Wednesday, 16 September 2009

Is there a possibility for Amphibiosity in coversion?

Concept


A good fast containership hull would be an economical starting point for a new generation aircraft carrier. The hull of a containership is open and empty, so naval architects can fit in accommodation, fuel tanks, magazines and hangar decks, and on top of it all, the flight deck needed for an aircraft carrier. For the cost of two ships now building, we could have four or more. After all, apart from planned dry-dock time, ships sometimes don’t pass in the night, but instead suffer accidents, and with just two carriers available, the danger is that one will be undergoing a refit and the other damage.

(Wragg, 2009, pp. 189-90)

This is not a new concept, the MAC ships in World War II were key to the efforts against the wolf packs, Atlantic Conveyor was at points in time the most important vessel sent to the Falklands War – and was certainly the greatest strategic loss. Full conversion is requirement of some major changes on the ships though; hence the first section of this piece focuses on practicability, and it is only after that capability will be considered.

Practicability

As Wragg makes clear these vessels are open spaces, in fact almost blank canvasses; only better. Due the fact that they are designed to be strong, even without a top deck to complete them, the addition of such a deck will only add their capability.

They are built with range; they do their journey’s with no chance of an at Replenishment At Sea, they are built with speed; time is money, and they are built big; this means it is literally a case of building a top and a hangar, with a large flex bay underneath – far larger and therefore more flexible than the ones which have shown to be off such use in the Danish Absalom class and the American LCS designs; with the freeness offered by their initial design there is no reason why, that with the provision hydraulic bomb doors, that the lifts and ramps could not service both decks – therefore providing maximum internal mobility and force capability.

It would also be a lot cheaper than building a brand new third aircraft carrier or a pair of LHDs; especially in Britain’s case, as they could all be put together in one yard. This would highlight the quality of that yard for civilian contracts, whilst also providing a very capable vessel for the RN at a cost of under £1billion per unit.

The most complicated part of the conversion will be the re-sitting of the superstructure; and the changing of the engine and power generation arrangement. The former is relatively simple due to the fact that ship is to be built up/filled in as part of the conversion any way; it depends upon the design chosen, and whether American, British or French practices are chosen. The power plant is more complicated as depending upon island position, propulsion system chosen and whether or not it requires a funnel to evacuate steam/fumes; if the American Island system is followed, with it mounted to the rear, then the power plant may have to be barely altered from its current arrangement.

Due the power, size and stability available in the design a relatively heavy weapons fit could be included for the benefit of both operational and tactical strategic capability. For example a heavy CIWS outfit of 4x SeaRam and 4x Mk110 BAE 57mm could be installed in complimentary pairs to provide defence against any missiles, small boats or aircraft which penetrate the perimeter. A perimeter which could be further enhanced by the inclusion of the Mk41 VLS loaded with SM-3 ABM, Aster 30 & 15, Tomahawk TLCM and ASROC. This along with the inclusion of the sensors and systems off the T45 destroyer; would allow the vessels to be fully multi-role and capable, as well as reducing the requirement for close escort.

Problems

The limitations are obvious; any design is being built in a confined space, an already built hull. Whilst it is a hull which is large, roomy and undeveloped; in a simple phrase, it is a ‘blank canvass’. It is still an already built hull, many will certainly contest that survivability is better included in a hull which is built for purpose – some would even contest it is cheaper to build an equivalent vessel from scratch than to convert. The other area of contention and problems will be the capability of stores/support mechanisms that can be put into such a vessel and its ability to deal with top weight for all operations. This author would contest that with all these questions and arguments they would be topics of further study, but are nothing that good Naval Architect could not overcome with a little thought.

Capability

A conversion is likely to produce a highly capable ship; but any aircraft carrying vessel (even one of an amphibious focus) is judged by its capacity for aircraft, not its capacity in any other role. This is conversion hover, is not just about producing an aircraft carrier, it is primarily envisaged as an LHA. Therefore it is fitting it should be fitted with ramp for Griffon Hovercraft; the same craft which are currently deployed upon the RN’s serving LPH, HMS Ocean, with much success. Ably bracketed by 4 LCVPs on davits; this is tradition in the commando carrier concept and is something which adds very interesting dimension into possible force multiplication.

The various roles require quite different air groups; the size and composition of which will depend upon the size of container ship converted. TEU’s are containers, and container ships are classed by how many they can carry. The specifications given at the end of this, and therefore the air groups are for the conversion of vessel that carries 6-8000 TEUs; there are larger vessels available, some carrying as many as 12000 TEUs. The important thing about the 6-8000 TEU container ships, are they represent the best balance of size, manoeuvrability and possibility if they are converted – there larger ones are really to large; the smaller ones are two small.

Ideally the smaller 6000 TEU ship could accommodate, in theory, its hangar and air group of 44 aircraft including either E-2D Hawkeye AWACs or Chinook Heavy Lift helicopters. Whilst the larger, 8000 TEU vessel, would accommodate the same air group of about 44 aircraft; such a vessel would have the advantage of developing a far more potent sortie rate. This would be down to its greater space for workshops and other support facilities required to maintain the capability of aircraft and their weapon systems.

There are constraints in any design though, Hawkeye’s & the cheaper and better F-35c JSF & the current envisage generation of UAVs all require catapults; this is something which could easily be built in (and AWACs are an aircraft carriers best force multiplier). It is though a decision which will need to be made at the design stage. Such decisions are crucial, a ship may be in service with the navy for 40 years, therefore whatever restrictions are imposed at the beginning, cannot be easily rectified (in the catapults case, without some major re-piping or re-wiring), and certainly not replaced in service for up to 4 decades.

The flex deck, is another key enabler of this container ship conversion, its ability to be re-modulated and refocused would allow 1600 personnel to be carried its assault amphibious role. Slightly less for the longer term deployment of conflict stabilisation a smaller contingent of 1000 personnel would be carried, with the space being converted to increase internal food storage and recreational facilities in line with the requirements of its longer deployments. In carrier mode, the flex deck could be converted to either stores, extra hangar space further increasing the aircraft capacity or it could be a true commando carrier and accommodate 800 personnel; to provide any battle group that it is a component of with a light strike/raiding and even emergency conflict stabilisation force.

Conclusion

When in future the British government deploys the RN, for whatever role, in its current situation it is going have to watch timing very careful, or else it will be deploying forces with no air cover. The purpose built carriers of the Queen Elizabeth class will if built number just two, and there will be periods when neither will be operational. Added to this there is proof in the success of HMS Ocean, in the necessity of an air assault component in the amphibious fleet. The answer to this question, especially in the time of financial strictures, is obvious to the mind of this author in light of what has been discovered and discussed in the course of this work.

A class of 3 (or perhaps 4...we can hope) converted container ships would fit the requirements of the possible roles very successfully and at a cost most affordable to the nation. The benefits of having vessels; which in turn could provide an alternative or supplementary carrier battle group when such is the need; the core of amphibious task group; or the keystone of any sea based conflict stabilisation and management that the British government wishes to engage in are great. Such vessels, especially armed as suggested, would provide the currently very overstretched RN with a multi-versatile core from which its other forces and capabilities could projected with the necessary levels of support and security.

Further more if they were designed to be capable (and were in fact capable of doing so) of carrying the ‘commando carrier’ load then they really would be ‘Woolworths Carriers’; a good quality vessel for all occasions, not spectacular, but not something to be discounted.

