Naval Requirements

Thursday, 1 August 2013

July 2013 Notes: Could the RNR provide a solution to the Naval Services lack of force depth?

Reason for writing: the Royal Navy is shrinking, it’s personnel numbers are being cut regularly and unlike other services it’s reserves whilst loyal, well trained and very committed are often seemingly an afternoon in defence considerations. These notes consider the idea that perhaps the Royal Navy Reserve should be re-established, re-energised and most importantly re-equipped so it’s once more on a more equal footing with its other service counterparts and can play as full a role as Britain in reality needs it to in the defence of the realm.

·         http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Naval_Reserve
·         http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/Careers/Maritime-Reserves/Royal-Naval-Reserves/Royal-Naval-Reserve-units
·         http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Maritime-Reserves/Royal-Naval-Reserves
·         http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/april-may-2013-notes-relocating.html
·         http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/06/june-2013-notes-possibilities-of-royal.html
·         http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/june-2013-notes-possibilities-of.html

Key Words/Phrases:

·         VSTOL: Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing, the cheapest system of carrier flight deck, but requires the most expensive aircraft… the Royal Navy (RN) was the first navy to employ this to provide its fixed wing airpower, but that was out of necessity when the first Queen Elizabeth class was cancelled (CVA-01 was due to have been called after the Queen) and all it managed to get built were the ‘Through-Deck Cruisers’ of the Invincible class.
·         F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter): produced in multiple variants, B for VSTOL and C for CATOBAR, this is the new stealth jet strike/fighter (what used to be called a Fighter Bomber…i.e. could fight its way to the target, drop its bombs and fight its way back) coming into service with the RN for the Fleet Air Arm to fly of the carriers.
·         Eurofighter Typhoon: Principle aircraft belonging to the Royal Air Force at the moment, a Cold War inspired Dog-Fighter that was used in conjunction with Tornadoes over Libya to do some limited bombing… although it was the much more venerable Tornadoes which had to aim the weapons.
·         NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Britain’s principle strategic alliance,
·         SSK: Diesel Attack Submarine
·         SSN: Nuclear Attack Submarine
·         LSL: Landing Ship logistics
·         Corvette: less than 3000tons warship.
·         STUFT: Ships Taken Up From Trade
·         LRMP: Long Range Maritime Patrol
·         ACA: Auxiliary Combat Aircraft[1]

Context:

In the 1800s the Royal Navy could draw upon a massive merchant fleet to provide both manpower and ships in times of war to make up for the peacetime procurement shortfall; in 1850s this was formalised into the Royal Naval Reserves. In the 1900s a proper fleet was stood up and until 1960 the Royal Naval reserve would retain their own vessels for activation in times of war. It was done in part because it was presumed that any future conflict would quickly go nuclear so a naval reserve would not be of use. However, since 1960 through a combination of luck, diplomacy and strategic deterrence there hasn’t been a nuclear war, there has been though been piracy, drug trafficking, a huge naval task force was despatched to the Falklands, constant patrols have been kept up worldwide at points of critical interest and countless other mobilisations. For all these things a reserve force would have been more than useful, they would have been lifesaving and more importantly far more cost effective than having to implement commercial solutions within a limited time frame.

For the modern Naval Service the lack of a proper reserve[2] is a problem which can only grow, fewer and fewer merchant ships are now British flagged, and those that are growing bigger – now whilst this might seem a benefit as fewer ships can carry more stuff, which in terms of commercial carriage is great as it cuts costs, in terms of naval operations it’s a real problem. The case study is the Atlantic Conveyor in the Falklands war, the loss of the helicopters and the supplies it was carrying really hampered the land war effort and forced the amphibious task group to have to take far bigger risks with its ships… now imagine if that ship had 50% bigger, even more loaded with equipment, even more important therefore not to place all the eggs in single basket.

Finally with a shrinking land forces then it’s becoming more and more obvious that the Army will be relying upon Territorial Units to provide whole formations in some war scenarios; it seems strange that the RMs are not also similarly equipped with a reserve formation to provide that extra strength – more importantly extra amphibious strength when necessary. This could be important because with the overall force size shrinking and the number of/distance to possible flash points increasing there is more likelihood of forces being overextended; and having amphibious thinking[3], amphibious orientated[4], amphibious trained[5], but most importantly amphibious forces[6] available to the missions that will be required of them is essential to the success of those missions.

Missions though are not only about what takes place on the front line, there are other posts of a more sedentary nature which also would benefit from being able to draw reservists. For example having reservists in the operational, logistics and planning staffs would mean should a scenario arise where the regulars need go forward to help form a task force staff or something similar, then the posts would not be left suddenly empty or time taken whilst new officers come up to speed as the reservists could just be activated and take post providing the extra person(s) who would already be familiar not only with the role, but with personnel and their style of work. Furthermore the reservists doing their weekends training would enable more regular personnel to have weekends off therefore improving their family lives immeasurably; something which would benefit retention of regular personnel.

