Reason for writing: A recent Article by Nick Ritchie of New York
University
Context: The Nuclear deterrent is an issue which is important
from multiple angles, in light of recent North Korean actions its more solid
role of deterrent is at the for… but what is often forgotten are its other
benefits, it drives forward research in many areas of technology which are
significant to UK industry (Communications, rocket design, guidance, submarine
building, nuclear reactors, advanced computers and other high end tech), it
provides a status level; most importantly it provides a constant touch stone in
our security – a base level from which we cannot drop only ‘punch’ above.
This article is seeking to make the
case for a different system of deterrent as stepping stone to disarmament, in
many ways its rather similar to the policy that seems to have been adopted on
voting systems; keep slowly pushing others in elsewhere and eventually the
dreaded First-Past-The-Post which the British people seem to like and want will
get forced out through embarrassment.
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A small Sample of
Britain’s Strategic Interests… our territories and exclusive economic zones
around the world
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Key Words/Phrases:
·
Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle
(MIRV): these are what are actually important, each missile carries several of
these, each with their own nuclear device.
·
Trident: the current missile system used by Britain
& the United States, can carry 12 MIRVs, but in British use only carries 5
– in accordance with the limit imposed by the START treaties. It has a range of
about 7,000 miles meaning it can hit pretty much anywhere from anywhere;
especially when compared with the Tomahawk cruise missile (the longest ranged
one currently in service) which has a range of only 1,000 miles.
·
Vanguard class: the
current serving generation of Britain’s nuclear deterrent submarines, excellent
vessels but like the Resolution class before them they
are now approaching they end of their service lives and hence we are now facing
this debate, as its them which are due to be replaced… not the missiles they
carry.
·
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Britain’s
principle strategic alliance,
·
CATOBAR: Catapult Assisted Take Off/Barrier Assisted
Recovery, the most expensive system of carrier flight deck to procure, but because
of this has the widest range of aircraft types available to operate from
it -
actually it works out cheaper in the long term as the aircraft are
cheaper and more capable.
·
VSTOL: Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing, the
cheapest system of carrier flight deck, but requires the most expensive
aircraft… the Royal Navy (RN) was the first navy to employ this to provide its
fixed wing airpower, but that was out of necessity when the first Queen Elizabeth class was cancelled
(CVA-01 was due to have been called after the Queen) and all it managed to get
built were the ‘Through-Deck Cruisers’ of the Invincible class.
·
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter): produced in
multiple variants, B for VSTOL and C for CATOBAR, this is the new stealth jet
strike/fighter (what used to be called a Fighter Bomber…i.e. could fight its
way to the target, drop its bombs and fight its way back) coming into service
with the RN for the Fleet Air Arm to fly of the carriers.
·
Eurofighter Typhoon: Principle aircraft belonging to
the Royal Air Force at the moment, a Cold War inspired Dog-Fighter that was
used in conjunction with Tornadoes over Libya to do some limited bombing…
although it was the much more venerable Tornadoes which had to aim the weapons.
·
X-47: The currently under development, but conducting
carrier deck operations and flying, Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, the X-47 is
the future of stealth strike & reconnaissance, there is no coincidence that
it looks like a mini B-2 bomber.
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An artist’s impression of
the X-47 in flight…
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It on the deck of the USS Truman
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_+Harry+S_+Truman+aircraft+carrier+host+test+operations+for+an+unmanned+airc+(4).jpg) |
Key Points:
1. This
article focuses heavily on Russia as our strategic enemy, when in reality Iran,
North Korea and the nations we are not even contemplating now could be the risk
we are facing over the twenty-thirty year service life of the Nuclear Deterrent
2. The author
talks about all the systems as if they are equal, or just as good as each
other… they are not:
a. Cruise
Missiles launched from Submarines – far shorter in range, meaning the sub has
to actually get quite close to the enemy shore line… furthermore cruise
missiles as was proved by the Iraqi’s, Libyans, Serbians and others, can be
shot down
b. Aircraft
Dropped Bombs – again limited by the range of aircraft and where you have
bases… currently Britain could if this was its system, with Eurofighters bomb
the h*ll out of Northern France, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands and a bit of
Germany – that hardly qualifies as a deterrent in any real way.
i.