Specifications: that must be asked for (Based on the Conversion of a 6-8000 TEU container ship)

Reconfigurable air group/assault group for roles:

in LHA/Conflict stabilisation mode -

  • Air Group: 8 UAV, 12 JSF, 8 Apache, 4 Chinook, 4 ASW Merlin, 8 Merlin Transports = total of 44 aircraft
  • Surface Assault: 4 LCVPs on Davits, stern ramp allowing access of 4 Griffon Hovercraft
  • 1000 troops carried = 1 Squadron RMC + Enhancements

in LHA/Assault mode -

  • Air Group: 8 UAV, 12 Apache, 8 Chinook, 12 Merlin Transports = total of 40 aircraft
  • Surface Assault: 4 LCVPs on Davits, stern ramp allowing access of 4 Griffon Hovercraft
  • 1600 troops carried = 2 Squadron RMC

Depending apon the design; this might also be a possibility

In Commando Carrier mode -

  • Air Group: 8 UAV, 24 JSF, 4 Hawkeye, 4 ASW Merlin, 4 Merlin transports = total of 44 aircraft
  • Surface Assault: 4 LCVPs on Davits
  • 400 troops carried = ½ Squadron RMC

Vital statistics (aprox):

Length of flight deck: 300m

width of flight deck: 50/75m

Speed: 27kts +

Range: 10,000nm

displacement: 40-60,000 tons

Aircraft operations

  • 2 Aircraft lifts; each capable of hefting a Chinook (or Hawkeye)
  • 2 Equipment lifts; each capable of moving a standard under-slung load (up to a 4x4 vehicle) or weapons
  • Hangar Deck/Flex Deck underneath
  • Ski Jump + a Single Catapult would be best for the development of operational capability on a budget and would have best interoperability with the currently envisaged Queen Elizabeth class; however if these are in the end not built then 2 Catapults would be needed.

Assault operations

  • stern ramp allowing for the operation of 4 Griffon Hovercraft
  • davits for LCVPs, the stern ramp must be able to support a Mexifloat or similar to provide for an easier operational loading/offloading.
  • There will need to be spots to allow for 2 Chinook and 4 Merlin’s to be operate simultaneously in assault prep.

Weapons & sensors

  • Enhanced T45 sensor suite; command and control system
  • 2*32cell Mk41 VLS mounted out of standard flight parameters; combined with sensor suite should be capable of mounting SM-3 ABM, Aster 30 & 15, Tomahawk TLCM and ASROC
  • 4* SeaRam & 4* BAE MK110 57mm for CIWS
  • 8* Oerlikon 30 mm KCB guns on DS-30B mounts & 8 single 20mm cannon mounts, for saturation defence in confined waters
  • Chaff, & flares

Power Plant

  • Gas Turbines combined with Pod Propulsion would be best for all round operations of the vessel.
  • A significant level of power will have to be developed in order to support Electro-Magnetic Catapults or alternatively a steam generator will need to be included to power any steam catapult.

Cost

  • conversion & purchase must cost less 0.9billion per vessel, and the vessel must be serviceable for at least 25years

Bibliography

Wragg, D. (2009). Naval Aviation: 1909-2009. Barnesly: Pen & Sword Maritime.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/container-types.htm
http://www.eurans.com.ua/eng/faq/containerships/

************************************************************************************

newwars (http://newwars.wordpress.com/)

Alex, as long as they Navy is wholly focused on projecting power ashore against Third World dictators, or trying to stop China from invading Taiwan, they will have no time or money for alternatives like this. We must get spending priorities straight or we lose our edge. The West having been at the forefront of change for centuries, is now wholly committed to the declining dominance of carrier air, when there are so many other power projection alternatives, as well as needs for the small low tech warship and auxiliaries.

the trouble is this type of vessel would be perfect for those kinds of operations in those kinds of wars; although I personally think that specialised vessels for the warships will be always present. I do wonder about the non-sinking amphibs and the future aviation ships - so many large hulls already available...however, it is capacity for workshops and systems that will be key.

yours sincerly

Alex

***************************************************************************

Armchair Chinese Admiral (go easy on my landlubber's use of naval terms.)

some good points were raised, but the whole point about a more permanent conversion and the use of pod propuslion is that these ships can be 'quite' manouverable - nothing of the order of 50,000, in fact even 30,000 tons is ever going to be manouverable enough; especially when avoiding a missile comining in at Mach 3. With your idea containerised CIWS weapons could be installed, which would allow for security.

In this one, ideally it would (along with its Air Group and its supporting Escorts) have a 4 Sea RAM CIWS and 4 BAE Mk110 57mm as well as two Mk41 VLS loaded with various missiles of its own; in other words its aim is to stop the missile before it hits the ship. Added to this the open space of the hull would allow for some quite heavy levels of subdivision, stabilisation and anti sinking systems to be installed.

However; the key with these ships is the space they have to put into supporting their airgroup, supporting their troops - that is their true advantage.

yours sincerly

Alex

***************************************************************************
Armchair Chinese Admiral (go easy on my landlubber's use of naval terms.) 2nd Post

this is where we diverge; what you are talking about is cheap and quick wartime conversion; what I am talking about is full time fleet ship; a full conversion, no containers, the hull be used as blank canvass with proper decks put in a - a complete rebuild in manyways. My ship would be a non-expendable asset...well all assets are expendable but it would not be one to which this would be readily described it would be to useful.

The ship I am proposing would be a class of three vessels, to provide the RN/RM amphibious Task group with the LHA it desperately needs, as well as the core of an influence squadron and even a back up carrier when operational required - I am talking about making proper warships out of them. I am talking about this from the RN perspective - which needs ships of these capabilities.

Also Pod Propulsion is probably going to become standard on the new 8-12-???000 TEU vessels as it has been found to be far less maintenance intesive, more energy efficient as well as more able to manouver in busy ports...and shipping lanes. However, for the purposes of my design would put in as part of the rebuild.

yours sincerly

Alex

Tuesday, 21 July 2009

Curtesy

I was driving back from work today, the road was a little busy, at a point where due to a bus lane two lanes become one, a little jam developed. Now why is this starting this post you will ask? well I had (because I have experienced it before), gone straight into the right hand lane, but not everyone manages this of course, and when I got to the point of the conference (which is helpfully just before some traffic lights) a jam had developed with the cars from both lanes coming together. Now thanks to a bus forcing its way through the bus lane, a lady driving a small Peugeot 308 (small compared to my Vauxhall Astra) was forced up next to me, indicating to join my lane. Now when the traffic cleared a bit, she was most shocked when I waved her forward instead of charging on my own way. Partially I will admit I let her through because she looked slightly distracted, not unfocused on her driving, but as if she had something on her mind; but mainly I let her through because I could, because it was the 'right', the 'courteous' thing to do.

Now I get to the point of this blog, if I can be courteous whilst driving my car, why can senior officers and ministers in our military/government not be courteous with each other and with each other’s projects; why does every military system have to be compared to every other military system? Yes we need to get the best for our needs; but why turn the argument over whether or not the Army gets its own or RAF UAVs into whether or not the RN should be allowed new carriers, or maintain control of its own fixed wing aircraft? Why is it then when the RN offers to help out the Army by sending more of its Commando Helicopters to Afghanistan, the RAF then jumps in about this testifying to the RN not needing fixed wing aircraft, and therefore not needing to buy the JSF, therefore Britain does not need to purchase the JSF, and as the RAF's magic Eurofighter's cannot fly off carriers - they are not needed either. Apart from this argument which was put forward in a magazine being terribly convoluted - it all smacks of obsession with self. There seems to be a rash of officers, both in American and Britain more obsessed with defending their own patch, and getting their own funding than providing their nations with what they need to defend themselves and their interests.

Now before anyone gets into the various debates of: maintaining bases in Germany, and Saudi Arabia vs. building aircraft carriers; whether we should build 3 or 2; or if they should be built nuclear or not; purchasing Eurofighters or JSFs; UAVs or Manned; IFVs or MRAP; in fact any of the debates wouldn't it be good if those fighting both sides admitted that the other systems do actually have some benefits; for example the RAF admit that the RN needs carriers and organic air power of a much better standard than it currently has; that the Army allows that the RN needs escorts and subs; the RAF allows that UAVs/MAVs dropping bombs will not win the war in Afghanistan alone; the RN could admit and allow the Commander of the RM to become a fully fledged member of the Chiefs of Staffs. Accepting this, and instead of making the debate 'you have to have one or the other based on partisanship'; you transform the debate based in the merits of the various equipment. Such a debate is what Britain, in fact what every nation needs; we need politicians, ambassadors, the public and most importantly all branches of the forces to get involved, to work out what the nation's current, future and supportable defence commitments are and are most likely to be; then design a force, and force structure capable of fulfilling those needs - perhaps with a little more than required, just in case.

