Reason for writing: Britain’s defence strategy has for so long
been focused on buy the best, not necessarily the best fit that it is now
facing a situation whereby it no longer has enough hulls to do the job, the
most obvious place for this other than Escort Numbers is Submarines…where a
pursuit of a Nuclear only fleet has not only left the RN short of hulls for
operations, but also short of hulls for training, and missing a key defence
export from its cupboard.
Key Words/Phrases:
·
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Britain’s
principle strategic alliance,
·
Littoral: the coastal regions of sea
·
AIP: Air Independent Propulsion,
·
SSN: Nuclear Attack Sub
·
SSK: Diesel (AIP) powered Attack Sub
·
SSBN: Nuclear powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
·
SSGN: Nuclear powered Cruise Missile submarine.
Context:
The world is changing and the British
government is facing the prospect of procuring just 7-8 Astute class SSNs and 3-4 Vanguard
Replacements for the Royal Navy: yielding a total fleet submarine force of
possibly just 10 boats; of which 3 would be of no use to the RN in any
conventional conflict, and in fact are a drain of resources as they require an
attack boat to be posted to provide them with security. This leaves the RN with very few vessels to
cover all the missions these submarines are now relied upon to do, ranging from
tactical strike with cruise missiles in support of D+1 missions to intelligence
gathering, from patrolling the South Atlantic as a deterrent themselves to
protecting the Strategic deterrent; they do all this and the full gamut of
variables in between. These vessels are therefore beyond doubt crucial to
national security; but, crucially Britain is in straitened economic times, and
the government is only willing to spend so much money, this means that not
enough will be bought.
So what is the solution to this
problem? There are two main options:
1) Do
nothing, and hope no one calls the nations bluff or that nothing happens that
really demands the full force of the fleet over the next 20-30 years
2) Procure some cheaper vessels, like the USN has
done with the Virginia class rather
than the Seawolf Class, but on a
Medium Navy budget… so a class of SSKs.
SSKs are cheap and capable, they
are not as fast nor as long legged as their Nuclear powered cousins; but they
make up for that by being easily forward deployed, requiring few crew (but
benefiting especially the officers of the crew by providing early command
experience – experience that hopefully helps to prevent accidents when those
officers get command of the far more expensive nuclear vessels later in their
careers), excellent in the shallow waters of the littorals and most importantly
for a country seeking to rebalance and strengthen its economy are eminently
exportable – in fact there is a growing market virtually everywhere in the
world.
For Britain on a strategic level
they would enhance
Britain’s ability to secure key trade routes and the key energy resources that
are needed to power the economy and support the NHS, Education and the
Pensioners at home. Further to this the unique selling points of the SSKs would
also yield benefits for Britain by enabling global operations for her intelligence
gathering agencies and Special Forces, whilst allowing for a more flexible
approach to war fighting should conflicts arise. This is something which cannot
be overstated as a strategic necessity, Britain at the moment, with its current
procurement practice, does not have any reserve built it… whilst the
high-value/high-tech/high-cost systems are necessary to retain Britain’s
fighting edge and full spectrum capability, there is a lack of
lower-tech/lower-cost systems necessary to provide the mass that provides true
flexibility to deal with threats; preferably by
preventative presence, or conventional deterrence[1]
- which is itself the largest saving possible, because wars cost a lot more
money than successful gunboat diplomacy[2].
Figure 1; a cross-section of the RCN Victoria Class submarine, previously the RN's last SSK class the Upholder's
Key Points:
·
Falklands (to provide extra deterrence/defence,
enabling more freedom in operations of SSNs as well as allowing greater
security),
·
Gibraltar (would provide for permanent
presence in Mediterranean allowing SSNs to concentrate further afield),
·
Plymouth(to support Flag Officer Sea Training
– ASW warfare needs to practice on a regular basis against more than
simulations, this would also represent a ready pool for Amphibious Warfare),
·
Faslane(to support strategic deterrent – with
the growth in other nations having SSNs its ),
·
…with the remaining 2 if built providing for
maintenance, area surge, Special Forces & amphibious warfare support –
although of course vessels from the original 8 could be used to cover these
roles on an ad hoc basis as and when required.