A specific area which could really benefit from reservist personnel is naval intelligence[7], which is a position which would not only benefit from having a large pool of experience/knowledge to draw but more importantly is often under staffed; especially when a crisis hits. Another area needing more personnel is Ships Take up from Trade – STUFT; this has always traditionally been an RNR role, and it still very much is, but the personnel for it need to be expanded both to cope with an increased capability and with the real possibility that they might have to man more ships or those ships might have to travel greater distances, most importantly though they must be able to provide those ships that are manned with better defences, such circumstance will again require more personnel…the moral of the story with STUFT is that while the personnel are great, to make proper used of it then the ships will need to be able to be armed better than they have traditionally been.

Maritime Security will always be an issue; the sea is not like land a wall cannot just be stuck up when you want to keep people out – this means many more personnel that can be provided under current circumstances with just the regular forces to rely upon; having reserves that could be called up in emergencies would be a very effective method of maximising security without having to pull regular forces or interrupt maintenance of vessels in order to be able to respond to the situation.

Key Points:

Formation

·         Based on the ‘nucleus’ reserve structure used by the RN traditionally, i.e. all ships would have small detachment of regulars to oversee maintenance, the RM reserve commando(s) would have a core of regular NCOs & Officers to build themselves round. Although, most importantly the Unit commanders must be themselves reservists, this would be helped in the ship circumstance by having more crews than ships, so the temptation could be easily resisted… but it is important when especially considering aircraft squadrons or commandos that the reservist personnel feel their commander understands their situation (or at least has a similarity). This will be important for retention which will be a key requirement to keep these forces capable and relevant.
·         Regular training – whilst retention will be a key plank of effectiveness, it will be retention combined with training that will provide the successes: 26 weekends a year plus two fortnight exercises will be a good start, but online courses/simulations, seminars/lectures by veterans & other knowledgeable people, a good technical & strategic service magazine and finally the chance to sign up for a 6 month deployment on a regular ship would all serve to create a far stronger, far more capable and integrated reserve organisation.
·         Career structure – the reservists can’t feel that every time a regular retires they have first dibs on any post, it must be felt that the reservists through commitment and hard work can conceivably become unit commander… if it is felt that all that matters is rank in regulars then a lot of great people will be put off, as there are many who would love to serve in the navy but would not want to go regular and would grow frustrated if there was any ‘glass’ ceiling. For example the army maintains a Major General Reserves, who is a reservist officer; in comparison the RN hasn’t had a reserve Rear Admiral since John Grant retired with the RNRs ships in 1960.
·         Units must be collocated with regulars units so as to enable them to train together, support each other; however reservists must have their own properly supplied and organised units. Just putting them ad-hoc-ly within units and having them fill in as and when required damages the regular unit as it prevents it from making the case to needing to be properly supplied with regular personnel, and also whilst building closer integration it can also lead to a feeling of insecurities and also can make them feel that they have limited chance of a long term career[8].

Roles proposed

·         Crisis response/disaster relief – they would provide a pool of manpower for when things happen, because naval service personnel all have to be trained in fire fighting and damage control because of the nature of ships…those same personnel are very useful when things go wrong ashore as they have lots of good quality useful core skills.
·         War fighting - it’s obvious be must never be forgotten the primary role of these personnel is to provide the naval service with the depth of personnel it needs to fight modern wars whilst not pushing numbers of regulars above levels which the government is unwilling to pay for.
·         Manning STUFT – including having stand-alone self defence systems they can install quickly. The last is important even if it’s only chaff, flares and jamming gear it would still be useful and instil greater confidence within the merchant crews whilst also serving to free up the escorts to be a little looser as they would be less important to point protection.
·         Providing support and fill – as they already do but on a more well supplied basis, with more depth and more training then the RNRs could not just provide personnel fill but also Unit Fill when that is required.

They would need equipment:

·         Ships – Corvettes[9], MCMVs, Patrol ships, LSLs & Auxiliaries[10] and SSKs[11]
·         Aircraft – Helicopters, LRMP and ACA
·         Vehicles – Viking APC, 105mm field guns[12]
·         Plug ins – Chaff, Flares, Jamming equipment, Communication stations, and CIWS systems[13]

This is all about generating the sort of force which will provide the naval service the reserves it needs for future conflicts, being able to outfit merchant vessels so that they can fire back if under attack will allow escorts to turn from guarding sheep dogs into protective wolves – prowling for the enemy rather than having to hold a line at all costs. Reserve ships will not only come with reserve crews, but provide slack so that when regular vessels go into long term maintenance their duties can be covered…a situation which would also benefit reserve personnel as it would allow them to volunteer for an extended deployment to upgrade their skills.