Tuesday, 30 June 2009

Rebuffing the IPPR

Never give in,
Never give in,
Never, never, never,
Never-in nothing,Great or small,
Large or petty,
Never give in, except to convictions of honour and good sense.
Never Give In, October 29, 1941 Winston Churchill

I was going to write a stinging attack on Paddy Ashdown and the IPPR, who managed to write a report which recommended scraping every navy project, and greater still - not purchasing any American equipment or actually exercising with them as much; because it is Europe that is our future and Europe that is our greatest ally and commitment; however after reading the report, and realising how lacking in proper research (apart from the opinion of so called 'great men' of the past) and un-ashamedly biased and corrupt it was; with pages reading as if they had been cribbed from the former Commander of the RAF's article in the telegraph. So I decided to be balanced, methodical, and vaguely polite. I would also like to point outs in panel was surprisingly lacking from a balanced naval point of view; perhaps this explains why every system it seeks to cut or curtail is part of the Royal Navy's order of battle.

On a sub-note I would point out that the last time a power put its nuclear deterrent on aircraft, with cruise missiles, well accidents did happen - and who really likes the thought of nuclear bombs endlessly circling above our heads.

The phrase throwing the baby out with the bath water springs to my mind, when the say that whilst we cannot fault the strategic and tactical arguments for the nuclear deterrent, aircraft carriers, JSF (rather than Typhoon's...which they do not mention in spending review at all), or Type 45's(which are not in service yet, but they have been built, and yet they want to scrap them or sell them on); however, due to the strictures of the current financial climate we should cancel them all, and put of the Future Surface Combatant indefinitely. Okay, I know currently we are fighting a war in Afghanistan; but who knows where we will be fighting next? Who knows what forms of conflict there will be? What we do know is that aircraft carriers are useful; they provide on call air power where ever they are needed. As for the strategic nuclear deterrent, it is currently the only ace in our sleeve keeping us on as a permanent member of the Security Council; something which every foreign expert says is incalculable in its worth diplomatically and status wise. The T-45s are necessary in a world of cruise missiles; and whilst they do not have the t41 vls which would allow them to carry the SM-3 ABMM...they are pretty good, and could be upgraded fairly cheaply. as for the JSF's...the same arguments for an aircraft carrier, require that vessel to have aircraft, and the RAF has got rid of the sea harriers...so there is no other option.

Let’s all go nuts and piss of our best ally buy European, conform with Europe. This seems strange to me; as it is a German soldier in Afghanistan complains about a lack of a good bed..and if they see combat, then the whole company has to go back home for counselling; whilst this is not something to hold against the Germans - it is something to say that you should seek to have as much commonality with its more active partner; with the one who it goes to war with. We may someday see United States of Europe, I for one shall fight it democratically to the utmost; and if me and those like me fail...expect to see me moving to Canada, or Australia, New Zealand perhaps; but up until that point to do try and make something out of nothing, make an artificial connection because that is your dream, when the reality is very different.

Finally the bias. An attack on all these navy projects, well that must mean the RN is now not necessary. well its not surprising; you take a group of former RAF, and Army officers, and you ask them to write a free thinking paper on the future of defence spending...surprise, surprise the service which they can take the money from is the Navy...wow that was unexpected - please excuse the cynicism but I am getting a little fed up of this; we have to stop this destruction of our armed forces...these spending fights are turning them inside out, and this is going to lead to tactical problems in the battlefield. If only they united together against the treasury, then they would surely far more likely to succeed in getting what they need to carry out the missions that the British Government signs them up for.

And where are the FCO, in this piece I see no mention of them, I see no mention of their views on the aircraft carriers, and the strategic nuclear deterrent...even though these weapons are in the norm far more important to them and their work? I find this lack of involvement and lack of joined up long-term thinking and preparation a little disturbing, and disquieting; it seems so reactionist as to be dangerous.

So after writing all this, you will be wondering why I started off with Churchill, well apart from it being about time I did, I thought it would be a good speech for those who speak reason, for those who put forward a balanced strategy for defence. I support the aircraft carriers, I also support the army's need for troops, I am sceptical - although many are not and I do respect their arguments, of the value of the Typhoon fighters...what though I want to see, second only to an election, is a proper defence review; which instead of looking just to see what it can cut, is a review which says: these are our current commitments; this what we need to be able to maintain these commitments; these are likely commitments; therefore we need some other stuff to give coverage if they come true. That is the only way that any British government could fulfil its most sacred duty...defence of the realm, and the only way to rebuild the covenant between the political classes, the British people, and the forces which protect them...by allowing the forces to ask for and be given what they need to do the jobs we ask of them.
*************************************************************************************
Solomon
that is the problem, a few years ago the other services (army and raf) forced the RN to take on the sole burden of maintaining the strategic detterrent, and they managed to get the extra money divided equally between the three services!
yours sincerly
Alex

The Bay Class....Brilliant Motherships? or just Logistics?



RFA Mounts Bay



Here are the vitals:


Crew: 60

What they can Transport :

  • Troops - 356, materiel - 1,200 linear metres of vehicles; including up to 32 Challenger II MBTs & 32 Warrior IFVs, or 150 land rovers, or various other combinations

  • 12 x 40 TEU or 24 x 24 TEU containers

Landing Craft: 2 x LCVP Mk.5 or 1 x LCU Mk10, 2 x Mexeflotes


RFA Cardigan Bay

Overall Length: 176m

Beam: 26.5m

Draught: 5.8m

Full Load Displacement: 16,200t


Speed: 18kt


Range: 8,000nm

Propulsion:

  • Type: Diesel electric
  • Diesel Engines: 2 x Wartsila 8L26 engines (2,240kW each), 2 x Wartsila 12V26 (3,360kW each) engines

RFA Sir Bedevier...what the Bay Class replaced

WEAPONS

The ship design has included weight and space allocation for 4 30mm gun emplacements, a Phalanx close-in weapon system and decoy launchers for chaff and infrared flare rounds. there are also rumours that they can be fitted with a vls designed for the launch of sea wolf missiles...although these have not be substantiated by any official site or source in an explicit manner.

HELICOPTERS
The superstructure is located far forward to provide the large available space to the aft of the ship for the helicopter deck.

RFA Largs Bay alongside next to the Grand Turk


"The helicopter deck has the capacity for two landing spots and allows simultaneous operation of two medium-size helicopters"such as EH101 Merlin, or Sea King

The helicopter deck structure is reinforced for two static load points and will also support operations by a Chinook helicopter, an MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft and Support and Amphibious Battlefield Rotorcraft.

A helicopter hangar is not installed as standard, but tempory ones (picture above) are often fitted to those vessles on counter drug operations in caribean, as well as those operating in the south atlantic; they are usually big enough to support either 1 medium or 2 light helicopters in shelter; although most rotor maintenance will have to be carried out on the deck.

My Analysis

I like these ships, they are very good at sea keeping, and can carry a lot, I just wish they were fitted with not for on the weapons, I also think a permanent hangar should have been included and a definite plus in my opinion would have been the construction of 6 or even 9 of these excellent vessels. The fact that they are 'D's of the amphibious trade means that they can operate Landing Craft with maximum ability; making them very useful tools of modern amphibious warfare - in both the logistical and tactical sense. The latter I added on because although they have only 350 troops as standard, they have been given enlarged shower facilities as well as larger than required galley spaces...meaning in overload they can take over 800 troops, or a full Royal Marines Squadron or a Army Infantry Battalion.

Overall the Bay class are great, but to have been really up to standard, there needed to be more of them.

************************************************************************************

Cost: £400 million for all four; this included cost of design, and it would have been cheaper per unit cost had all the orriginal 6 considered been bought, going on final cost that would have made to total £528million...which would have made a unit cost of about £88million each, rather than £100million

Sunday, 28 June 2009

Whatever Happened to the Type 45?