·
Thanks to their smaller crew (the Type 212 has
a crew of just 22-27, whilst the larger Upholder/Victoria
class has a crew of 48… still under half of the Astute class’s 98) and simpler maintenance requirement,
these could be maintained in position by having trickle crewing with part of
the crew rotating home/out every 30 days.
Operational Capabilities as result of procurement of
SSKs:
Ø
Special
Forces –
insertion/extraction, with the growing usage off these forces in Britain’s
foreign policy strategy it makes sense to increase the assets which could be
used to insert them; combined with the forward basing this would dramatically
increase the flexibility of Britain’s covert assets.
Ø
Intelligence – with the growth in the diversity of UAVs it
is not inconceivable that soon, one with such a weapon emerge which can be
deployed from submarine and return to the submarine after completing its
mission…however, even without that their ability to get close inshore and
manoeuvre in shallow waters would allow Britain the opportunity of gaining
greater understanding of the world around; and as the old saying goes the more
you know the less you fear, the less you fear the less likely there is to be
conflict.
Ø
Forward
Deployment – as the
recent events in Libya and the wider Arab world show, things will sometimes
happen very quickly and very fast, being able to forward deploy assets so that
they are already close to an area is of tremendous advantage…further to this
because SSKs are seen as being more defensive than SSNs (and without the risk
of massive accidents), its far harder for anyone to object to their presence;
therefore by basing two at Gibraltar Britain would of course have a stable
presence with the Mediterranean and the crucial transit points of the Suez
& Straits of Gibraltar, by basing two in the Falklands the Britain would
have easy access to the Antarctic, a presence at another crucial transit point
- Cape Horn, and of course a stronger defensive presence in South Atlantic.
Ø
Training – Flag Officer Sea Training Plymouth;
Warships (for ASW training), Task Groups, Submarines, Special Forces and
Amphibious Forces would all benefit from access to these vessels… these are
sorts of vessels that are most likely to be at the disposal of the enemy’s they
face, therefore experience operating with and against them is of premium
advantage.
Ø
Security
of Strategic Deterrent – with
their abilities inshore being of such a good standard, then the option of using
two to constantly have one sitting of the entrance of Faslane to check if
another nation is snooping around Faslane would seem to be an obvious use of
them. The fact that unlike aircraft they could literally sit on the sea floor,
without moving for weeks, just listening. This would mean that it would be
almost impossible for another nation’s submarine to sneak within range of one
of the RN’s SSBNs as they leave their harbour – and therefore possibly being
able to follow that SSBN to its operating area, putting it in grave danger.
Ø
War
Fighting – apart
from what has been mentioned above, there is the fact that SSKs would act as
force multipliers in a conflict; for example whilst an SSN might well be needed
to keep up with the Carrier Battle Group, the Amphibious Task Group would be
able to use an SSK to provide it with its attending submarine – freeing up an
SSN to go ahead of the force, another SSK might be used to provide the guard on
the Strategic Deterrent Patrol to free up another one. What they will do in
warfare is provide options for the Government, for Task Force Commanders and
for Operators to be able to choose how best to maximise the capabilities at
their disposal…not make decisions upon restrictions of force security.
Figure 2; Type 212
SSK at sea
·
Essential Items
o Time
frame – the full class needs to be brought into service with at most 8-10 years
(2 parliaments) from start to completion of last vessel
o Cost
– as little as possible, obviously it should be aimed to be roughly a 1/3rd
of the price of the Astute class SSNs
o Maintenance
– must be easy to maintain/operate
o Capability
– must be able to use full range of weapons as carried in SSNs, and preferably equivalent
sensors
o Legacy
– it must rebuild British standing and technical capability to a level at which
·
Desired
o Appeal
to allies such as Australia and India, who would most likely be interested in
the more oceanic focused SSKs that Britain has a history of producing – this
started with the Porpoise class.
o Life
– they need to be designed to have a service life of 24-36 years, so need to be
easily upgradeable and as componentised as possible (i.e. the vessel must be
designed so not only are the components
Figure 3; HMS Otus, one of the very successful Oberon class submarines
Recommended
Procurement Plan:
·
The purchase of a foreign design, such as the
German Type 212 design (pictured above), would most likely fit the criteria
best probably with a combined production system whereby they would build 2
units with the remainder being built in the UK – principally because it could
be built quickest. Probably at a firm such as Cammell Laird’s at Birkenhead to
allow BAE Submarine Solutions at Barrow to focus on nuclear production. To
spread the costs, as well as the legacy as much as possible, it would be
recommended to build the vessels at a rate of 1 a year after the initial
production of 3-4 vessels, which should be done as quickly as possible.
