to orders of Nation 1’s goods, boosting Nation 1’s industry and providing employment at home[4]. Which is at the end of the day one of the core duties of government, keeping the economy as strong as possible, it’s that and defending its citizens/realm from attack.

 

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[1] http://www.marina.difesa.it/uominimezzi/navi/Pagine/Vespucci.aspx (16/08/2013), http://www.marina.difesa.it/uominimezzi/navi/Pagine/Palinuro.aspx (16/08/2013) & http://www.marina.difesa.it/uominimezzi/navi/Pagine/Italia.aspx (16/08/2013)... Even the German navy has one called the Gorch Fock http://www.marine.de/portal/a/marine/!ut/p/c4/DcLBDYAgDADAWVyg_ftzC_VXSKENWEwRTZxec4c7_oxuzXRpM6q44hZ1Dg8c5DA4sA_rwGrCerGBaE09kfjLIzPk5lFSiwXPskwf9DZpQQ!!/ (16/08/2013)

[2] All figures obtained from http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/ (18/08/2013)

[3] The French government oversees an area nearly 18x the size of its land, the Seychelles is nearly 2,938x the size of it’s land

[4] During one trip to Bombay without a member of the Royal Family aboard her, the Royal Yacht Britain got £1.1 billion worth of contracts that had been sitting around not moving forward, signed. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2042231/Why-Tony-Blair-wished-hadnt-Queen-cry.html (18/08/2013)