Figure 1: HMS Daring

Abstract

This text is examining the appearance of the Type 45 Destroyers in the printed media, how various experts feel the program has been portrayed, and what could be done to improve the situation. It has discovered that there has been so small an amount of real coverage of the program that it is almost a joke. It has found that a nation which used to pride itself on its navy, and where practically every journalist could name off the top of their heads every major vessel in the Royal Navy. Now, they cannot even get the number of missiles carried in the navy’s brand new class of destroyers. It has concluded that the programme of procurement for Type 45 destroyer has included the MoD pursuing a media agenda which was actually counterproductive (whether willingly or not) to the Royal Navy getting what it asked for. Its findings reflect the fact that the UKNDA has been handicapped in its attempts to correct this and many other programs. Primarily this could be said to be because the UKNDA pursues an exclusive top down approach to lobbying rather than inclusive ground swell political campaign; simply put it is concentrating on influencing ministers and rallying former senior military personal to its standard, when the former have no wider body of ‘voters’ interested in the issue, and the latter are already prepared to pledge support; but are very bad at presenting either a united front or actively mounting a political front to effect the government. However, more than anything it is the current government forcing down the level of debate which has crippled both their actions and their attempt to build a wider base of support. In order to overcome this in the long-term a suggestion might be for them to try a populist approach to build up a wider foundation of support for complete defence procurement reform; as well as to enable to starting of an ongoing vibrant debate on the future operational requirements, strategy, shape and what is necessary for it.

Figure 2: Artists impression of a T45 firing an Aster missile in profile


“I have not followed the programme closely, and to me there has been very little coverage of note in the press, and no significant discussion at Westminster.”
CG(2009)
The Type 45 class of destroyers[1] is arguably the Royal Navy’s most important vessel procurement program for 30 years[2]. These 6 destroyers, of which the Royal Navy originally asked for 14, will be the core protection, presence, and support of all future naval operations; whether they are in the Mediterranean (Freedman, et al., 1994), the South Atlantic (Woodward & Robisnon, 1992, paperback edition 2003), or East of Suez (Clapp & Southerby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands, The Battle of San Carlos Water, 1997).

These vessels, whose primary role is that of ‘monkey-goalkeeper’; moving around the seas and the carrier (Fig 3) or amphibious task groups that they will be attached to with the roles of fielding cruise missile strikes and air attacks; whilst also providing fire support with their 155mm main gun[3]. They nevertheless have only the fittings for but are not fitted with anti-ship missiles, they are fitted with a Vertical launch System (VLS)[4], which even those who recommended it, advertise it may have to be upgrade to another; which was cheaper to buy in the first place. To this are added a litany of further compromises on the original requested specifications. Even with these issues, and costing about £600million for each, there has been limited, or no involvement by the media; this report asks two questions; what have the media reported on the Type 45, and why have they reported so little. Simply put, both these questions ask what the quote at beginning stated; why has there been no debate on something so important.
Figure 3: Artists impression of a Queen Elizabeth class carrier under way

During the 1982 Falkland’s War and the 1991Gulf War I the importance of area air defence was consistently reinforced (Clapp & Southerby-Tailyour, 1997; Jones, 2008); unfortunately all the Royal Navy had was the Type 42 class destroyers (Figure 4). They were, and are still, armed with the arm launched ramjet based Sea Dart surface to air missile (Janes, 2006).
Figure 4: Type 42 class destroyer firing a Sea Dart missile
A replacement though was sought; originally this was to be a collaborative effort with France and Italy; in order to spread the cost, this was the Horizon Frigate project. Unfortunately, it was doomed from the very first due to the nations wanting different things from the vessels, and unlike with Euro-fighter project[5]; the navies were building enough the compromising was an option; thus FREMME (still sometimes called the Horizon Frigate, Fig 5) and the T45 destroyer were born. Italy and France had similar enough requirements to continue working together; whereas prior to 2004 the RN desperately needed at least 12 (it had by then been forced to accept the cuts already) Area Air Defence Destroyers or AAD’s as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) calls them, in July of 2004 it was cut to 8 (SPG Media Limited, 2009).
The T45 design was thus entrusted to British Aerospace Engineering (BAE), Britain’s largest, in fact one of the world’s largest, full spectrum arms companies. Through the borrowing of a lot of influences from both the Type 23 Duke class of ASW Frigates of the RN (Fig 6) and the Horizon project, a design was cobbled together with an initial order of eight being placed; after a strategic defence review had made further cuts.
The project continued, eventually leading to events of 2005, when HMS Daring’s keel was laid, the lead ship in class which due to budget cuts brought about by ‘unforeseen drains on the MOD finances’ (Afghanistan & Gulf War II), had been further cut to the figure it now currently resides at 6. They had also grown dramatically in price and austerity.
Figure 5: Horizon class Frigate of the French Navy

Figure 6: HMS Norfolk, a Type 23 class frigate

3.0 What has been reported?

“It has focussed on the gee whiz statistics and largely ignored the need for AAD and the question of why 6 is the right number.”
AL (2009)

The report of the type 45 has been heavily orientated within the direction of firepower and the equivalence to the Type 42s (Evans, 2006), which were considered inadequately armed even when launched 30 years previous (Ministry of Defence (National). C, 2009). The most obvious example of this focus is the quote Lord Drayson[6] in the Times “the most modern and powerful air defence destroyers anywhere in the world” (Scotland Correspondent, 2005); this is a very bold statement considering the world also contains the Arleigh Burke class of the United States (Janes, 2006). However, this is where the reporting comes in, the Arleigh Burk class are General Purpose Missile Destroyers; which thanks to the SM-3 missile[7] and their Aegis command and control system (and the SPY-2 radars) (Janes, 2006) mean they can hit ballistic missiles or aircraft the size of cricket ball’s, if ever that is necessary, but can also carry Tomahawk cruise missiles which can hit land targets with pin-point accuracy at a range of 1000nm’s (WGBH educational foundation, 2009), or can launch ASROC torpedoes at targets found by their own sensors or either of the two helicopters (compared to the Type 45’s 1) or the UAV’s(which the T45 does not have) that they carry’s sensors (Janes, 2006). Despite the comparison with the Arleigh Burke class the claim is based in some fact.


The reports point to the Principle Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMs)[8], talking about it as “the most sophisticated of its kind” (Leppard, 2009), as an ace in the Royal Navy’s arsenal; after all only one type 45 is required to defend London (Leppard, 2009) for the 2012 games. There have been considerations for installing the SM-3 on Type 45s (Pike, 2008), however as was stated in the introduction the Type 45 with the wrong VLS, it is fitted with Sylver A-50, not the Type 41 VLS, or even the Sylver A-70. The problem therefore is one of size of launcher, whilst the A-70 might have been upgradeable[9], the A-50 which was selected over the Type 41[10] for political reasons (and the Type 45s might still have to be retrofitted) is too small and too limited to be able to take the SM-3, or tomahawks, or even the less capable Tactical Land Attack Missile being developed by the French for the A-70 VLS[11].
Figure 7: Type 41 VLS missile range[12]

The comparative qualitative lacking of the Type 45 has been further clouded by the eye catching statistics such as each Type 45 has the firepower equivalent of over eight Type 42s (Evans, 2006); “weaponry capable of hitting an object the size of a cricket ball travelling at twice[13] the speed of sound” (Reid, 2007; Ministry of Defence (National). E, 2006); And that a Type 45 “generates enough electricity to power the Shetland Islands” (Reid, 2007). The fact remains that none of these statements really matter, it does not matter in a warzone whether or not a Type 45 could power the Shetland Islands, whilst being able to hit a cricket ball suggests a very accurate system - any missile or aircraft will be dodging and manoeuvring not travelling in a straight line, and the firepower of eight Type 42s does not matter as the Type 45 is not fitted with the technology to be in eight places at once[14]. These originated with the MOD’s own press releases such as is featured in Appendix F (Ministry of Defence (National). E, 2006).


