There has been
a growing vogue in some quarters of the internet to view every problem as being
resolved by the deployment of a warship; and to a certain extent they are
right. However, the problem would likely never have occurred if there had been
a vessel there already; or more often if the other nation perceives that that
vessel has nothing behind. A Gunboat works because of what it represents.
Britain ruled the world with its fleet, because it had ships everywhere,
therefore presence everywhere; but just as importantly it was realised that if
anything happened to those ‘gunboats’ there was a big battle fleet and
expeditionary ground forces sitting behind it ready to sail to battle. That is
deterrence for a global super power; the trouble for a nation comes when it is
challenged to satisfy the tenements of deterrence to achieve security when they
have global commitments/interests, a status as a world power and the budget of
medium power.
Conventional
Deterrence
Conventional
Deterrence requires certain things in order for it to be viable:
·
Overt
strength and at least apparent capability – the best way for a nation to deter
conflict is to maintain a force capability which is good enough most other
nations and organisations will think twice about risking conflict, and will
seek to carefully plan and prepare for any conflict which they might have
decided upon giving time for the nation to discover their plans.
·
Intelligence
– a nation relying upon deterrence for its defence, most know what its friends
and possible antagonists are thinking, preferably before they do anything.
·
Pre-emption/Reaction
– with good enough intelligence, then moves against the nation’s interests
could be nipped in the bud with a quick pre-emptive move; alternatively if not
seen coming then they need to be able to deploy forces quickly and in strength
·
Scalability
– to deter a small nation may only require a gunboat, a major power will
require a fleet if perhaps (in local terms) not of equal strength in numbers,
it definitely has to be equal (preferably superior) in capability and
professionalism.
In simple terms
these could be summed up in three words; Presence, Potential and Perception.
For a nation to be able to project overt strength it must have presence, the
same thing which is starting point of scalability, of pre-emption and
intelligence. Potential is all about capability, there is no point having a
capability only part time; it’s the same as having a strategic deterrent, if
it’s a constant it can act as a deterrent, if it’s something that’s deployed
when tensions increase it can actually magnify those tensions. This is where
Perception comes in, it’s not only what a nation thinks of it’s own strength
but how others view it’s resolution to use that strength. Perception leads into another issue often
raised as a deterrent, that of collective security.
Collective
Security
There is no
Security on this Earth;
There is
only opportunity.
General
Douglas MacArthur
Interesting
words from an interesting character but also very true, there is a lot of talk
of collective security, of nations co-operating on security issues and that is
true when there are opportunities for them to benefit. The problems comes that
it’s not always in another countries interest to help, Britain fought the
Falkland war alone, despite being in the Commonwealth, NATO and the 5 Power
Agreement - whilst lots of kind words and even information was given, some
technology & equipment proffered, no troops, no ships and no planes were
sent to Britain’s aid. The case could be made it wasn’t needed in 1982, the
trouble is it might be needed in the future and collective security only
functions as a deterrence if it can be relied upon in times of crisis.
Therefore if
countries can only be relied upon to act collectively when it is in their
interests to do so, i.e. if their energy supplies are threatened, an over
mighty neighbour throwing it’s weight around or similar pressures, then security
becomes a balance between how a nation seek to deter threats to its
commitments/interests itself and how well it can bind others to those
preservation of those commitments/interests.
This though is
not the biggest problem with collective security; that honour goes to a more
complex proposition. Even if a nation can call upon the resources of it’s
allies to defend it’s interests in times of conflict; will they share those
same resources to prevent it? To deter the aggressor nation from initiating
conflict of more than just words? When they have their own requirements for
their resources; even if they did allow their vessels to be used would it have
the same effect? To put it in less abstract way; would an American destroyer
being sent to reinforce the Falklands have the same impact than a British
destroyer? This is valid because despite Britain’s tradition of going to war
alongside the other partner in what is sometimes called the ‘special
relationship’, American diplomacy has often proved more schizophrenic than the
British Foreign Offices on the subject of the Falkland Islands… so would
Argentina believe the ship would be allowed to do more than show the flag? They
might actually even count on that ship being used to implement a UN ‘peace
zone’ allowing them time to consolidate their forces post invasion.
Presence
& Potential
‘Gunboats’ are
great, they don’t need to be expensive, they don’t need to have all the best
equipment; what they do need is enough weaponry that they have the potential to
cause trouble and the capability to defend themselves against limited threats[1]. These are vessels which do need range, and
space for the crew to be comfortable on long voyages and entertain dignitaries
when visiting ports. These are ships which like the ‘Gunboats’ of the late 19th
century and early 20th century were the task group ships, the
vessels which clustered together had Potential, when operating with larger
ships had POTENTIAL, but alone just had potential. Modern equivalents are what
nations must aspire to, instead of the current focus on building only the best
the can, which can never be built enough numbers to achieve presence.
