Showing posts with label Diplomacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Diplomacy. Show all posts

Tuesday, 1 October 2013

September 2013 Thoughts: Sea Power


From Trafalgar and Waterloo to the first German war the British navy was supreme upon the seas. Our sea-power during the greater part of the nineteenth century equalled that of all other nations put together. Did we misuse that power? On the contrary, there never were so few warships afloat. History, which has been my guide and inspiration, will show the future ages that the control of the seas which the British held so long was used not for the exercise of warlike ambition, but to keep the peace, to suppress the slave trade and to make the seas safe for the commerce of all nations. All our ports, even our own coastwise trade, were opened to the entry and competition of men and good from every land.

Winston S. Churchill, London, May, 1946

Sea Power is an encompassing phrase, all too often commentators will use it to describe the raw naval/military potential of a nation – but in a world where international relations encompasses soft power as well as hard power how can Sea Power be so one dimensional? Even Mahan, who stated the history of sea power was “largely a military history”, issued a qualified statement with the word largely. The truth in fact is that Sea Power certainly isn’t so mono-polar; it includes not only the war fighting potential of a nations naval forces, but their diplomatic potential, the economic potential of its & other merchant ships traversing the world laden with goods, and perhaps most importantly it includes the succour which a nation may extract from that sea, both water & seabed, which comes under that nations jurisdiction. All these things are now part of Sea Power, and they must be in balance otherwise a nation could find itself weak at a time of crucial necessity.

This is itself a very Corbettian view, in that no longer is control of the sea the epitome of sea power, but what can be done with/from the sea when it is controlled. The important thing though is that both of these parts are as important as each other; without the ability to control the sea (at the least in a local sense) nothing can be done with/from it. Control of the sea allows the utilisation of the sea in peace time for actions such as gathering food (fishing or harvesting seaweed), collecting energy (directly by wave, tidal or wind power; or indirectly by the extraction of natural gas, oil, coal or uranium[1]) or amassing resources (mining the sea floor or underneath it) – none of this can be overstated in their importance to a nation’s economy. It’s because of that importance that disputes over the extents of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)[2] are so contentious; it’s also the reason that naval conventional deterrence is rising[3] as a required capability for many nations. However, deterrence comes in many levels and the equipment/diplomatic commitments required by each nation depend upon the level of sea power it itself requires/desires and the level it feels it receives/can accept from any alliances. For example a nation for which it’s EEZ is concentrated in one area could well focus upon sea denial systems such as Diesel/AIP Submarines (SSKs[4]) supported by land based aircraft and missile boats to provide the military part of the ‘sea power’ they require. In comparison a nation with a diffused EEZ, will need aircraft carriers to provide ‘organic’ air power to support any operation[5], amphibious ships to bring along land forces[6], auxiliaries for logistics to provide the global reach, major escorts and nuclear submarines (SSNs & perhaps SSGNs[7]) – all necessary to protect and project sea power on a global scale[8].

It’s not only a nation’s EEZ which determines their requirements; the world is increasingly interconnected, or put another way, globalised. This means that the trade routes which crisscross the world moving everything from energy & raw materials to completed multi-component products, and which depends upon the “freedom of the sea’s” for that movement are of massive importance. Something accentuated by the fact that the ships which carry all this are growing bigger as their owners seek economies of scale; some modern ships carry as much as a convoy of 50 ships did in the Second World War[9]. This is great for companies, terrible for countries as it means that the impact of disruption (or even worse, destruction) of the practically never ending conveyor belt like flow of ships would at the minimum be devastating economically – in the case of energy supplies it could be literally life and death for millions[10]. This brings in another version of sea power, a nation which is unable to protect its trade is a weak sea power; protection of this trade requires presences and is the principle role of escorts during ‘peace-time’[11]. Even this is variable, as major exporting nations require less strength as the onus is on the importing nations which need the goods to protect the trade – of course the nations which are most exposed are those nations which are trading nations, both major importers & exporters as for them the movement of goods is a foundation which if undermined would cause their economy to crumble. Protection of this has been the traditional role of the Royal Navy, and is exemplified in its Prayer which states: “that we may be a safeguard unto our most gracious Sovereign Lady, Queen Elizabeth and her dominions, and a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions”.

