Showing posts with label Conventional Deterrence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conventional Deterrence. Show all posts

Tuesday, 1 October 2013

September 2013 Thoughts: Sea Power


From Trafalgar and Waterloo to the first German war the British navy was supreme upon the seas. Our sea-power during the greater part of the nineteenth century equalled that of all other nations put together. Did we misuse that power? On the contrary, there never were so few warships afloat. History, which has been my guide and inspiration, will show the future ages that the control of the seas which the British held so long was used not for the exercise of warlike ambition, but to keep the peace, to suppress the slave trade and to make the seas safe for the commerce of all nations. All our ports, even our own coastwise trade, were opened to the entry and competition of men and good from every land.

Winston S. Churchill, London, May, 1946

Sea Power is an encompassing phrase, all too often commentators will use it to describe the raw naval/military potential of a nation – but in a world where international relations encompasses soft power as well as hard power how can Sea Power be so one dimensional? Even Mahan, who stated the history of sea power was “largely a military history”, issued a qualified statement with the word largely. The truth in fact is that Sea Power certainly isn’t so mono-polar; it includes not only the war fighting potential of a nations naval forces, but their diplomatic potential, the economic potential of its & other merchant ships traversing the world laden with goods, and perhaps most importantly it includes the succour which a nation may extract from that sea, both water & seabed, which comes under that nations jurisdiction. All these things are now part of Sea Power, and they must be in balance otherwise a nation could find itself weak at a time of crucial necessity.

This is itself a very Corbettian view, in that no longer is control of the sea the epitome of sea power, but what can be done with/from the sea when it is controlled. The important thing though is that both of these parts are as important as each other; without the ability to control the sea (at the least in a local sense) nothing can be done with/from it. Control of the sea allows the utilisation of the sea in peace time for actions such as gathering food (fishing or harvesting seaweed), collecting energy (directly by wave, tidal or wind power; or indirectly by the extraction of natural gas, oil, coal or uranium[1]) or amassing resources (mining the sea floor or underneath it) – none of this can be overstated in their importance to a nation’s economy. It’s because of that importance that disputes over the extents of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)[2] are so contentious; it’s also the reason that naval conventional deterrence is rising[3] as a required capability for many nations. However, deterrence comes in many levels and the equipment/diplomatic commitments required by each nation depend upon the level of sea power it itself requires/desires and the level it feels it receives/can accept from any alliances. For example a nation for which it’s EEZ is concentrated in one area could well focus upon sea denial systems such as Diesel/AIP Submarines (SSKs[4]) supported by land based aircraft and missile boats to provide the military part of the ‘sea power’ they require. In comparison a nation with a diffused EEZ, will need aircraft carriers to provide ‘organic’ air power to support any operation[5], amphibious ships to bring along land forces[6], auxiliaries for logistics to provide the global reach, major escorts and nuclear submarines (SSNs & perhaps SSGNs[7]) – all necessary to protect and project sea power on a global scale[8].

It’s not only a nation’s EEZ which determines their requirements; the world is increasingly interconnected, or put another way, globalised. This means that the trade routes which crisscross the world moving everything from energy & raw materials to completed multi-component products, and which depends upon the “freedom of the sea’s” for that movement are of massive importance. Something accentuated by the fact that the ships which carry all this are growing bigger as their owners seek economies of scale; some modern ships carry as much as a convoy of 50 ships did in the Second World War[9]. This is great for companies, terrible for countries as it means that the impact of disruption (or even worse, destruction) of the practically never ending conveyor belt like flow of ships would at the minimum be devastating economically – in the case of energy supplies it could be literally life and death for millions[10]. This brings in another version of sea power, a nation which is unable to protect its trade is a weak sea power; protection of this trade requires presences and is the principle role of escorts during ‘peace-time’[11]. Even this is variable, as major exporting nations require less strength as the onus is on the importing nations which need the goods to protect the trade – of course the nations which are most exposed are those nations which are trading nations, both major importers & exporters as for them the movement of goods is a foundation which if undermined would cause their economy to crumble. Protection of this has been the traditional role of the Royal Navy, and is exemplified in its Prayer which states: “that we may be a safeguard unto our most gracious Sovereign Lady, Queen Elizabeth and her dominions, and a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions”.