Points of Interest:

·         RM’s could have a 4^th (or even a 5^th) Commando so no matter what deployments were on it the world the Government would always be able to deploy an amphibious brigade to trouble spots – that is important because a brigade sized force is large enough to establish and defend a bridgehead whilst further forces are off loader, or deal with many scenarios without further support.
·         RN would have a surge number of escorts – the force level required for war fighting, and that required for global presence are different, this is where the reserves come in
·         Reserve equipment is a force multiplier as instead of losing a ship or something when it has to go into long term refit, a ship can be pulled out of the reserves and put into action – it could even be beneficial with a special crew put together for its tour of volunteer reservists and regulars so as to increase the proficiency of the reservists.
·         Reconnecting with wider society; Sea Blindness is a phrase which comes up all too often, and in many ways is a double edged blade on its user, because it puts the failure to communicate the case not the people who could make it, but those who would listen to it. The first lesson of democracy has always been that whilst everyone may have a voice, everyone doesn’t have to listen. A larger reserve would combat this, would help the naval service to connect with the wider nation in a more understanding and communicative way. This would be accomplished simply by the mixing process, by the chucking together of regulars who spend most of their careers away from home (some underwater with virtually no communication to the outside world for months at a time) with people who speak their language, share their values, but spend most of their lives at home reading papers every day, watching the evening news – better preparing those regulars for when they have to explain the case for the continued existence of the navy.
·         Benefits to personnel, if they become a single parent or a parent get ill, then instead of losing them, their experience and the investment made in their training they could transfer to reserve

Summary:

Short answer is yes, the long answer is different. For Reserves to work they would have to be supported, not just lip served, they would need their own ships; imagine for a moment if the 4 Type 22s instead being scrapped had been placed in reserve, or the 3 Type 23’s sold Chile had been? The RN might have 7 frigates in reserve, not costing anything apart from basic maintenance but available for if a conflict should arise where escorts are needed quickly – then the RN would of at a stroke had 20 frigates in service rather than 13 (which in reality due to maintenance requirements is more like 11, in training, returning from patrol, going on patrol or on patrol). What would the navy have been able to do if the Upholder class had been put in reserve rather than sold to Canada? Would it have ever had to go without the chance to train it’s ASW ships against real submarines rather than just simulations? Would not have been better for Largs Bay the LSL(A), a vital component of UK amphibious forces which was sold to Australia, to have been put in reserve for when it is needed? Or HMS Illustrious¸ the vital second ‘LPH’, with no Ocean replacement yet being mooted due to the focus on the Queen Elizabeth’s and the Type 26s would it not be better for her to have gone into reserve status? However, it’s not just ships – whilst cutting the harriers as a ground attack aircraft instead of the Tornado is a decision to be debated elsewhere, why could a reserve squadron have been raised; with far less flying hours per year and reserve personnel it would have still save money and the fleet would have still had some air defence aircraft until the F-35Bs entered service? There also minesweepers, auxiliaries, all sorts of aircraft and vessels which still had service left in them, and could have provided a more than adequate reserve strength to support operations.

The problem with making cuts to save money is too often the emphasis is on the cutting, because that is what is at the front of the mind; and the need to save money in the recent financial crisis is more than understandable. However, now the Army is being cut post Afghanistan, and is promised an increased Territorial Army to support it – yet successive governments have been cutting the Royal Navy and never have they offered option, and therefore presumably never even thought about ‘should we instead put that into reserve?’. This is the question though which now should be asked, because coming up with whatever escorts replace them in service the Type 23s will still be fairly good ships – suitable for a reserve? More than likely… Alternatively, should the low cost, adaptable and numbers orientated options of the Corvette or ACA be taken up then they would make perfect systems for reservists, simple easy to master systems that would allow the RN a solid base for future operations.

Further Reading:

http://www.britishpathe.com/video/reserve-fleet

[1] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/june-2013-notes-possibilities-of.html

[2] Now that’s not to say they are not there, and do not do a great job - http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Maritime-Reserves/Royal-Naval-Reserves/Roles-in-RNR, but read the descriptions, they are back fill, their

[3] i.e. it’s what they signed up for and don’t mind having to spend possibly long periods on a ship in the ocean waiting for orders to attack.

[4] i.e. in terms of equipment, it’s not just ships which have to be salt water proof, it’s aircraft, guns, any electronic device – the stuff is corrosive on electronics as anything.

[5] i.e. if they are going to take part in amphibious assault, the more times they have seen and LCU, LCVP or helicopter before the more likely it is to go well. http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/what-should-future-of-british-ship-to.html

[6] i.e. they have to be expeditionary, they have to able to think an act as much as part of a naval task group as a part of a RM Brigade or it just won’t work.

[7] They already exists, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Maritime-Reserves/Royal-Naval-Reserves/RNR-Units/Bedford-HMS-Ferret, but there is no direct entry, and they are in reality (but not quite in theory) limited to operational intelligence roles

[8] Yes several do, but usually it peaks at commanding an RNR area units, not FAA squadrons or corvette squadrons.

[9] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/july-2013-notes-corvettes-chance-to.html

[10] The Strategic and the Tactical forces proposed here (http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/april-may-2013-notes-relocating.html) are ideal candidates for being reserve lead organisations, and in fact would benefit enormously from being so.

[11] Probably requiring more than the 10 suggested here (http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/06/june-2013-notes-possibilities-of-royal.html) to work properly, a force totalling 14 would probably be adequate to provide for regulars, reserves and maintenance – representing an increase from £3.5billion over 8 years to £4.9billion over 12 years – doable and very attractive from the perspective of providing a secure SSK force to free up the SSNs to do the jobs they are needed to do, rather than trying to be used for everything.