That’s not
saying that the best does not have to be built, it is required for the major
surface combatants, the aircraft carriers and amphibious ships which are the
modern ‘battle fleet’; they are what allow for scalability of the response,
sending a destroyer would be a physical re-affirming that a situation is being
watched closely. The despatch of an amphibious ship, with suitable landing
force would be a more a defensive gesture with more impact – as well as
enabling the nation’s government to rapidly deploy supported land forces
instead of just light forces should they decide it necessary. The deployment of
carrier with it’s strike potential is a far more assertive gesture; it can do
offensive operations and hit at the heart of the enemy – or provide an aerial
shield of the allied nation. Beyond this is of course the Task Force, an
Amphibious Task Group, Carrier Battle Group and extra escorts for outlying
pickets can provide a total response scenario for short term crises.
Presence with
sea based forces is far more effective than land based because of the reach of
them; one ship with a helicopter could ‘wander’ around the Indian ocean
visiting all the nations that share it’s shore and project a visible presence
even beyond the shore with the aid of the helicopter and various other methods
of naval diplomacy – before being relieved by the next ship which would
continue again from the beginning. Furthermore in terms of deterrence, whilst
sea based forces have the potential for a war fighting response they also have
just as much potential for withdrawal should the situation improve. In
comparison land forces are more expensive to deploy/redeploy and once deployed those
forces are a more blatant threat because they have been deployed ‘on the
ground’. This is because the ‘potential’ of land forces is more limited and are
more binding for the deploying nation; whereas sea based forces whilst they are
deployed they don’t have to be employed. For a long term commitment the
deployment of land based forces could make more sense from a financial
perspective – but then all sorts of questions have to be answered about the
level of commitment which can vary from a trip wire/training force to a full
scale British Army of the Rhine with schools, housing estates and a huge
deployed civilian infrastructure as well as the military infrastructure.
Summary
Deterrence
whether strategic or conventional is certainly from one perspective a house of
cards, presence is all about maximising assets to make it look like a country
has to ability to be everywhere it needs to be at the same time; this is of
course impossible, but it’s impression, the perception which counts. However,
just as important image is to presence, the reality is important to potential;
there is no use having a part time capability a carrier battle group will
require an aviation ship loaded with a carrier air group (i.e. Strike Aircraft,
Air Defence Aircraft, AEW Aircraft and ASW/SAR Aircraft[2])
as well as escorts, an amphibious task group will require at least one vessel
with a dock for landing craft and it’s own aviation ship loaded with an
amphibious air group (troop transport helicopters, helicopter gunships/Close
Air Support aircraft and possibly ASW aircraft).
This means that
2 aviation ships are required at all times, now in an ideal world a nation would
allocate the money and build 3 amphibious aviation ships and 3 aircraft
carriers and always guarantee those at least two aviation ships available
(usually would be 3 – 4), however it can be done with five vessels. Under this
circumstance one aviation vessel would be a swing one; for example a nation
could build two carrier orientated ships, and 3 amphibious orientated ships –
two of which would also have docks (making them LHDs, the amphibious ships with
the most potential), but the third whilst being of the same design, would not
have the dock, instead that space would be used for storage of fuel and supplies.
The third vessel without the dock would by virtue faster and able to carry a
wider range of aviation stores, meaning should a circumstance arise where one
carrier orientated vessel is in deep refit and the other has an accident it
could be used to cover for that carrier; just the same as it could be used if
similar circumstances occurred to cover for an amphibious ship. Whilst of
course a nation could make do with just 4 aviation ships and still achieve a
similar effect, the benefit of 5th vessel would be the guarantee of
at least 2 aviation ships available, the flexibility that the possibility of 3rd
task group centred on an aviation ship being formed should circumstance require
it.
A similar
policy would be the most practical in terms of other vessels, general
purpose/multi-role or easily adaptable vessels are far more useful to a small
navy than focused ones; although more difficult to sell to Treasuries in times
of peace/economic stringency, when lack of a clear mission to highlight their
necessity can leave them open to accusations of no mission.
The fact is
that whilst the construction necessary to have the forces for these missions,
and the maintenance of those forces would cost money. The question is though,
is it cheaper to deter a war or fight it? Is it better to expend treasure at a
measured & controlled rate or have to splurge it under the pressure of an
emergency? Finally is it better to raise a little more money in tax to fund all
this, or to suffer the economic disruption (damage to trade, higher insurance
premiums, damage to property, ect) that conflict brings?
[2]
In 1982 the RN was without a proper carrier battle group, it had Sea Harriers
which were very capable air defence aircraft, and it had aircraft carriers,
small ones but serviceable – so the question is why did the Argentinian
government perceive Britain as lacking the necessary aircraft to mount a
response? Well for starters it was numbers, the Argentines doubted there would
be enough aircraft carriers available capable of heading south, more
importantly they felt that whatever was sent if anything was (and they
sincerely doubted the resolution or the capability of Britain to send anything)
it would lack any AEW and despite having the (for the time) excellent Type 42s this
would leave whatever was sent at a massive disadvantage against air attacks.
Now it’s well known, that their calculations proved false, but how much money
would have been saved if the RN had had an AEW aircraft in service, if the Invincibles had been slightly bigger and
carried a slightly larger air group? Would the Argentinian’s have made the same
calculations?
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