The final factor affecting a nation’s sea power is their diplomatic commitments/support; again a nation higher up the status level can expect more support but, in turn, more is expected more of it. These alliances and the status they bring can deliver a certain level of insulation from events, as well as false feels of greater security – false because the greater security is dependent upon the idea that other nations will protect their interests; which they will as long as those interests coincide with their own and they do not have other commitments for their forces. An excellent example is the reliance European nations have developed upon America for defence; and the fact those nations seem to have perceived this as being more technological reliance[12] and are now reacting as such is interesting. As whilst seeking to be self-sufficient in an armaments is a very sensible strategic notion for any nation[13] - the fact is that the most important thing America has done for those nations is allowed them to focus on Europe, it’s America which to be fair pushed for decolonisation, which has had to take on the role the colonial powers had up till that point fulfilled of global stabilisation. It took up a mantle which whilst previously had had a lead nation, Great Britain, had been a collective work rather than a single nation’s responsibility. The great prosperity of the modern world, recession & all is based upon stability – conflict disrupts that, unstable regimes disrupt that, any problems disrupt that and for the last half a century it has been America’s job to deal with it. America though cannot afford to shoulder this burden indefinitely, neither should it be expected to; the Pacific Pivot whatever it’s end result is an example of the rebalancing it is having to do as it has to focus on protecting once more its own interests. For European nations this means that they will have to consider their interests, their role in the world and the security as their own responsibility[14]; and more than likely, although it could take decades to break the current cycle, adjust spending on defence to fit.

Sea Power is global power, the sea is the medium by which all people are brought together, and can reach other – even before the undersea cables that are the truest foundation of modern communications ran along its bed the sea was the global information super highway where cultures met and where discoveries were passed along. It has been a constant throughout the passage of the recorded history of humanity[15]; the only change has been the evolution in both how people use it, and the capability with which people make use of it.

In summary Sea Power is not just about fighting high level wars. It is about daily political commitments, flexibility, potentiality, capability and manoeuvrability: whether hard or soft; economic, political or military it is about the things that the sea offers a government, a nation, a people in terms of options and resources. However what they get out from it depends entirely upon what they are willing to put in. Having started with his words, and for all his humanity, it seems sensible to make use of another quote from Churchill; which sums up eloquently what Sea Power can do for a nation.

We have never lived at anybody’s mercy. We have never lived upon the good pleasure of any Continental nation in regard to our fundamental requirements. We have never entrusted the home defence of this country to any foreign power. We have never asked for any help from anyone. We have given help to many, but to make good the security of our own island we have asked for help from none.

Winston S. Churchill, Commons, March 8, 1934

Further Reading:                             




[11] although with counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, national & international emergencies, anti-smuggling, presence/showing-the-flag and various other contingencies which spring up, the phrase ‘peace-time’ looks more & more misleading
[12] Whilst it certainly provided volume for NATO’s force structure, the fact is the American armed forces were mostly valued for their high-tech/high –value units such as Patriot air defence batteries; hence why many NATO countries do not actually have their own equivalent systems to defend their forces.
[13] Which of course Europe is not; making the idea of a European Defence Industry just as much of strategic misnomer – however recent focus on procuring missiles from MBDA rather than buying from the Standard Missile company; buying Sylver VLS rather than MK 41.
[14] For the UK this will include 14 Overseas Territories, of which 12 are islands and not all have airfields but they do all have EEZs around them with the potential economic & strategic benefits/requirements.
[15] And more than likely the unrecorded and pre-history of humanity

Sunday, 1 September 2013

August 2013 Thoughts: Sea Based Conventional Deterrence; more than just gunboat diplomacy!


There has been a growing vogue in some quarters of the internet to view every problem as being resolved by the deployment of a warship; and to a certain extent they are right. However, the problem would likely never have occurred if there had been a vessel there already; or more often if the other nation perceives that that vessel has nothing behind. A Gunboat works because of what it represents. Britain ruled the world with its fleet, because it had ships everywhere, therefore presence everywhere; but just as importantly it was realised that if anything happened to those ‘gunboats’ there was a big battle fleet and expeditionary ground forces sitting behind it ready to sail to battle. That is deterrence for a global super power; the trouble for a nation comes when it is challenged to satisfy the tenements of deterrence to achieve security when they have global commitments/interests, a status as a world power and the budget of medium power.  

Conventional Deterrence

Conventional Deterrence requires certain things in order for it to be viable:

·                      Overt strength and at least apparent capability – the best way for a nation to deter conflict is to maintain a force capability which is good enough most other nations and organisations will think twice about risking conflict, and will seek to carefully plan and prepare for any conflict which they might have decided upon giving time for the nation to discover their plans.