[12] The current reserve unit that supports the 29^th Commando Regiment Royal Artillery (http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/The-Royal-Marines/3-Commando-Brigade/Attached-Army-Units/29-Commando-Regiment-Royal-Artillery), is to be re-rolled by the Army under its Army 2020 program to mini-uavs and subsumed into another unit that will no longer be a commando orientated force http://www.serfca.org/Portals/0/Images/f/SUMMARY%20OF%20A2020%20RESERVE%20STRUCTURE%20AND%20BASING%20CHANGES.pdf; however, the RN has a number of gunnery personel, it would not seem strange should some spare L118 guns be found for them to be used to form a reserve battery – nor would be without president for naval personel to man land guns in support of RM & British army units.

[13] It could be adapted stuff, i.e. for example the Starstreek man portable triple launcher could be adapted to ship use; alternatively a self-contained container system could be used.

July 2013 Notes: Corvettes – the chance to rebuild the RN?

Reason for writing:

The Royal Navy is shrinking and has been since 1946; with each new ‘peace dividend’ or technological leap demanding more & more and providing fewer & fewer vessels. The trouble is though that the world is not anymore peaceful, and is just as big with as many trouble spots demanding attention and ships can only be in one place at any one time… and sometimes that place has to be the home port for refit and repair.

An example of the shrinking is that the RN requested for 14 Type 45s AAD Destroyers to replace the Type 42 class vessels which had been in service since before the Falklands War in 1982. The RN accepted 12as the final procurement and ended up receiving just 6 (although more were paid for). Considering the RN is starting by requesting for 13 Type 26’s; then despite the fact that the official allocation of £11billion for new construction, the odds would seem that based on previous experience the RN could end up getting 6 again or even 5[1]. A situation that will be exacerbated by the fact that these major escorts will at current be required to do every mission, increasing wear and tear on vessels that need to be maintained for war fighting.

The solution to this problem is not only to build a decent number of the critical major escorts, but also build a number of adaptable force multipliers (or minor escorts) to provide the RN with the mass it needs to support the brawn it’s hollow without.

This is something which I think I am going to be drawn back to again and again in the future so any comments/ideas/suggestions are welcome.
·         http://shipbuildingtribune.com/2013/05/20/new-project-20380-corvette-boiky-commissioned/?utm_source=Shipbuilding+Tribune.com&utm_campaign=93df79db9b-RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_021336d9cb-93df79db9b-215317925
·         https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-concept-note-1-12-future-black-swan-class-sloop-of-war-a-group-system
·         http://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/wordpress/tag/type-26-frigate
·         http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ddg-type-45-britains-shrinking-air-defense-fleet-04941/?utm_medium=textlink&utm_term=continuereading
·         http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/type-56-corvette-chinas-lcs-underway.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+blogspot/gSklN+(SNAFU!)
·         http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2008/12/corvettes.html
·         http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2008/12/frigates.html
·         http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2008/12/destroyers.html

Key Words/Phrases:

·         NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Britain’s principle strategic alliance,
·         Type 26 Global Combat Ship: no not a British version of the USN’s Littoral Combat Ship nor the RN’s Type 23 frigates, but a Frigate successor to the larger more general purpose Type 22 class frigates, the last 4 of which were recently.
·         Area Defence: weapons which exist to defend the task group, usually covering an area with a radius greater than 15nm, examples of such systems would be Aster 30 (as fitted in Type 45 class[2]), SM-2 (as fitted in Arleigh Burke class[3])
·         Point Defence: weapons which exist to primarily defend the ship and vessels it is very close to, usually covering an area with a radius less than 15nm,

A rough outline of Task Group Air Defence parameters[4]

·         AAW: Anti Air Warfare
·         ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare
·         ASuW: Anti-Surface Warfare
·         MCMV: Mine Counter Measures Vessel
·         Stanflex, is a modular mission payload system developed by the Royal Danish Navy, it allows for a ship’s out fitting to be quickly changed and supports a range of systems, from Oceanography to Harpoon SSMs, from MCM gear to SAMs or Torpedoes, and a whole range of other systems.
·         Organic, when this is used in military terminology it means something that is part of that group, i.e. an aircraft carrier provides a task group with ‘organic’ air defence & strike aircraft, an oceanography vessel provides the task group with an ‘organic’ ocean mapping and analysis of conditions.
·         UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
·         USV: Unmanned Surface Vehicle
·         UUV: Undersea Unmanned Vehicle
·         EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone, they are up 200miles out to sea from shore, or contiguous with an undersea shelf that is UN mandated under the jurisdiction of a country to manage the resources of.

HMS Echo, one of the RN’s oceanographic survey vessels

Context:

How can Britain go about rebuilding its fleet to a level that it needs to be; providing the depth of vessels to support operations. There is a possible solution, one which is tried and tested – the High-Low navy, a navy cannot be made big enough being made up only of high value units (it’s simply too expensive) so that means a navy in the 1920s needed light cruisers and destroyers to be able to have the presence and carry out the policing necessary in peace time maritime relations; and essential to furnishing sufficient vessels to put together task groups in war.