There is a sub clause to this, and that is the
RN’s new Aircraft Carriers, the Queen
Elizabeth’s, now if they were built as CATOBAR carriers, and a third was
built, and the Fleet Air Arm were given F-35C’s alongside some Strike UCAVs
(like the X-47) a sort of capability would emerge… it would be global in reach,
but it would still have limits like those of cruise missiles from subs, the
aircraft could be shot down – or the cruise missiles they launch could be… so
it would not be a certain system.
ii.
Some will bring up the concept of air to air
refuelling… the trouble is this is even more problematic as it’s a difficult
manoeuvre at the best of times, but would even a friendly country allow Britain
to overfly them, conduct a refuelling over their people’s heads, whilst
carrying nuclear weapons… would even Britain’s greatest friends agree to such a
thing – it’s doubtful to say the least.
c. Space Based
Weapons: against the law and would not be independent as Britain does not
currently have the ability to launch anything into space by its own volition
d. (For
Comparison) Trident: has a range of 6,000nautical miles (which if put in
context, Cape Town is 5,203nmi from London, Manaus Brazil is 4,462nmi, and Sydney is 9,173nmi- these are just though to give examples of distance), it is
bl**dy difficult to nigh on impossible to shoot down an incoming MIRV
travelling at around 7 x the speed of sound at our current levels of technology[1].
3. The real
argument here is its either to have Trident or not have a deterrent after all
have a half way system is worse than not having one at all, because the risk is
run that when it’s brought online it will make the situation worse; so it
places the leadership in a bind, bring it on line and risk escalating the
situation – don’t bring it on line and don’t have the tool you need to prevent
escalation…
4. The RN
doesn’t actually get any benefits from operating the current system, in fact
it’s a drain on resources… these systems are purely strategic in nature yet now
they come from the MOD’s main budget rather than a special one as they used to
pre-labour.
Points of Interest:
1. So far
since the Lib-Dems have been in government as part of the Coalition they have
sought and paid for with Taxpayers money for three different studies of the
nuclear deterrent, each one has come back after great expense backing the
Trident system
2. What no-one
seems to be considering with the deterrent is that actually we would be better
off building 5 subs than 4, after all with the slot in system BAE is developing
the same tubes used for Trident could have a dozen cruise missiles slotted in…
and 5 subs would mean we would be able to guarantee have a deterrent at sea
(whilst administratively speaking only having three boats in the role) and
usually have a boat rolled as an SSGN (cruise missile sub) available to support
other operations British forces could be tasked with.
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(thanks to the Daily Mail and MOD for this photo)
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Summary:
When I first saw this article I
thought well it’s from New York there is a hope that there will be some
rational thought in it… but unfortunately not. I am a believer in the value of
the nuclear deterrent, I will freely hold my hand up to that… but I am not a
blind adherent. I realise it is expensive, it is resource consuming and it is
in many ways a very blunt tool. However, I am not persuaded that if that money
was not used for the deterrent it would be spend upon conventional forces,
neither am I so naïve to that a weapon as powerful as a nuclear device can ever
be anything but a blunt tool.
Britain is economically powerful
enough that without nuclear weapons it would still have some relevance, but
with the pressures of the welfare state (amongst other expenses) growing every
year; Defence Spending has been cut again and again, and without this level of
capability provided by the Deterrent it might well be very hard, if not
impossible, to maintain the status we have become accustomed too, a status
which helps with trade, with tourism, with safety of our citizens when they
travel abroad – things that do not come up in a debate of the strategic
deterrent, but which nevertheless are impacted upon by it.