·
If an indigenous design is gone with Britain
could do a lot worse than building new versions of the Upholder class with an upgraded engine and the already waiting
Astute Sensor suite – again Cammell Lairds could be used, they did after all
build 3 out of the 4 Upholder class.
Whilst these vessels would be procured over a similar time frame, it would take
longer to get started as certain skills would have to be re-acquired; a task
which could be accelerated by buying in skills from abroad i.e. nations such as
Japan or Germany, or by partnering with nations with recent building/operating
experience who are also looking at new programs such as Australia and India.
·
There would also be the necessity of procuring
an Auxiliary vessel which could act as a submarine tender to enhance global
operations; this vessel would most likely be procured from one of the
specialist builders within the UK such as the A&P group in Falmouth– they
would be especially suited as they specialise in vessel conversions and it
would of course be far cheaper to covert that to build from new.
Points of
Interest:
·
Whilst SSNs are the best submarine money can
buy, SSKs are better in shallow water, their size; their relative simplicity
and the fact that when operating on battery they make almost no mechanical
noises mean that they are excellent tools for Special Forces insertions and
extractions.
·
With the increased procurement of SSKs around
the world a fundamental understanding of them as well as the increased training
opportunities that would be brought by possessing modern vessels.
·
Will provide an entry for UK into a burgeoning
global market; SSKs are big business and this would be a method of using the
skills and knowledge that has been developed in our nuclear program to develop
an export market – bringing in foreign capital to the UK domestic economy.
·
Reduces the chances of a major submarine
accident by providing for more command experience of key personnel
·
Will provide a greater level of security for
the Strategic Deterrent, as well as allow the forward basing of units in areas
of strategic significance – thereby allowing for more soft power opportunities
and hard power options.
Figure 4; Cut out
drawing of a Type 212
Cost
Benefit Analysis:
Total cost of the program based on disclosed figures would be as
follows (based on procurement of Type 212, other options are of course
available):
10 x T212 at $525million or £331million each =
£3.3billion
1 x Submarine tender at £120million =
£120million
Minor modifications to facilities at docks in
Falklands and Gibraltar = £120million
Total Cost = £3.54billion
There is though, another option; a new
design based upon Upholder class (for
simplicity of reference called the Stoic
Class[3])
- they entered service at $215 million in 1992 or roughly £250million in
today’s money; so with the addition of the Astute
sonar suite, other modernisations using off the shelf equipment/systems and
the cost of partnering with nations/companies to accelerate the acquisition of
key skills would raise the cost to <£350million. This would work out at:
10 x Stoic = £3.5billion
1 x Submarine tender at £120million =
£120million
Minor modifications to facilities at docks in
Falklands and Gibraltar = £120million
Total Cost = £3.74billion
For the outlay equivalent between
0.495% and 0.523% of yearly total Government Spending[4]
the British Government, and the British Taxpayers, would have the got 125%
increase in total number of attack submarines (based on 8 Astute class vessels being procured – it would be 143% increase if
only 7 were procured); and a consequently 80% increase in unit availability
across the whole flotilla as opposed to the current numbers and force
structure. Furthermore that cost is reduced further when it is placed in the
context of being spread over 6 years (falling to about 0.049% of total spending
and average over an eight year period of 0.065% or £430million a year[5]),
and most likely resulting in future work producing more vessels for allied
nations…
Such an outcome could be more
immediate should the Stoic class managed to follow the success of the 26
vessels of Oberon class which were
built in late 1950s/1960s and which served with the RN (13), Royal Australian
Navy (5), Royal Canadian Navy (5), Brazilian navy(3) and Chilean navy(2). Whilst
the RCN have bought the 4 Upholder class
- are getting back into the Submarine operating community and may well consider
adding to that force under the right circumstance, the RAN are looking for a
replacement for the Collins class, the Indian Navy are talking about project
75I, the South African navy are looking for replacements for their Type 209s;
thanks to the commonwealth there is a perfect
opportunity for the British government to market such a submarine
instead of letting European partners and Russia have the market to themselves. Whilst
it’s unlikely that all of them would be built in the UK, key components
certainly would be, and the design would be in the UK and a lot of the class
would be built in the UK and a lot of money would be brought in to the British economy.