In Britain the emphasis on high value units has been exacerbated by two beliefs. One of which has been held since the 1970s that should a major conflict arise there will be enough time or warning for the low value units to be mass produced (this is despite the closing of shipyards, and the consequent loss of not only production space but experience). The other view can be seen as a more problematic one. That is there is a growing trend to try and make ships do more by adding in more and more capability into a hull – in part this is because with few vessels, those vessels need to do more, which in turns makes them more expensive and meaning fewer can be built without further money being allocated – something which doesn’t happen often. The trouble is a vessel may be more capable, it may even be three times as capable as its predecessor, but one ship can only be in one place at a time; that might be in refit or more likely it might be the North Atlantic when they are needed in Indian Ocean or the Pacific. The trouble is that any design that attempts to rectify the RN’s lack of numbers will have to at least conform to these ideas in spirit in order to be accepted.

Despite the construction of low value units being limited, with the belief it can be ramped up in times of emergency, it has been on going. This has been the case because certain roles such as Mine Warfare, Oceanography and of course Patrol require those types of vessel – and whilst some specialists vessels may still be required to supplement this role, this proposed class would (to be built in enough numbers, and deliver on savings) be able to carry out all these duties. Furthermore, Britain has a legacy of producing these types of vessel and selling them to other nations; a legacy which is chequered, but which is there and provides a certain advantage to construction as it means there are designs ready to be used as basis.

The capability requirements have to be dealt with by a modern slight of hand; which in this case is an off the shelf modular weapon/equipment system. The Stanflex system has both advantages and disadvantages[5], but there are at the moment 11 types of module in service. These allow a ship to fulfil a wide range of roles, not at the same time, and not without a trip to a facility with a crane… but baring those requirements very capable ships.

	A knud Ramusen[6] the current Danish OPV and the class which replaced the Flyvefisken and took some of their Stanflex modules
A Stanflex system being taken out of a Flyvefisken class vessel[7] – highlighting it’s ease of change

The Flyvefisken Class Highlighting some of the range of options available with stanflex by MConrad[8]

Core Requirements

· Cost less around £100million per vessel

· Be easily adaptable to missions, preferably using an off the shelf modular system

· Easy enough to operate that a number of the vessels can be manned by reservists based around core competency crews (i.e. a small engineering detachment to keep track of maintenance)

These core requirements have been put together to provide the maximum number of ships, at £100million the class would cost less per unit than either the Eurofighter or F-35[9], now this is more than what was paid for the River class but it is reflective of the adoption of a modular system, the increased size required and t8he fact their base design is corvette rather than ocean patrol.

The requirement to allow them to be operated by reservists is that this is a key to increasing fleet strength; there used to be many ships in the RN which were reservists, now there are no vessels which are operated by reserves[10]. In a time when the Territorial Army (and the reserves in general), are being increased as a cost effective measure to increase capability whilst allowing for reductions in cost/size of regular forces it seems strange that whilst there is reserve artillery and tanks, there are no longer reserve ships.

The UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone

Mission

·         Maritime Policing: Counter Piracy, Counter Drugs, Fishery Protection, Patrol of the Economic Exclusion Zone
·         Presence
·         Task Group: Point AAD, ASW, ASuW, MCMV
·         Oceanography & Artic Patrol (this would be limited as they would lack the icebreaking capacity of HMS Endurance[11] or HMS Protector[12])

These vessels have to be capable of carrying out a wide range of missions during ‘peace’ time[13] and War time. However, these missions would require a range of capabilities from their modules, for example in the case of the three most peace time mission profiles:

·         Maritime Policing - all the missions outline are really the constabulary missions the RN engages in, mostly they require boats, benefit from a light helicopter/organic aerial surveillance and a deck gun,
·         Presence - which requires significant surveillance capacity, enhanced self-defence systems and an ASuW capability,
·         Oceanography & Artic Patrol - would be fitted with survey modules, boats and some UUV/USV

However, when they are war fighting within an Amphibious Task Group (a Carrier Battle Group will be different) the load out of modules will reflect what is required of that vessel. As there will be multiple vessels functioning within the group (at least four), they could be module orientated thusly:

·         two might be ASW orientated,
·         one Oceanography,
·         one MCMV

Whilst in reality there may only be one module difference on a standard load out (as they will require a general purpose potential due to the likelihood of combat) between the vessels these orientations will define how they are used, with the MCMV and Oceanography vessels taking inshore duties when part of an amphibious group conducting a landing, or inner ring when part of a the group during transit.

Vessel Outline

·         Displacement: ~2800tons
·         Sensors: Air/Surface Search - SMART-S mk2, ESM - Vigile 400 ES, Sonar - Thales UMS4132 Kingklip
·         Weapons:

o Modular - 5x staflex (2 to be mounted in a pair amidships, one each port & starboard, and one next to stern ramp so that it can either carry crane, towed sonar or MCM gear),

o Fitted - 1x Phalanx CIWS (atop hangar), 1x BAE MK110 57mm (forward) & 16 cell Sylver A43 VLS[14] for CAMM (as in Type 23s & 45s mounted forward between main gun and bridge)

·         Range: 4500nm (at 19knots minimum)
·         Engines: Combined Diesel Gas and Electric, whereby the diesel and gas can be used to generate electricity which will power batteries which power pod propulsion units… ensuring maximum modularity & survivability with minimum cost – plus the very real advantages of running on batteries for ASW/MCMV warfare, the economical distance of diesel and the high speed of gas.
·         Speed: >25knots (it’s got to be able to operate with the Carrier Battlegroup)
·         Aviation Facilities: Hangar for one Lynx + 2 Rotary UAVs
·         Boats: stern ramp, that can be fitted with towed sonar array or launch boat (must retain ability to do either at short notice)

The principle purpose of these vessels to bring back numbers for the Royal Navy, to give the depth of force strength that it has been missing the Falkland’s war; they are not to be the war fighting elite, but the vessels which support that elite, the modern Flower Class corvette. However, they would need to be oceanic then in terms of design, i.e. not just Atlantic Ocean, but vessels which are just as capable in all oceans, meaning a high freeboard + heating for South Atlantic, Arctic & Antarctic as well as some sort of air conditioning for gulf, Indian Ocean & Pacific.