The final factor affecting a nation’s sea power is their diplomatic commitments/support; again a nation higher up the status level can expect more support but, in turn, more is expected more of it. These alliances and the status they bring can deliver a certain level of insulation from events, as well as false feels of greater security – false because the greater security is dependent upon the idea that other nations will protect their interests; which they will as long as those interests coincide with their own and they do not have other commitments for their forces. An excellent example is the reliance European nations have developed upon America for defence; and the fact those nations seem to have perceived this as being more technological reliance[12] and are now reacting as such is interesting. As whilst seeking to be self-sufficient in an armaments is a very sensible strategic notion for any nation[13] - the fact is that the most important thing America has done for those nations is allowed them to focus on Europe, it’s America which to be fair pushed for decolonisation, which has had to take on the role the colonial powers had up till that point fulfilled of global stabilisation. It took up a mantle which whilst previously had had a lead nation, Great Britain, had been a collective work rather than a single nation’s responsibility. The great prosperity of the modern world, recession & all is based upon stability – conflict disrupts that, unstable regimes disrupt that, any problems disrupt that and for the last half a century it has been America’s job to deal with it. America though cannot afford to shoulder this burden indefinitely, neither should it be expected to; the Pacific Pivot whatever it’s end result is an example of the rebalancing it is having to do as it has to focus on protecting once more its own interests. For European nations this means that they will have to consider their interests, their role in the world and the security as their own responsibility[14]; and more than likely, although it could take decades to break the current cycle, adjust spending on defence to fit.

Sea Power is global power, the sea is the medium by which all people are brought together, and can reach other – even before the undersea cables that are the truest foundation of modern communications ran along its bed the sea was the global information super highway where cultures met and where discoveries were passed along. It has been a constant throughout the passage of the recorded history of humanity[15]; the only change has been the evolution in both how people use it, and the capability with which people make use of it.

In summary Sea Power is not just about fighting high level wars. It is about daily political commitments, flexibility, potentiality, capability and manoeuvrability: whether hard or soft; economic, political or military it is about the things that the sea offers a government, a nation, a people in terms of options and resources. However what they get out from it depends entirely upon what they are willing to put in. Having started with his words, and for all his humanity, it seems sensible to make use of another quote from Churchill; which sums up eloquently what Sea Power can do for a nation.

We have never lived at anybody’s mercy. We have never lived upon the good pleasure of any Continental nation in regard to our fundamental requirements. We have never entrusted the home defence of this country to any foreign power. We have never asked for any help from anyone. We have given help to many, but to make good the security of our own island we have asked for help from none.

Winston S. Churchill, Commons, March 8, 1934

Further Reading:                             




[11] although with counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, national & international emergencies, anti-smuggling, presence/showing-the-flag and various other contingencies which spring up, the phrase ‘peace-time’ looks more & more misleading
[12] Whilst it certainly provided volume for NATO’s force structure, the fact is the American armed forces were mostly valued for their high-tech/high –value units such as Patriot air defence batteries; hence why many NATO countries do not actually have their own equivalent systems to defend their forces.
[13] Which of course Europe is not; making the idea of a European Defence Industry just as much of strategic misnomer – however recent focus on procuring missiles from MBDA rather than buying from the Standard Missile company; buying Sylver VLS rather than MK 41.
[14] For the UK this will include 14 Overseas Territories, of which 12 are islands and not all have airfields but they do all have EEZs around them with the potential economic & strategic benefits/requirements.
[15] And more than likely the unrecorded and pre-history of humanity

Sunday, 1 September 2013

August 2013 Thoughts: Naval Diplomacy – from the Amerigo Vespucci to a Royal Yacht


In August of this year the Amerigo Vespucci, one of the Italian’s navy’s three sail training ships (the others being the Italia and the Palinuro[1]), docked in South Quay near Canary Warf its purpose was multi-layered. The most obvious reasons being a nice stop for the officer cadets and crew, a visit to an allied major/capital city to strengthen ties, and in the name of those ties to hosting a series of tours, dinners and talks. In broad terms it was exactly what the Royal Yacht used to be used for by British governments, but trading on Italian chic rather than the majesty of British royalty. This was the colourful pageantry side of naval diplomacy at work (as was highlighted by the Captain as its primary role), and it was good; the Italian navy pulling out all the stops to accomplish the missions that are the bread and butter of these vessels, and highlighting all the good the ship does, the Marina Militare does, and Italy does & produces.

What is Naval Diplomacy?