Currently in Service/being built Diesel electric
and AIP submarines (in service):
·
Africa
o South Africa – Heroine class (German Type 209s),
·
Asia
o China – Type 043 Qing class, Type 041
Yuan class, Type 039 Song class, Type 035 Ming class (Russian Romeo class), Type 033 Wuhan
class (Russian Romeo Class), Kilo class
o Japan – Asashio class and Soryu class
o Singapore – Archer Class (originally
Swedish Vastergotland class)
o South Korea – Chang Bongo class (modified indigenously built German Type 209
design), Son Won-il class
o Indonesian – Cakra class (German Type 209s), Chang
Bogo class (South Korean modified German Type 209s)
·
Asia
Minor
o Turkey – Atilay Class (German Type 209s), Preveze class (German Type 209s), Gur Class (German Type 209s)
·
Asian
Sub-Continent
o India – Project 75I (underdevelopment[6]),
Scorpene class (bought 6 French
subs), Shishumar (modified
indigenously built German Type 209 design), Sidnhughosh
class (upgraded Russian Kilo class)
o Pakistan – 90B class
·
Australasia
o Australia – Collins Class
·
Europe
o Spain – S-80 class
o Italy – Todaro class (Indigenously
built Type 212)
o Germany – Type 212/Type 214 (export variant of Type 212), Type 206/Type 209
(Export variant of Type 206),
o France – Scorpene Class
o Sweden – Gotland Class, Sodermanland class
o Greece – Type 214 class
o Portugal – Tridente class (modified
German built Type 214)
·
Middle
East
o Israel – Dolphin Class (1 operational,
2 building in Germany… modified Type 214s)
·
North
America
o Canada – Victoria Class (formerly British Upholder class)
·
South
America
o Brazil – Tupi Class (German Type 209s), Tikuna
Class (German Type 209s)
o Argentina – Salta class (German Type 209s)
o Chile – Thomson class (German Type 209s)
o Columbia – Pijao class (German Type 209s)
o Ecuadorian – Shyri class (German Type 209s)
o Peru – Islay class (German Type 209s), Angamos
class (German Type 209s)
o Venezula – Sabalo class (German Type 209s)
·
Russia
o Project
677 Lada, Project 1650 Amu, Kilo class
Summary:
When Britain stopped having SSKs it
was based in the belief that thanks to the end of the Cold War the world was going
to be safer and that there would be fewer submarines/enemies; both of these
assumptions have been unfortunately proved to be based in hope rather than
pragmatic evaluations. The capability benefits of procuring some SSKs far outweigh
the costs; the capabilities of SSKs means that whilst they will not replace
other units, they will fill a hole within Britain’s force structure that will
enable other units to be utilised in a more effective and more strategic way. This
is not however an overnight fix, but it is a cost-effective and well-travelled
one – in fact it is a route which has already been travelled by a lot of
Britain’s friends and they will most likely be will to help Britain avoid any
possible pitfalls, at least by examination of their failures & successes if
not their active participation.
Further
Reading:
·
Air Independent Propulsion
·
U212/214
·
Japanese Soryu
Class
·
RN Upholder
class, now RCN Victoria Class
·
Interesting Articles
[2] (Cable, Britain's
Naval Future 1983, Cable, Gunboat
Diplomacy, 1919-1979 1981)
[3] Named after one of the S class submarines which served
the RN so well in the Second World War, http://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/3448.html
[4] 2014 spending is estimated to be £715.3billion
[5] Or
less than a 17th of what the government spends every year on ‘Executive and legislative organs’ http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/year_spending_2014UKbn_12bc1n_60655070738m8o8r8971#ukgs302
(in fact the whole program would cost less than half the yearly budget of the
‘Executive and Legislative Organs’)
[6]
http://ibnlive.in.com/news/navy-eyes-new-submarines-for-bluewater-capability/59174-3.html