“These ships will form one of the essential pillars of the Royal Navy in the 21st Century."
(Ministry of Defence (National). A, 2009)

Bob Ainsworth the Minister for the Armed Forces has been quoted by the Ministry of Defence as describing the “Type 45 is an immensely powerful state of the art destroyer that will provide a vital layer of protection from missile attack for the fleet” (Ministry of Defence (National). B, 2007); Whilst Quentin Davies the Minister for Defence Equipment and Security “These ships will form one of the essential pillars of the Royal Navy in the 21st Century". The Type 45’s are consistently presented as important and necessary for the future capability and operation of the Royal Navy in waters near or far from Britain’s own territorial waters; however only 6 are being procured.
Figure 8: HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, the LPDs which are the core of the RN's Amphibious Task Group
Figure 9: HMS Ocean the LPH which is so important to the RN's Littoral capability

4.0 Analysis of Interviews

‘To me there has been very little coverage of note in the press’
CG (2009)

AL (2009) classified the press coverage as simplistically positive and taken straight from the press release; the quote of CG is very much a reinforcement of this; but it is JM’s analysis of the press which is really interesting.
The emotive and highly expressive vocabulary that JM uses to describe the way the media interacts with their audience and the information available to them on topic of the Type 45 would suggest that he believes it is a more widespread problem than just the Type 45 program of procurement. It also points to a source of the trouble, targeting the MoD/Government’s ‘spin’ doctors as being responsible for giving cover to the undermining of the Royal Navy’s required number of destroyers. It is therefore an analysis which puts forward the view that rather than the press coverage just being non-existent in the most part and vacant in the rest, the press coverage was in places wilfully uninformed and in others was in a frame not suiting the seriousness of the topic.
Figure 10: 3D drawing of a Type 45

The seriousness of the topic though is something which comes up again and again in AL’s (2009) testimony, for example he states that “there is a glaring need to show the public that behind the statistics...is a vital mission upon which the safety, prosperity and food supply of this country depend”. AL doesn’t finish there though, making the statement that “No navy = No food, and no fuel”, a point which is probably the most salient to make in support of a stronger Royal Navy, in fact it is the most salient point to make in favour of a viable debate on defence, on what is desired for, on what is needed from the defence establishment and what is required for the forces to accomplish that.

This is different again from the way that JM develops it; he suggests that the RN did get the type and style of ship it wanted; although he is careful to avoid mentioning the words quality or quantity. The Royal Navy wanted an AAD[15], it wanted 14 of them, probably with a better VLS than the Sylver A-50; however it’s got just 6 of them, and according to JM (2009) it is due to the huge cost which was caused by MoD/government imposed cuts to the defence budget. This is an interesting point to put across and it’s probably more a product of the lack of media or public debate, in fact interest, in the defence procurement and planning process.
Figure 11: Selected point Picture HMS Daring


The programme of procurement for Type 45 destroyer has become mired in its own MoD media releases. They have focused on fun rather than serious, they give anecdotes about football pitches, cricket balls and one being enough to cover the whole of London, rather than have a radar system which can pick out sea skimmers at over a 100 miles, armed with Aster 30 missiles which can pluck said sea skimmers or in fact almost any aircraft out of the sky at a range of over 40 miles. Therefore instead of focusing on the Type 45 as a war fighting vessel with an actual role in modern conflict they have been putting forward a media program like they are advertising a kid’s toy or a book of 1001 interesting facts no one else knows. This is why the Type 45’s press has failed; this is why defence procurement gets so little mention of quality, because the MoD’s own press releases have pulled it down to a level below the lowest level of newspaper readers. The reason there is no debate is because defensive is a complex issue, defence procurement even more, and it keeps being driven down below the level at which it can take place.

The groups such as the UKNDA need to develop the capability of lobbying the court of public opinion as the only viable method of affecting government action. They are currently focused on lobbying a government which does not want to listen in the first and in the second would prefer to not have to pay anything for the forces it deploys around the world for its political/diplomatic ends. This is notably the converse opposite of America where defence spending and procurement is a very public issue. As an issue though it gets worse when you go from land to air to sea, the land has a visible battle Afghanistan and Iraq which it is fighting, the air is ‘obviously’ supporting the ground battle (even though the most successful aircraft are RNAS harriers); what is the role of the navy? This is not being announced to people of Britain, all that they hear and see are the failures verses the pirates, not the fact that it is lack of deployable escorts, with UAVs and Helicopters, which is holding back the counter pirate effort and merchant protection.
Figure 12: HMS Daring conducting pre-service entry trials

Primarily this has happened because the UKNDA pursues an exclusive top down approach to lobbying rather than inclusive ground swell political campaign. The UKNDA is concentrating itself on influencing ministers and rallying former military personal to its standard; when the former have no wider body of ‘voters’ interested in the issue, and the latter are already prepared to pledge support but are very bad at presenting either a united front or actively mounting a political front to effect the government. It needs to change itself from focusing at the very top, if the MoD drives the debate too low, the UKNDA is focusing too high – they need to bring the bottom, they need to bring the defence debate to the same level as immigration and hospitals; equally complex topics but they are still given more debating space because they are at the level at which debate can and will take place.

Bibliography
Booth, K. (1994). Military Intervention: Duty and Prudence. In J. Gow, J. Sharp, K. Booth, T. Haiverson, P. Towle, J. Howorth, et al., & L. Freedman (Ed.), Military Intervention in European Conflicts (pp. 56-75). Cambridge (MA) and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Churchill, W. (2003, 2004). NEVER GIVE IN, The Best of Winston Churchill's Speeches. (W. S. Churchill, Ed.) London: Pimlico.
Clapp, M. (2007, July 4). Commodore Amphibious Warfare 1982. (A. Clarke, Interviewer)
Clapp, M., & Southerby-Tailyour, E. (1997). Amphibious Assault Falklands, The Battle of San Carlos Water. London: Orion Books.
Colledge, J. J., & Warlow, B. (1969, 1987, 2003, 2006). Ships of the Royal Navy, The Complete Record of all Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy from the 15th Century to the Present. London: Chatham Publishing .
Daily Telegraph reporter . (2009, January 16). First next generation Royal Navy destroyer leaves shipyard . Retrieved May 23, 2009, from Telegraph.co.uk: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/4272506/First-next-generation-Royal-Navy-destroyer-leaves-shipyard.html
Evans, M. (2006, February 2). Warship with all the comforts of home. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from The Times Online: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article724629.ece
Finlan, A. (2003). The Gulf War 1991. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
Freedman, L., Gow, J., Sharp, J., Booth, K., Haiverson, T., Towle, P., et al. (1994). Military Intervention in European Conflicts. (L. Freedman, Ed.) Cambridge (MA) and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Gow, D. (2001, April 25). Ministry in battle for control. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from guardian.co.uk: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2001/apr/25/2
Grove, E. J. (2005). The Royal Navy. Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Harding, R. (Ed.). (2005). The Royal Navy, 1930 - 2000, Innovation and Defence. London: Frank Cass.
Harding, T. (2007, July 25). Navy Carriers to get green light. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from Telegraph.co.uk: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1558396/Navy-carriers-to-get-green-light.html
Hill, J. R. (1988). Air Defence at Sea. Shepperton: Ian Allan Ltd.
Hill, J. R. (2002). The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Janes. (2006). Warship Recognition Guide. (A. J. Watts, Ed.) London: Collins.
Jones, P. (2008, February 15). Commodore Amphibious Task Group 2006-2008. (A. Clarke, Interviewer)
Lambeth, B. S. (2001). NATO's AirWar for Kosovo, a Strategic and Operational Assessment. Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburgh: Rand.
Leppard, D. (2009, May 24). Super-destroyer to guard 2012 Games. Retrieved May 24, 2009, from Times Online.co.uk: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/olympics/london_2012/article6350326.ece
Lovette, T. (Ed.). (2007, Royal Navy 2005). Amphibious Assault, Manouvre from the Sea. London: Seafarer Books .
Lucas Phillips, C. E. (2000). The Greatest Raid of All. London: Pan Books.
Ministry of Defence (National). A. (2009, March 13). MoD responds to NAO report on type 45 Destroyers. Retrieved May 24, 2009, from News Distribution Service: http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?ReleaseID=395334&NewsAreaID=2&NavigatedFromSearch=True
Ministry of Defence (National). B. (2007, August 14). New Destroyer boosts Royal Navy. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from News Distribution Service: http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?ReleaseID=307347&NewsAreaID=2&NavigatedFromSearch=True
Ministry of Defence (National). C. (2009, January 28). Who dares wins - Royal Navy's newest warship arrives at her Portsmouth home. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from News Distribution Service: http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?ReleaseID=391033&NewsAreaID=2&NavigatedFromSearch=True
Ministry of Defence (National). D. (2009, February 11). Sea Viper Shows its fangs. Retrieved May 22, 2009, from News Distribution Service: http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?ReleaseID=392388&NewsAreaID=2&NavigatedFromSearch=True
Ministry of Defence (National). E. (2006, February 1). Countess of Wessex Launches Royal Navy's New Warship. Retrieved May 22, 2009, from News Distribution Service: http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=186251
Newton Dun, T. (2009, January 29). £1bn advanced ship is Daring. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from TheSun.co.uk: http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/article2183875.ece
Pike, J. (2008, February 25). RIM-161 SM-3 (AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense). Retrieved May 24, 2009, from GlobalSecurity.org: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3.htm
Reid, M. (2007, July 19). Pioneering warship begins sea trials. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from Timesonline.co.uk: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2100028.ece
Royal Navy. (2008, January). Royal Navy. Retrieved April 20, 2008, from http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/server/show/nav.1264
Scotland Correspondent. (2005, November 25). Minister's praise for Clydeside builder of Navy's new destroyer. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from TimesOnline.co.uk: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article596483.ece
Sherrin, N. (2007). Oxford Dictonary of Humorous Quotations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, J. T. (1994). Rolling Thunder, The Strategic Bombing Campaign North Vietnam 1965-68. Walton on Thames: Air Research Publications.
Speller, I., & Tucker, C. (2001). Amphibious Warfare, The Theory and Practices of Amphibious Operations in the 20th Century. London: Amber Books Ltd.
The Daily Telegraph. (2009, April 15). Somali pirates attack US-flagged ship. Retrieved May 05, 2009, from The Daily Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/5156221/Somali-pirates-attack-US-flagged-ship.html
The Daily Telegraph. (2009, April 30). Telegraph topics: Piracy . Retrieved May 05, 2009, from Telegraph online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/
Thompson, J. (2007). 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands. London: Pen & Sword Military.
Thompson, J. (2007, Decemeber 13/20). Brigadier 3rd Commando Brigade 1982. (A. Clarke, Interviewer)
Till, G. (2004, reprinted 2006). Seapower, A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. London, Portland OR: Frank Cass.
WGBH educational foundation. (2009). Tomahawk. Retrieved May 24, 2009, from The Gulf War: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/weapons/tomahawk.html
Woodward, S., & Robisnon, P. (1992, paperback edition 2003). One Hundred Days, The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander. London: Harper Collins.