·                      Intelligence – a nation relying upon deterrence for its defence, most know what its friends and possible antagonists are thinking, preferably before they do anything.

·                      Pre-emption/Reaction – with good enough intelligence, then moves against the nation’s interests could be nipped in the bud with a quick pre-emptive move; alternatively if not seen coming then they need to be able to deploy forces quickly and in strength

·                      Scalability – to deter a small nation may only require a gunboat, a major power will require a fleet if perhaps (in local terms) not of equal strength in numbers, it definitely has to be equal (preferably superior) in capability and professionalism. 

In simple terms these could be summed up in three words; Presence, Potential and Perception. For a nation to be able to project overt strength it must have presence, the same thing which is starting point of scalability, of pre-emption and intelligence. Potential is all about capability, there is no point having a capability only part time; it’s the same as having a strategic deterrent, if it’s a constant it can act as a deterrent, if it’s something that’s deployed when tensions increase it can actually magnify those tensions. This is where Perception comes in, it’s not only what a nation thinks of it’s own strength but how others view it’s resolution to use that strength.  Perception leads into another issue often raised as a deterrent, that of collective security.

Collective Security

There is no Security on this Earth;

There is only opportunity.

General Douglas MacArthur

Interesting words from an interesting character but also very true, there is a lot of talk of collective security, of nations co-operating on security issues and that is true when there are opportunities for them to benefit. The problems comes that it’s not always in another countries interest to help, Britain fought the Falkland war alone, despite being in the Commonwealth, NATO and the 5 Power Agreement - whilst lots of kind words and even information was given, some technology & equipment proffered, no troops, no ships and no planes were sent to Britain’s aid. The case could be made it wasn’t needed in 1982, the trouble is it might be needed in the future and collective security only functions as a deterrence if it can be relied upon in times of crisis.

Therefore if countries can only be relied upon to act collectively when it is in their interests to do so, i.e. if their energy supplies are threatened, an over mighty neighbour throwing it’s weight around or similar pressures, then security becomes a balance between how a nation seek to deter threats to its commitments/interests itself and how well it can bind others to those preservation of those commitments/interests.

This though is not the biggest problem with collective security; that honour goes to a more complex proposition. Even if a nation can call upon the resources of it’s allies to defend it’s interests in times of conflict; will they share those same resources to prevent it? To deter the aggressor nation from initiating conflict of more than just words? When they have their own requirements for their resources; even if they did allow their vessels to be used would it have the same effect? To put it in less abstract way; would an American destroyer being sent to reinforce the Falklands have the same impact than a British destroyer? This is valid because despite Britain’s tradition of going to war alongside the other partner in what is sometimes called the ‘special relationship’, American diplomacy has often proved more schizophrenic than the British Foreign Offices on the subject of the Falkland Islands… so would Argentina believe the ship would be allowed to do more than show the flag? They might actually even count on that ship being used to implement a UN ‘peace zone’ allowing them time to consolidate their forces post invasion.

Presence & Potential

‘Gunboats’ are great, they don’t need to be expensive, they don’t need to have all the best equipment; what they do need is enough weaponry that they have the potential to cause trouble and the capability to defend themselves against limited threats[1].  These are vessels which do need range, and space for the crew to be comfortable on long voyages and entertain dignitaries when visiting ports. These are ships which like the ‘Gunboats’ of the late 19th century and early 20th century were the task group ships, the vessels which clustered together had Potential, when operating with larger ships had POTENTIAL, but alone just had potential. Modern equivalents are what nations must aspire to, instead of the current focus on building only the best the can, which can never be built enough numbers to achieve presence.

That’s not saying that the best does not have to be built, it is required for the major surface combatants, the aircraft carriers and amphibious ships which are the modern ‘battle fleet’; they are what allow for scalability of the response, sending a destroyer would be a physical re-affirming that a situation is being watched closely. The despatch of an amphibious ship, with suitable landing force would be a more a defensive gesture with more impact – as well as enabling the nation’s government to rapidly deploy supported land forces instead of just light forces should they decide it necessary. The deployment of carrier with it’s strike potential is a far more assertive gesture; it can do offensive operations and hit at the heart of the enemy – or provide an aerial shield of the allied nation. Beyond this is of course the Task Force, an Amphibious Task Group, Carrier Battle Group and extra escorts for outlying pickets can provide a total response scenario for short term crises.