In one sentence its ‘diplomacy which is carried out from the sea or upon the sea’; the trouble is that one sentence whilst accurate, also covers so much but gives so little. For starters whilst it encompasses that which is usually considered Maritime Diplomacy & the Law of the Sea, i.e. what happens at sea, it in fact goes further as it also includes the use of the sea as a medium to convey an effect on the land. Broadly speaking naval diplomacy fits into four areas, which define not only how the approach the type of vessel which is best:

Area
Explanation
Vessel
Presence/Deterrence
Presence is about making it known that your nation has an interest in the events that are taking place it that area; the larger the steak a nation has in the events the more significant the presence required.
Deterrence is about achieving a level of force present that will make any actions country to the will of the nation deploying that force, either likely to take too high a losses or be defeated entirely.
Presence is about ‘Gunboats’ but it can grow as it moves from a watching/waving the flag role to a more forceful ‘no’ which will require ships of greater ‘potential’.
Furthermore larger ships should have spaces aboard for conferences – after all holding talks to prevent a conflict aboard a warship at sea, could not be on more neutral ground or in a more secure space.
Relationships
When ships pass at sea they acknowledge each other; even at the height of the Cold War the ships of the rival alliances would still say interact. These contacts will often grow when vessels find themselves working nearby each other- perhaps conducting counter-piracy or some other similar mission. These interactions build bridges which the pomp, formality, rigidity and posturing of land borders do not – a fact which is sometimes ascribed to the simple truth that all sailors risk more from the sea than enemy action.
Any ship will do, but warships are usually better for interacting with other warships on an ‘equivalency’.
Alliances
These can vary from simple accords to full treaty organisations; but whatever the form they require maintenance like any relationship. They require exercises to keep allies familiar and up to standard that operational co-operation/co-ordination is already practiced so as to allow for smooth operation.
Again it’s a combination in that a constant regional presence by a single vessel, with regular visits by more powerful vessels for training.
Trade
A ship turning up and hosting events can draw interest in the goods of the nation that sends it. When the Royal Yacht motored into port, even without any royalty aboard, it would host contract signing events, trade fares and lots of meet & greet events. At the Amerigo Vespucci everything is done to make visits memorable, the food, the drink and the ceremonies are all of the highest quality Italian products.
For this status is everything, a flagship such as an aircraft carrier, or a ship which has cache because it’s special – i.e. a Royal Yacht or sail training ship, are best as they will garner the most attention, interest and most importantly attendance.

Despite the fact that it can be fit into just four rough areas, Naval Diplomacy is one of the most subtle forms of international relations as a single gesture can carry multiple messages on different levels of analysis; which in turn have a differing impact/weight depending upon the tool used to do it. A warship hosting an event will have a different impact from an auxiliary, and again to a geo-strategic/tactical or status ship; the latter group will always carry the most weight although depending on which they are that can be read differently. A status ship will usually be seen as a projection of power but with less militaristic overtones – usually more friendly so is excellent for building economic alliances, supporting trade and making ‘first contact’. Whereas a geo-strategic/tactical vessel such as an aircraft carrier will always have the visible ‘potential’ for military action, so whilst again it can be used to support trade by hosting suitable events, it is excellent when used for building strategic alliances and for highlighting intent for action. Smaller ships are again capable of these things, but of course on a smaller scale; a single helicopter popping around a country with some personnel in can highlight presence, multiple helicopters makes that presence tangible – but also represents the commitment of a large volume of resources.  

How Maritimes & International Law affect Naval Diplomacy

In the modern world nothing exists in a complete vacuum from words and even the sea has some rules & regulations; however the vast majority of international law has yet to be written, and international maritime law is even more sparsely populated. This is mainly due to the difficulty of having to get every nation to agree to it; even the United Nations has only accomplished so much. The main laws that affect naval diplomacy, and using naval forces for conventional deterrence are the those which effect the Territorial Waters (TW), those which affect the Contiguous Zone (CZ) and those affecting the Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ); all but the first 12 nautical miles from the coast, the TW, are considered International Waters under which access of vessels cannot be restricted accept under circumstance of war.