Force Proposal

·         A strength of 24 in regular, 24 in reserve
·         Procurement would be at the rate of initial rate of 6 a year, after the first three years falling to 4 for the next three, then 2 for the next 4 years … spreading the cost of procurement over 10 years
·         Furthermore the small size and design simplicity would allow for the construction to be spread out to different yards than just the BAE ones – allowing for an element of competition which has recently not been in British ship procurement to affect the pricing of the vessels
·         Finally all systems are to be procured off the shelf, therefore R&D costs are merely about fitting those systems together, again something which has mostly been done (even the hull design proposed is based on the BAE F2000, a design that has

The force proposed is reflective of the fact the RN has shrunk in comparison to the missions it is required to do, 24 vessels in regular would generate in terms of normal deployment 8 vessels, with 8 on their way back/going, and 8 in training/refit[15]; however with 24 vessels in reserve this changes – vessels could be put into the ‘reserve’ when in major refit and others put in their place, changing the figures to 9, 9 and 6.

This reserve could be easily structured so as to provide 6 more vessels at 24hrs notice, with a further 6 at 48hrs, 6 more at 72hrs and the remaining vessels comprising those in major refit/7 days alert (this would be done by having 30 crews on rotation, so that one week a crew would be on 24hrs notice, the next week on 48hrs, the third week on 72hrs and 4^th & 5^th weeks on a week alert – enabling both rapid mobilisation, and the reservists to still have the freedom to go on family holidays). This would mean that should a crisis emerge the RN would be able to draw on up to 42 vessels to provide escort/combat support missions, to maintain presence/patrols whilst the fleet is concentrated elsewhere – in simple terms it would turn many decisions from ‘knife edge strategic gambles’ into just ‘tough decisions’.

Spreading the construction between more yards and introducing competition can only be beneficial for Britain. The concentration and reduction in vessels being procured for the RN has undermined the shipbuilding in the UK because the orders have been placed with fewer and fewer yards, and the loss of these orders which had tended to be constant (so were reliable in lean times as means of keeping the yard functioning, although at a reduced level) lead to closures. There are though still lots of yards left functioning; Harland & Wolff (Belfast), Ferguson Shipbuilders (Glasgow), Swan Hunter (Tyneside)[16], A&P Group Ltd (Falmouth, Hebburn & Middlesbrough), Cammell Lairds (Birkenhead), Babcock Appledore Shipbuilders (Appledore) and BAE Systems Maritime – Naval Ships (Scotstoun, Govan & Portsmouth). In simple terms, BAE control 3 of 10 yards that could be used to build ships, and whilst when building High-Value units like destroyers it would seem sensible to got either the biggest or the best in order to ensure quality (which under current circumstances is restricted), but with low value simple units then all yards would be able to compete – and even yards like Ferguson which traditionally concentrate on building ferries & merchant ships might well be tempted to put in a tender. The more yards that tender, the more competitive the costs will be.

This is another reason to use off the shelf equipment – leave the R&D for the high value units, for these vessels going with off the shelf, available options, makes it not only cheaper but easier to build and easier to sell. If something is already in service, then a lot of the problems with it will have already been ironed out, again reducing costs.

Key Points:

·         Off the shelf: reliable and cost effective
·         Simple design: easy to build and maintain
·         Adaptable: modular system + size gives it a lot of flexibility to be adapted to emerging situations or technological changes
·         Cheap: so enough vessels can be procured

All the things which are key to helping the RN achieve the numbers it requires, but which would also be very attractive to foreign countries – especially those wishing to turn a green water navy into a light blue navy capable of patrolling their EEZ or sending a single ship to engage in maritime diplomacy by participating in a multi-national task force.

Points of Interest:

World War II

· Flower class, were a 267 vessel strong corvette class which served as convoy escorts during the Second World War. They were basic, but they carried a radar, various ASW weaponry and guns – they were war winning because they were there when they were needed.