___________________________________________________________________
[1]. Defined as vessel as greater than 6000 – 12000 tons and not nuclear powered
[2]. Whilst the Future Carrier (Queen Elizabeth Class) is also important, without the destroyers to provide a layered protection against the swarms of cruise missiles and any aircraft which might leak through a Combat Air Patrol CAP, then the carriers and the amphibious ships will be tragically exposed. Layered defence, that is CAP and long range Surface to Air Missiles SAMs are what are necessary to provide a full spectrum defence for a modern fleet far from home (Hill J. R., 1988)
[3]. This is to be retrofitted into the first two vessels of the class when it is opportune
[4]. VLS is complete system of both launcher and controls, including software, which allows for the operation of a specific range of missiles
[5]. The MOD has been on a buy European tract recently; but it keeps having to then buy American to get the equipment it needs, the Euro fighter is a perfect example of this as it is only batch 3 which will be able to launch the bombs required for modern warfare, whereas the Joint Strike Fighter JSF (Britain and America’s joint effort to replace the Harrier) is about 20% of the cost and even though it has not gone into production can launch or fire every weapon system either in use or projected
[6]. Minister for Science
[7]. SM-3, is the Standard Missile, the principle family American naval SAMs, they have multiple versions, with the SM-3 being the Anti-Ballistic Missile/Extended Range Area Air Defence missile; with a range of 250nm and a ceiling of 150nm. (Pike, 2008)
[8]. PAAMs is like the Aegis, it is a command, control and information system, however the Type 45 does not have phased array radar, and does not have missiles with the range of the SM-3 or SM-2ER
[9]. It is bigger, therefore might be large enough to take a modified missile, the A-50 due to its size is limited to Aster and Mistral missiles: the A-70 was selected for the Horizon class frigates, but when the project broke down the MOD changed and selected the A-50 in order to keep costs down
[10]. The Type 41 is probably the most common most tested VLS in the world; it carries the widest range of munitions available (Figure 7 is only about 25% of those available), because of its modular design it is capable of taking multiple sizes of missile. It is currently fitted in the USN’s Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers, examples from the rest of the world include the Anzac class frigates of the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy, the Canadian Iroquois class destroyers, the Netherlands De Zeveb Provincien class frigates, the Israeli Navy’s Sa’ar 5 class corvettes, the Japanese Kongō class destroyers, the South Korean KDX-II & III class destroyers, the Spanish Álvaro de Bazán class frigates, the under-construction Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen class frigates, the German Navy's Sachsen, Brandenburg, and F125 class frigates and others.
[11]. In its RAF version it is called Storm Shadow and has a range (once launched) of 250km, its cost seems to vary though with Italy having paid $270 million for 200 putting it at $1.35million per unit, whilst the French senate is indicating it at €800,000 per unit or $1,117,760 per unit; the RAF have not disclosed what they paid for it. This is all compared to $575,000 per unit for the Tomahawks which are arguably better more proven systems.
[12]. From left to right, Tomahawk, VL ASROC, SM-2 IV (for runner of the SM-3), Aster 15, Aster 30, Sea Sparrow, and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) quad pack
[13]. Some articles have three times the speed of sound
[14]. This point is especially important America has 61 Arleigh Burkes in its fleet and is still building, whilst Britain is only building 6 of the Type 45’s, which is only slightly better in design and slightly cheaper to build; but is so under armed and un-versatile in comparison that they should never be put next to one another lest the rest of the world notices how hollow the British claims are. Whilst Britain does not need 61 destroyers, to guarantee at least one to defend the UK, and two deployed at other places in the world 9 would needed, to accept any level of battle damage and extremes of situation 12, if not the 14 originally asked for, would be required. Although if 6 more were to be built then A-50 VLS would probably be replaced with the Type 41 VLS.
[15] The RN likes specialist vessels still, although this might be a reaction to the MoD/Treasury and the need to sell it to them. It is after all easier to sell a vessel which has a single visible focus or mission that is easy for non-area specialists, not to understand, but to quantify.

Wednesday, 24 June 2009

Contemporary globalisation has reached levels unseen since before 1914. Comment on the significance of this fact in the context of two of the....

...following topics
James Rosenau (Reich, 1998) describes globalisation as it is not:
“Globalisation is not the same as globalism, which points to aspirations for an end state of affairs wherein values are shared by or pertinent to all the world’s five billion people, their environment, their roles as citizens, consumers or producers with an interest in collective action designed to solve common problems. Nor is it universalism—values which embrace all humanity, hypothetically or actually.”

This when combined with the definitions of Higgot and Reich (Globalization and Sites of Conflict: Towards Definition and Taxonomy, 1998), and also Scholte (What Is Globalization? The Definitional Issue - Again", 2002) can give the following definition:
Globalisation is a term of economy and purchase where by companies or in fact any organisation spreads the costs of production and resource procurement between different nations, territories, or even continents in order to maximise profit by taking advantage of the situation within those places.