EEZs cover the area of water out to 200nautical miles from the coast, although it can also extend further if the continental shelf is proved to be contiguous to a nation’s EEZ. Within this area that nation has complete authority over all resources contained in the sea or under it. Put like this it sounds simple, but most countries EEZs are to a greater or lesser extent comprises or contested; the current troubles in the South China Sea, the Cod Wars in the North Atlantic, some of the current issues over Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands are about nations wanting the resources (fish, fossil fuels, ores and all the rest) that are under the sea around them.  TW and the CZ are where a nation can enforce civil laws as well as control resources; TW as has been said are where freedom of the seas do not apply, and a ship needs permission to enter. It was a figure fixed before the missile age, before 12 nautical miles was no longer a barrier to enemy attack and which was the area visible from land by the naked eye so was therefore considered to be ‘practical’.

Monitoring and exercising control over these areas requires more than just a cursory glance on occasion; for starters the shear area they cover makes a constant presence necessary. For example the UK has an EEZ of 6,805,586km2 (not including Gibraltar or any Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus)[2] compared to a Total Internal Area (basically the land + plus lakes) of just 242,900km2, or in simple terms the sea area which is the responsibility of the British government is a little over 28x the size of the land under its charge[3]. It is the responsibility of the government to monitor fishing & fish stocks, study & preserve the ecology & bio-diversity, prevent piracy and basically police the waters; furthermore considering the level of resources contained within, protect it from avaricious neighbours. Presence is therefore not only about supporting allies, but also key to protecting national ‘territory’ & interests.  

What makes the Sea special?

The sea is next to impossible to construct anything on so it cannot be held in a conventional sense the same way land can, even the mightiest warships can be driven from their stations by fierce storms that can ravage oceans. The resources are very difficult and expensive to get to and fish stocks are depleted. So there is a reasonable case for why bother?

Well, for starters whilst the resources are difficult & expensive to get at, they are reachable, technology is improving every day and the market is such that the profit from getting to them is more than worth it. Furthermore, whilst the sea may make the internet look positively controllable in terms of a medium for flow of information it also carries 70% of the world’s surface. Plus unlike the internet which is restricted to data movement, the sea also allows for the physical movement of goods and people between nations, i.e. trade. In fact, more trade and goods go buy sea than any other method, principally because as a sheer function cost & volume sea trade is worth it.  Fish stocks are improving, as better management is put in place; and whilst construction of a ‘border’ is not really possible, and whilst it can be argued that countries don’t own the sea merely act as it’s guardians.

It’s special because whilst all the above and on the previous pages is true, the fact is the sea is an international free for all; which is why ships of opposing nations bump into each other and can’t ignore each other so have to behave in cordial manner.

Summary

Naval diplomacy is not just about the sea, although it’s the sea which gives it a lot of its capabilities; at its heart naval diplomacy is about utilising the advantages of the sea for strategic national gains, whether that is selling a nations goods or selling a nation as an ally. However, like conventional deterrence it is something which is best built on firm foundations rather than sand; a sufficiently supported program of naval diplomacy can provide bountiful opportunities for the country that wields it. Deploying a land force can be expensive, complicated and binding, a ship just docking on it way past is just maximising the opportunity; but to do it well the ships and embassies have to be prepared for it.

For example if Nation 1 wishes to maximise the effect of one of it’s destroyers (chosen for the example as it’s a large escort, but not a geo-strategic/tactical vessel or a status vessel) visiting Nation 2 then the embassy of Nation 1 must have an up to date a list of ministers/opposition, dignitaries, business people and opinion formers ready to go so that invites can be issued – not just to locals from Nation 2, but from other nations diplomatic corps and of course representatives of Nation 1’s firms that have dealings in the area, turning each ship visit into a must attend opportunity for great food, great opportunity and great experience; all things navies as a tradition do well. The result of such an evening will be closer relationships built between Nation 1’s diplomatic corps & navy and all of the visiting persons, if handled right this will not only provide what the 2012 Olympics provided the UK with (on a smaller scale of course) – the general feeling that Nation 1 is really quite good, but also provide contacts which lead to orders of Nation 1’s goods, boosting Nation 1’s industry and providing employment at home[4]. Which is at the end of the day one of the core duties of government, keeping the economy as strong as possible, it’s that and defending its citizens/realm from attack.

 



[2] All figures obtained from http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/ (18/08/2013)
[3] The French government oversees an area nearly 18x the size of its land, the Seychelles is nearly 2,938x the size of it’s land
[4] During one trip to Bombay without a member of the Royal Family aboard her, the Royal Yacht Britain got £1.1 billion worth of contracts that had been sitting around not moving forward, signed. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2042231/Why-Tony-Blair-wished-hadnt-Queen-cry.html (18/08/2013)