Foreign Navies

· Danish Navy - the inventors of the stanflex

o Knud Rasmussen class patrol vessel, displacement - 2050 tons, range - 3000nm, top speed- 17knts, country of origin – Denmark

· Russian Navy

o Steregushcy class corvette, displacement - 2200 tons, range - 3800nm, top speed- 27knts, country of origin – Russia

o Gremyashchy class corvette, displacement - 2200 tons, range - 3800nm, top speed- 26knts, country of origin – Russia

· Chinese Navy

o Type 056 class Corvette, displacement - 1400 tons, range - 2000nm, top speed- 28knts, country of origin – China

Meko A200 Valour Class[17]

· South African Navy

o Meko A200 Valour Class frigate, displacement - 3700 tons, range - 8000nm, top speed- 28knts, country of origin – Germany

· Royal Omani Navy

o Khareef Class, displacement - 2660 tonnes, range - 4500nm, top speed- 25knts, country of origin – United Kingdom

Commercial export opportunities, lots of countries (for example Turkey, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia to name just a few) are looking at expanding their maritime forces to deal with emerging security issues; adaptable vessels, which are competitively priced and capable of around the world operations will fit in with any fleet. They would especially fit in with allied fleets, allowing for Britain to have an even more flexible response as it could well leverage logistical benefits from having such a widely serving class, as it did with the Leander class.

LCS 1 USS Freedom & LCS 2 USS Independence[18]

Summary:

The trouble with being defined as a ‘frigate navy’ is that the temptations is to build frigates; ships which are too small to carry the flexibility of firepower in the modern world yet are too expensive to be built in the numbers required. It’s a fine policy for a navy which wants to concentrate in European waters, but for a navy which is necessitated by its government commitments to have a global presence and a global war fighting capability; such a navy will not wield enough fire power to deal with peer conflicts alone and will not wield enough numbers to be present.

Whilst it is destroyer sized vessels which are the fighting teeth of any blue water navy’s escort strength (for example the Arleigh Burke’s are the mainstay of the USN’s global reach – far more than the far fewer carriers or the invisible submarines) the RN would never be able to secure the funding under current circumstances to build so many ships. Therefore, it must think smaller, think smarter and with an eye to exports - because by getting them then the RN will strengthen UK shipbuilding hopefully resulting in more investment in yards, more competition for naval construction and lower costs to the British taxpayer so that the RN. Corvettes as proposed in these notes offer a real chance, a really good chance if taken to rebuild the RN not to some golden glory day strength, that’s not what this about, it’s about build what the RN needs to do the missions it’s required to do. A destroyer/corvette tiered escort force would be by nature very adaptable with the destroyer sized vessels providing the back bone, the core, that the corvettes would support and work from to carry out their missions.

Even after saying all this if the Type 26 program could yield 18 vessels (as could be procured if the money was spent on General Purpose Type 45s[19]) rather than the 13 that’s been proposed they would go a long way to providing the RN with a stronger core escort strength. They would be something that numbers could be wrapped around, and that is the important thing – the multi-adaptable corvettes are vessels which in war time would be key task group units, they would be the MCMV, the extra ASW, the point defence vessel, and the oceanographic vessel; in peace time they would be the piracy patrol, the counter drugs patrol, oceanographic vessels, the Gibraltar patrol, the Falklands patrol and countless other patrols that will be needed as the world situation evolves over the next 30-40 years[20]. These vessels should not be looked down on because theirs would be the supporting role, as without them none of the operations would be really possible - the Royal Navy needs escorts, it needs numbers again so that it can fulfil what it’s country needs, what it’s countrymen expect and what it’s government orders.

Simply put an Oceanic Adaptable Corvette would be winner for the Royal Navy, a Winner for foreign sales and therefore a Winner for the Country. Yes to some it will at 2800tons look more like a small frigate than a corvette, but the name is important – frigate in Britain inevitably leads to ASW warfare, perhaps the reasoning behind the Type 26 being called a Global Combat Ship rather than a frigate is to stop treasury accountants being able to go “that’s not necessary it isn’t part of the ASW mission set” so that a truly multi-role ship could be bought. In the same way a corvette means, unlike the River class OPV arming it with just a 30mm cannon will not be acceptable, but also mean that costs can be kept down by the service because when another mission is suggested for it that will add to the cost & complexity and therefore reduce numbers, they can reply “no, it’s just a corvette”. An Oceanic Adaptable Corvette it would be, but Corvettes aren’t really expected to do disaster relief or other missions, they are expected to provide the task group ships in war, and the patrolling presence in peace.

Another’s Idea

A friend of mine who’s a naval architect read an early draft of this work and decided to put forward their own ship design… there are some interesting innovations including a removable helicopter deck which when taken off allows mission containers to be stored underneath and a multiple easy access spaces for the carriage of stanflex modules.

Multi-Roll Corvette

Diesel/GT (by=pass) Turbo Alternator powered with twin diesels and a 12000kW Driven altenators driving ywin azimuthing vp props which together witha bow thruster facility forward that will allow almost total variable maaanouerverability. Speed 17 knots with perhaps 26+ available if required

76mm gun mounted forward with two side mounted small calibre guns to offera degree of side cover.

Helideck made portable over protected well aft for stowage of the various equipmeny modules and extra stores. Space for 4 @20 ft & 4 @ 10ft.

Multi anchoring facility with two bower forward and one stern and one aft c/l mooring to a;;for positioning in a tideway(surveying and research) operated by two capstans forward and one aft.

Particulars: Displacement 2900 tonnes sw !%)x17 (16.7 at swl) 3.4 m draught c/b 0.43

Crew approx 87 with 28 RM's and a band space & equipment if showing flag which is a task the RN often has to do in peacetime.

Arsenal and silo's position ford just aft of main gun. Space forward deck for torpedo deployment. The rest of equipment is up to you.