Armed with a working definition of globalisation it is now necessary too examine the title question through the use of two sub questions. The first to be considered will be whether or not resource conflicts are on the increase; first examining what are resource conflicts, then considering those which have become wars, those wars which were not resources conflicts and finally conflicts which have not escalated to the level of war.
The second question is that of considering two aspects of capitalism, and their impact upon globalisation. The aspects selected for this evaluation are Free trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) combined with Multi-National Corporations as a new ‘imperialism’. These are both of course cornerstones of globalisation, with free trade being the ‘best’ and ‘truest’ circumstances for the conducive conducting of globalised business model; whilst FDI is closely linked with the process of turning a company into a global force as it is only by investing in factories, workers and mineral rights within the poorer countries (directly investing or investing through intermediaries), the company can gain access.
Both questions will be concluded in their own sections before the conclusion of the whole work draws together the evidence from both to examine the significance of Contemporary globalisation attaining a levels financial fluidity and prevalence unseen since before the First World War.
Virtually all conflicts fit the definition of a resource conflict; i.e. a conflict over or because of economic reasons such as mineral exploitation, trade, fossil fuels, and of course the oldest form of resource conflict over living space or farm land and people to tax. The problem that sometimes arises with such conflicts though is that there are so many different forms as well as reasons for resource conflicts; is it a conflict to deny or restrict access to a particular resource, to gain access to or control over the resource, to displace and replace a resource (i.e. people); or is gaining these various levels of control over such resources as are part of the dispute subsidiary to another wider dispute (i.e. cultural, religious or political). These are all questions which have to be decided before the conflict can be confirmed as a resource conflict.
There are however some wars which are straightforward when it comes to assigning them as resource conflicts. For example World War I can be assigned as one such straightforward resource conflict. In World War I there was conflict over empire; all the European powers wished for ‘their place in the sun’ or rather access to the raw materials needed to fuel the factories and arsenals of Europe which were so important to the powers sense of themselves (Kaufman, Little, & Wohlforth, 2007; McDonald, 2004). For Britain there was another resource which it sought to defend, from what it saw as German aggression; control of the sea. Much as the modern US dollars predominance in economic transactions gives the united states power, British military and mercantile dominance of the world’s oceans were what secured it the empire, and its place in the world (Churchill, 2004; The Churchill Centre and Museum at the Cabinet War Rooms, London, 2009; Lavery, 2006; McDonald, 2004).
World War II is much the same with Germany instead of attempting to build an empire external to Europe, aiming to take through force of arms ‘Lebensraum’ from what they viewed as the ‘lesser’ peoples of Eastern Europe; Poland, Ukraine and Russia. For the Japanese it was again a story of the desire for more natural resources; something which had become more urgent after the American government had cut the supplies of the resource that has kept on giving, in terms of conflict, oil. Oil was arguably the root cause of the British and French involvement in the Suez Crisis 1956; it was the cause of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; and according to some the real reason for the American led invasion of Iraq in 2007.
The future cause of conflict though is more likely to be the one thing more precious than oil; fresh water for drinking, irrigating, and practically every other basic life requiring necessity. The African Great Lakes region (Adebajo, 2002; African Union, 2008) and the Middle East (Mendoza, 2007; Bregman, Israel's Wars, A History Since 1947, 2000) are just two areas where water is already causing conflict; the latter area building on the already inflamed tensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Bregman, A History of Israel, 2003). A conflict which up till recently was mainly based in culture, ideology, and history has added an even more important element; life. This is similar to the Falkland Islands conflict between Argentina and Britain, which started off with history (Clapp, Commodore Amphibious Warfare 1982, 2007; Thompson J. , 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands, 2007) and has now added oil under the sea shelf to its potential victor’s prizes (Cronin, 2007).
Although of course the currently most famous resource conflict is the piracy of the coast of Somalia. This is where a very poor people are holding lots of very rich corporations, governments and international organisations to ransom in order to earn a living (Fellows, 2009; African Union, 2008; The Daily Telegraph, 2009).
The other major form of resource conflict is of course trade/tariff ‘wars’, such as the banana conflict when the EU was structuring its Tariff’s to favour former British and French Colonies (elsalvador.com, 2008); these in modern times are mostly decided by the World Trade Organisation. However, these themselves have escalated into full wars such as when Britain was in war time fight Napoleon’s armies, in peacetime fight the Napoleonic Continental system (Corbett, England in the Seven Years War, 2005, London/New York/Bombay/Calcutta: Longmans, Green, and Co 1907; Mahan, 1987, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1890). With the increase in globalisation some say these forms of conflict are over; others point to the growing militancy of labour movements revolting against the loss of jobs to cheaper less regulated peoples.
In conclusion resources conflicts are changing, they are less physical now than they used to be more focused on diplomatic posture; but when they do get violent they go all the way to total war very quickly. They are on the increase; especially in areas such as South America, Africa and the Middle East, where a combination of scarcity of resources, widespread poverty and political regimes which have both a history animosity and history of rapidly occurring extreme changes of those in power makes them all extremely volatile. These situations are only compounded by external interference and the factionisation which often results; that not only will the number of conflicts increase but they will grow in nations and numbers that they encompass.
Free trade, the theoretical counter to the causes of resource conflict, unfortunately there is also the counter that Germany’s biggest market in 1940 was Russia; however that is also countered, after all, both of those nations at that time were dictatorships and therefore not subject to the normal rules and restrictions imposed by a capitalist market on a democratic nation.
Therefore perhaps we should say that Free Trade stops wars between democracies; well leaving aside what some would say was the natural tendency of politicians from democratic nations to want to rely on their own strengths of jaw, jaw, rather than they’re commander’s abilities at war, war, this can make sense. After all the greatest advantage when revving a nation or people up for conflict is misunderstanding, it is playing on the cultural stereotypes to fuel the fires of indignation and pride (McDonald, 2004). However, free trade boosts contact, boosting cultural exchanges, and the relationships which spring forth from such interaction; all these things make it harder for politicians to build the case for war (McDonald, 2004). This is one of the theories behind the European Union, the more interconnected and interdependent the economies, the people of its nations become the less likelihood of conflict. However, some would also point out that the conflict has just moved from the arsenal to the parliamentary chamber; and whilst this may be good from the ‘war’ point of view, it does not mean there are any less conflicts in fact there are probably more as they take on such personal perspectives.
It is promulgated that if the nations are trading rivals, then free trade will decrease the chance of conflict because it will move the emphasis to the individual corporations rather than making it a case of national pride (McDonald, 2004); after all when it does become a case of pride it can actually increase the chance of conflict.
Many economists will argue that Free trade is the truest form of Fair trade, as it is only under a situation of no tariffs in fact no trade barriers of any kind does the economic and mercantile world seem to be a fair and level playing field. This fairness if implemented would benefit all nations involved by allowing supreme access to limitless financial growth; although recent events would suggest that that is no longer more than an idealised possible. Unfortunately, this would not be the case as without tariffs to protect the manufacture of goods and the operation of services being carried out ex-national then a lot of nations would simple go bankrupt and their own industry would be bought wholesale by the really rich American, British or Chinese Multi National Corporations; or they might not even bother to buy out the local opposition, they may just decide to undercut to the point that all manufactured goods or Wheat (for example) is brought in from outside; due to the cost in comparison of producing their own.
Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) are the main vehicle for the transfer of work/production from one national address to another, the main vehicles for undermining local economies and the main vehicles for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); or as some call it economic ‘imperialism’. It was argued prior to 2008 that the MNCs had lost their nationality; that they had become supra-national like the United Nations or European Union, and were now separate and powerful almost state-like organisations channelling the movement of capital (FDI) from one geographical area to another as it promised greater profit or greater influence and thus more power for a longer-term increase in profit.
However, with the recent banking crisis have caused many of this so called supra-national entities to suddenly become very national; for example HSBC ‘the worlds local Bank’ suddenly became ‘British’, General Motors became ‘American’ again (Abboud, 1009), in fact almost all major countries to a lesser or greater extent found themselves suddenly having to support these huge conglomerates which right up until before the crisis had been protesting their freedom, their power, their place in the world as being above/apart from nation states.
This has of course had a major impact on the flow of FDI; something which will have more of impact of the poorer nations whose economies had been reliant upon MNCs using them for the production part of the product process. In this case with the ‘re-naturalisation’ of the MNC’s governments are placing on them the requirements to build at home, to close factories abroad before they close factories at home; so as to protect their own economies (Abboud, 1009). As the economic crisis deepens the true extent of the FDI impact on nations economies is going to become very apparent; with countries Mexico going to need an increase in aid if it is going to carry on financing the Drugs War, without the part and unit production that has become so important to its economy.
Globalisation, free trade, these are both concepts which are supposed to reduce the chance of conflict by creating/fostering a ‘global world’ – this is not the same as globalism however. Globalisation is in its purest form when it is a Multi-National Corporation, moving parts all over the world, assembling, selling them again all over the world, minimising cost and maximising profit; removing the need for a conflict over resources as after all who needs to go to the costly business of sending arming when you can a send profit making entity to take control. The problem though is in the title; even with the huge levels of jealousy the empire period brought about; the fact was globalisation was present, and according to the title at a level which has not been seen again till the current era.
The significance of this should not be lost as whilst such trade and economic power is good it can build up unhappiness; with fresh water and oil both becoming such precious resources, how content are populations going to be if such resources are in the hands of foreign nations. This has previously been an argument countered by the fact that MNCs had apparently lost their ‘national identity’; something which the recent economic crisis has changed, perhaps irrevocably. This means that now foreign powers are controlling key resources, which are now key not only to national development, but thanks to Globalisation international development.