Presence with sea based forces is far more effective than land based because of the reach of them; one ship with a helicopter could ‘wander’ around the Indian ocean visiting all the nations that share it’s shore and project a visible presence even beyond the shore with the aid of the helicopter and various other methods of naval diplomacy – before being relieved by the next ship which would continue again from the beginning. Furthermore in terms of deterrence, whilst sea based forces have the potential for a war fighting response they also have just as much potential for withdrawal should the situation improve. In comparison land forces are more expensive to deploy/redeploy and once deployed those forces are a more blatant threat because they have been deployed ‘on the ground’. This is because the ‘potential’ of land forces is more limited and are more binding for the deploying nation; whereas sea based forces whilst they are deployed they don’t have to be employed. For a long term commitment the deployment of land based forces could make more sense from a financial perspective – but then all sorts of questions have to be answered about the level of commitment which can vary from a trip wire/training force to a full scale British Army of the Rhine with schools, housing estates and a huge deployed civilian infrastructure as well as the military infrastructure.

Summary

Deterrence whether strategic or conventional is certainly from one perspective a house of cards, presence is all about maximising assets to make it look like a country has to ability to be everywhere it needs to be at the same time; this is of course impossible, but it’s impression, the perception which counts. However, just as important image is to presence, the reality is important to potential; there is no use having a part time capability a carrier battle group will require an aviation ship loaded with a carrier air group (i.e. Strike Aircraft, Air Defence Aircraft, AEW Aircraft and ASW/SAR Aircraft[2]) as well as escorts, an amphibious task group will require at least one vessel with a dock for landing craft and it’s own aviation ship loaded with an amphibious air group (troop transport helicopters, helicopter gunships/Close Air Support aircraft and possibly ASW aircraft).

This means that 2 aviation ships are required at all times, now in an ideal world a nation would allocate the money and build 3 amphibious aviation ships and 3 aircraft carriers and always guarantee those at least two aviation ships available (usually would be 3 – 4), however it can be done with five vessels. Under this circumstance one aviation vessel would be a swing one; for example a nation could build two carrier orientated ships, and 3 amphibious orientated ships – two of which would also have docks (making them LHDs, the amphibious ships with the most potential), but the third whilst being of the same design, would not have the dock, instead that space would be used for storage of fuel and supplies. The third vessel without the dock would by virtue faster and able to carry a wider range of aviation stores, meaning should a circumstance arise where one carrier orientated vessel is in deep refit and the other has an accident it could be used to cover for that carrier; just the same as it could be used if similar circumstances occurred to cover for an amphibious ship. Whilst of course a nation could make do with just 4 aviation ships and still achieve a similar effect, the benefit of 5th vessel would be the guarantee of at least 2 aviation ships available, the flexibility that the possibility of 3rd task group centred on an aviation ship being formed should circumstance require it.

A similar policy would be the most practical in terms of other vessels, general purpose/multi-role or easily adaptable vessels are far more useful to a small navy than focused ones; although more difficult to sell to Treasuries in times of peace/economic stringency, when lack of a clear mission to highlight their necessity can leave them open to accusations of no mission.

The fact is that whilst the construction necessary to have the forces for these missions, and the maintenance of those forces would cost money. The question is though, is it cheaper to deter a war or fight it? Is it better to expend treasure at a measured & controlled rate or have to splurge it under the pressure of an emergency? Finally is it better to raise a little more money in tax to fund all this, or to suffer the economic disruption (damage to trade, higher insurance premiums, damage to property, ect) that conflict brings?




[1] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/july-2013-notes-corvettes-chance-to.html                                                     
[2] In 1982 the RN was without a proper carrier battle group, it had Sea Harriers which were very capable air defence aircraft, and it had aircraft carriers, small ones but serviceable – so the question is why did the Argentinian government perceive Britain as lacking the necessary aircraft to mount a response? Well for starters it was numbers, the Argentines doubted there would be enough aircraft carriers available capable of heading south, more importantly they felt that whatever was sent if anything was (and they sincerely doubted the resolution or the capability of Britain to send anything) it would lack any AEW and despite having the (for the time) excellent Type 42s this would leave whatever was sent at a massive disadvantage against air attacks. Now it’s well known, that their calculations proved false, but how much money would have been saved if the RN had had an AEW aircraft in service, if the Invincibles had been slightly bigger and carried a slightly larger air group? Would the Argentinian’s have made the same calculations?