2900tonnes is 1200 steelweight; 600 fuel & fw 100 arsenal120 crew stores etc230 radar, masts LSA,etc.

Carbon fibre sounding and sonar forefoot shaped to integrate with underwater lines forward and provide a bulbous bow facility.

LSA stored around vessel as required with a hydraulic operated stern door facility opening up the transom space to permit access to a boat/rib handling deck space and stowage proving repair and refuelling facilities in action. A specialised ramp to be devised for stern mounting a towed array facility. A cut in stern ramp would make to aft equipment well very wet in heavy weather.

Flight desk made removable over aft equipment well and at hangar level. Hangar two decks and fitted between exhaust and air intake casings. Hatch fitted in well to allow for quick vitualling at roll changeover when helideck will be temporily removed for deck space access.

DB tanks serviced by 4 pipe tunnels in DB to avoid contamination thogh pipe joints moving in rough conditions. FW generator and water purifier facility. It wll nees a neuclear decontamination system.

Totally enclose bridge, wheelhose and C&C spaces in bridge tower deckhouse. Well on hangar house top to carry equipment. Stability shoild be adfquqtw but another 0.5 m on beam at swl will solve any stability problems. The GT can easily be uprated to give any mor power if it is required.

	The overview and dimensions

The profile

Some other imaginings of a Stanflex RN vessel, from 2007:

Son of River Class[21] by username MSR

Further Reading:

[1] Although the author really does hope he’s proved wrong

[2] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/whatever-happened-to-type-45.html & http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2009/02/type-45-paamssea-viper.html

[3] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2008/12/destroyers.html

[4] Inspired by Admiral Hill’s Air Defence at Sea, 1988

[5] On the Advantage side, unused modules can be stored ashore when not needed, so extend the life of & reduce the need for preventative maintenance of the systems (something which is an issue in when things operate in the salt water environment). This maintenance also has a benefit on ships service, as instead of taking time to service equipment when a ship comes into port, the equipment can be swapped in/out with other modules and the maintenance done at leisure – reducing ship time in port and costs of ship maintenance. Similarly through life weapons/equipment upgrades are easier, as it does not require major modifications to ships, just the construction of some new modules, which can be swapped in during routine maintenance. Further to this the modules are not lost from service when the ship is, i.e. when a vessel goes out of service removing useful equipment takes money, money which could be used to build more ships – with modules that equipment readily accessible without lots of work. So it sounds perfect; well there is of course a trade-off, something traditionally the RN has been less able to get, the multi-role adaptable vessels that the system produces, are of course not as good at any role as the specialist ships; they jacks of all trades not masters – this is made up for by the fact they can do all those trades, and also more ships can be afforded when economies of scale are brought into effect and in the end if the option is one specialist ship or two adapted ships – then surely the latter option is more viable?

[6] http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/6465/Interesting-article-about-the-new-danish-frigates#.UfIoBdxwaM8 (26/07/2013)

[7] http://razonyfuerza.mforos.com/549911/3073177-noticias-de-la-armada-de-chile/?pag=2 (26/07/2013)

[8] http://razonyfuerza.mforos.com/549911/8014543-reemplazo-de-las-tiger-y-las-reshef/?pag=15 (26/07/2013)

[9] http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/june-2013-notes-possibilities-of.html

[10] There hasn’t been since 1960

[11] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Ships/Patrol-and-Minehunters/Ice-Patrol-and-Survey-Ships/HMS-Endurance (25/07/2013)

[12] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Ships/Patrol-and-Minehunters/Ice-Patrol-and-Survey-Ships/HMS-Protector (25/07/2013)

[13] As much as there is ever peace when conducting counter narcotics operations in Caribbean, counter piracy missions of the coast of Africa, dealing with freedom of the seas issues, maintaining an at sea readiness group and protecting various overseas territories against avaricious neighbours.

[14] Could be fitted for not with, but best would be to fit it.

[15] http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/385142/Royal-Navy-is-now-too-small-to-protect-Britain (25/07/2013)

[16] Now concentrating on Ship Design only

[17] http://www.warshipsifr.com/LegacySite/sansManAtHelm.html (01/18/2013) & http://www.navy.mil.za/equipment/valour.htm (01/18/2013)

[18] http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/littoral/littoral1.html (01/08/2013), even the USN has tried to go for a hi-low navy, unfortunately the result was a more hi-med navy, with the LCS being too expensive to be built in the numbers desired, and not really capable enough to justify the price tag.

[19] Class costs about £500million per unit to build, all the development has been done – the £1billion included development costs, so now all that would need paying for is the steel, the equipment and the man hours – all things which are made cheaper by economies of scale, the more that are built the quicker building them becomes, the easier training is as crew do not need to become familiar with an entirely new vessel – it is like the USN are doing now with the Arleigh Burke class rather than build Zumwalts. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/ddg-51.htm & http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/burke/ (01/08/2013)

[20] For example Britain may need to have a guardship at Gibraltar if tensions continue to rise http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23482549 (01/08/2013)

[21] http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/1155/A-diversion-from-serious-topics-Son-of-River-Stanflex-Hybrid#.UfFBDtxwaM8 (25/07/2013)