Bibliography
Abboud, L. (1009, March 31). At Peugot, New Boss Faces Stubbon Woes. Retrieved May 22, 2009, from Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123845289776171311.html
Adebajo, A. (2002). Building Peace in West Africa; Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc: Boulder and London.
African Union. (2008). African Union Mission Somalia. Retrieved May 05, 2009, from African Union Commission: http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/amisom.htm
Albright, M. (2004). Madam Secretary. London: Pan Books.
Barry, B. (2008). A COLD WAR, Front-Line Operations in Bosnia 1995-1996. Chalford Stroud: Spellmount Limited.
BBC. (2008, December 15). BBC News, UK fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Retrieved December 15, 2008, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5121552.stm
Berridge, G. R., Keens-Soper, M., & Otte, T. G. (2001). Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger. (G. Berridge, Ed.) New York: Palgrave.
Blum, W. (2004). Killing Hope, US Military & CIA Interventions since World War II. Noida, India: Gopsons Papers Limited.
Bregman, A. (2003). A History of Israel. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bregman, A. (2000). Israel's Wars, A History Since 1947. London: Routledge.
Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., et al. (2005, 1st Edition 1996, 2nd Edition 2001). Theories of International Relations (3rd Edition ed.). Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cambridge English Dictionary . (2008). Cambridge English Dictionary. Retrieved November 23, 2008, from Cambridge English Dictionary: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=89524&dict=CALD
Chambers, D., & Pullan, B. (Eds.). (2001, reprinted 2004). Venice, A Documentary History, 1450 - 1630. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Churchill, W. (2004). NEVER GIVE IN, The Best of Winston Churchill's Speeches. (W. S. Churchill, Ed.) London: Pimlico.
Clapp, M., & Southerby-Tailyour, E. (1997). Amphibious Assault Falklands, The Battle of San Carlos Water. London: Orion Books.
Collins, D. (2008). In Foreign Fields, Heroes of Iraq & Afghanistan in their own words. Great Britain: Monday Books.
Congress of the United States. (1993). Somalia : a country study / Federal Research Divsion, Library of Congress. (H. C. Metz, Ed.) Washington: United States Government Printing Office.
Corbett, J. S. (2005, London/New York/Bombay/Calcutta: Longmans, Green, and Co 1907). England in the Seven Years War (Vol. I). London: Elibron Classics.
Corbett, J. S. (2005, London/New York/Bombay/Calcutta: Longmans, Green, and Co 1907). England in the Seven Years War (Vol. I). London: Elibron CLassics.
Cronin, J. (2007, April 19). Oil billions beckon Falkland Islands. Retrieved May 22, 2009, from BBC News Channel: Buisness: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6571431.stm
D'Este, C. (1990). World War II in the Mediterranean 1942-1945. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books.
elsalvador.com. (2008, November 27). World Trade Organisation rules against EU in banna conflict. Retrieved May 26, 2009, from Summanews: http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/World_Trade_Organization_rules_against_EU_in_banana_conflict
Frank, A. G. (1998). ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkely, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.
Glaser, C. L. (n.d.). When are Arms Races Dangerous? International Security , pp. 44-84.
Government Accountability Office. (2008). Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts. Washington : United States Government Accountability Office.
Hegre, H. (2004). Size Asrmmetry, Trade and Militarized Conflict. The Journal of Conflict Resolution , XLVIII, 403-429.
Higgott, R., & Reich, S. (1998, March). Globalization and Sites of Conflict: Towards Definition and Taxonomy. CSGR Working Paper No.01/98 . Pittsburgh, Warwick, United Kingdom, United States of America: University of Pittsburgh, University of Warwick.
Holzgrefe, J. L., & Keohane, R. O. (Eds.). (2003). Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge, New York, Melbourn, Madrid, and Cape Town: Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, M. (2008). Soldier. London: Transworld Publishers.
Jackson, R. (2007). Soverignty, Evolution of an Idea. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.
Kaldor, M. (2002, 2001, 1999). New & Old Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Kaufman, S. J., Little, R., & Wohlforth, W. C. (Eds.). (2007). The Balance of Power in World History. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Krause, K., & Williams, M. C. (Eds.). (1997). Critical Security Studies, concepts and cases. Abingdon: Routledge.
Lane, F. C. (1973). Venice, A Maritime Republic. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press.
Lavery, B. (2006). Churchill's Navy, The Ships, Men and Organisation 1939-1945. London: Conway Maritime Publishing.
LeRoy Bennett, A., & Oliver, J. K. (2002). International Organizations, Principles and Issues (7th Edition ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersy: Prentice Hall.
Mahan, A. (1987, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1890). The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (5th Edition ed.). New York: Dover Publications Inc.
Marshall, P. (1997, 1999). Positive Diplomacy. New York: Palgrave.
Matar, N. (1999). Turks, Moors & Englishmen, in the age of discovery. New York: Columbia University Press.
McDonald, P. J. (2004). Peace through Trade or Free Trade. The Journal of Conflict Resolution , XLVIII, 547-572.
Mendoza, T. (2007, January 1). Six Day War. Retrieved April 21, 2008, from http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/
Norwich, J. J. (2007, 2006). The Middle Sea, A history of the Mediterranean. London: Vintage Books,Chatto & Windus.
Prince, R. (2006, February 26). Telegraph. Retrieved December 12, 2008, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/1579111/Iraq-dossier-based-on-spin-doctors-arguments.html
Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2006, 2005). Contemporary Conflict Resolution (2nd Edition ed.). Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.
Reich, S. (1998, December). What is Globalization? Four Possible Answers. Working Paper #261 . Pittsburgh, United States of America: Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh.
Royal Institute of International Affairs. (1985). Soviet Interests in the Third World. (R. Cassen, Ed.) London: Sage Publications.
Scholte, A. J. (2002, December). What Is Globalization? The Definitional Issue - Again". CSGR Working Paper No.109/02 . Warwick, United Kingdom: Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick.
Smith, H. (Ed.). (2000). Democracy and International Relations. London: Macmillan.
The Churchill Centre and Museum at the Cabinet War Rooms, London. (2009). Winston Churchill org. Retrieved May 15, 2009, from Winston Churchill org: http://www.winstonchurchill.org/
The Churchill Centre and Museum at the Cabinet War Rooms, London. (2009). Winston Churchill org. Retrieved May 15, 2009, from Winston Churchill org: http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches/1941-1945-war-leader/103-never-give-in
The Daily Telegraph. (2009, April 15). Somali pirates attack US-flagged ship. Retrieved May 05, 2009, from The Daily Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/5156221/Somali-pirates-attack-US-flagged-ship.html
The Daily Telegraph. (2009, April 30). Telegraph topics: Piracy . Retrieved May 05, 2009, from Telegraph online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/
Thompson, J. (2007). 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands. London: Pen & Sword Military.
Thompson, J. (1999, Hedgewick & Jackston 1998). War Behind Enemy Lines. London: Pan Books.
Thompson, R. C. (1994). The Pacific Basin Since 1945; A History of the Foreign Relations of the Asian, Australiasian and American Rim States and the Pacific Islands. London and New York: Longman.
Weitz, E. D. (2003). A Century of Genocide, Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton, Woodstock: Princeton University Press.
Young, J. W., & Kent, J. (2004). International Relations since 1945, a global history. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.