Reason for
writing:
In a time when budgets are tightening, when
it is less and less likely that the equipment needed in times of conflict will
be built in times of peace; options must therefore be considered. So if Britain
is to make do, but still punch above its weight as it leaders profess, then
simply put a way must be found to bridge the difference between what as a
nation we are willing to pay for our security, and what as globally committed
people with a very exposed economy the nation needs to pay.
The Auxiliary Aviation Support Vessel is an
option for this, it is a vessel which could and would be something of a
chameleon – being one thing at one time, and another at another due to its being
easily reconfigurable. In the end again such vessels are about providing
quantity and dexterity, not the quality, with just two (very good but still
only two and therefore limited by that) aircraft carriers to provide for Air
Superiority/Strike/ASW and whatever vessel(s) will hopefully replace HMS Ocean
and HMS Illustrious as amphibious aviation, the Royal Navy will have the
quality in hopefully enough quantity to support at least first rate operational
requirements, but not have enough quality to fulfil all its require missions and
certainly lack the ability to absorb a reasonable measure of damage should the
worse happen, as well to provide crucial surge capabilities when required
by operations. The procurement of
vessels as outlined in this work is another way of providing the depth and
surge of numbers, providing a flexible auxiliary aviation platform as a force
multiplier, and providing those crucial capabilities at a reasonable cost
The need though is for something which is
cheap and cheerful but most importantly effective to make up the difference
between the quantity of capability required and the quality that can be
supplied.
Key Words/Phrases:
·
RFA: Royal Fleet Auxiliary
·
AAD: Area Air Defence
·
ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare
·
AEW: Airborne-Early Warning
·
RORO: Roll On, Roll Off – vehicles can load themselves
on and off a ship by using a ramp
·
CATOBAR: : Catapult Assisted Take Off & Barrier
Assisted Recovery, the system used on most major aircraft carriers, it allows
for the widest range of possible aircraft to operate; but it is also more
expensive to install and maintain than the VSTOL flight deck, although that is
to an extent offset by its capabilities visa-vie aircraft operation.
·
VSTOL: Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing, the
cheapest system of carrier flight deck, but requires the most expensive
aircraft: historically the Royal Navy (RN) was the first navy to employ this to
provide its fixed wing airpower, but that was out of necessity when the first Queen Elizabeth class was cancelled
(CVA-01 was due to have been called after the Queen as well) and all it managed to get built were the
‘Through-Deck Cruisers’ of the Invincible
class.
·
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter): produced in
multiple variants, B for VSTOL and C for CATOBAR, this is the new stealth jet
strike/fighter (what used to be called a Fighter Bomber: i.e. could fight its
way to the target, drop its bombs and fight its way back) coming into service
with the RN for the Fleet Air Arm to fly of the carriers.
·
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Britain’s
principle strategic alliance,
·
Type 26 Global Combat Ship: no not a British version
of the USN’s Littoral Combat Ship, but a Frigate successor to the Type 22 class
Context:
Recent events have highlighted the need for aviation
ships, whilst they are important for warfighting they are also important for
peace; the trouble is first rate warfighting vessels are expensive, they are
required for a nation to be able to do many of the Global Reach missions, but
the problem is having enough, for those operations, for longer term low level
commitments and for Humanitarian operations which might crop up. Furthermore,
there is the problem with having enough vessels to support operations was the
first line vessels need to move on and the facilities of an aviation ship is
still needed to provide for operations; with the growing importance of
helicopters (both manned and unmanned) to all forms of logistics and troop
movement, especially for nations seeking to do more with less. When it’s this
important, this critical, then the facilities of a forward operating base fail
to compare with those that can be offered on even most basic of aviation ship;
for starters there is a hangar, which can allow for maintenance to take place
in the dry – this is before bringing in to consideration of factors like
machinists and other facilities every ship will have to support its own
operations, that can also be utilised for support aircraft.
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Figure 1. HMS PURSUER
(D 73) - Attacker-class Escort
Aircraft Carrier with some Grumman
Wildcat
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During
World War II the Royal Navy took delivery of 45 Escort carriers, only 5 were
lost including HMS Dasher which blew up (cause unknown); yet because they were
either war service or lend lease, they were very quickly gone and seemingly
their contribution and value has been erased from history. There have been some
excellent books about them; but to hear many of the comments directed about
them in discussions these days a casual listener would be excused for thinking
it was they not Sherman Tanks which were called “Tommy Cookers”[1].
In 1982 writing about aircraft Desmond Wetter wrote the following[2]:
“At this stage in the development of Naval
Aviation the accent was still seen to be on ‘air superiority’. It was deemed
essential that the Navy should have aircraft faster, or at least as fast, as
any enemy aircraft which might be encountered. The gun was still the only
weapon for use against other aircraft and not until the air-to-air missile
became a reliable weapon would the need for performance superiority give way to
the concept that what was really needed was an aircraft that was a good weapons
platform with both adequate radar and payload. Indeed, the comparative merits
of ‘air superiority’ versus weapon carrying aircraft is still argued today.”
In many ways this is as just as
true if not more so for ships, at no time other than in the modern world have
navies sought to have fleets entirely composed of 1st rates; the
Napoleonic wars were largely fought by 3rd rates[3],
the destroyers and light cruisers which swarmed around the fleets at Jutland
were certainly not equipped to the equivalency of battleships[4],
the Second World War was won at sea with just as much contribution from escorts
carriers and corvettes as it was given by the fleet carriers, battleships and
cruisers[5].
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Figure 2. Lunny
Thomas's Battle of the Nile
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Escort Carriers
were not therefore just a product of war contingency, they were a logical
evolution of practiced and proven warfighting experience; a battleship or a
fleet carrier for every mission is simply not necessary. A battleship is not
needed to fight a torpedo boat or to provide ASW escort for a convoy or Task Group:
a fleet carrier is not needed to escort convoys, lead Anti-Submarine (ASW) task
groups, support ongoing land operations, to ferry aircraft forward to the
combat zone and it’s certainly not going to be simple enough to for 45 to be
built[6]. Now
of course Britain doesn’t need 45 at the moment, and certainly such vessels could
not take the place of Queen Elizabeth
class or an Ocean/Illustrious replacement(s)[7];
after all when a situation requiring a 1st rate ship takes place,
then it is really needed and nothing else will do. However what about the
occasions where one isn’t required – even if an Ocean(and Illustrious)
replacement(s) is procured and the RN has more than two 1st rate
aviation ships in service; this will mean at best between one and two vessels
will be available at any time[8],
will that be enough? What happens if there are accidents, delays in maintenance
or conflicting commitment and just one aviation ship available?
Well then
it’s going to be used as the carrier – Falkland’s war of 1982 shouts that
lesson loud and clear, and it should, it’s the right decision (Air Defence and
Strike are key to providing for Task Force/Group operations and actually making
a landing, plus fighters can provide close air support to land forces once
ashore)[9].
However, this means Royal Marines and perhaps the Army too are left without air
support; not the bashing holes in things kind, but the transport kind – and the
other lesson of the Falklands war was whilst it can be achieved by a scratch
force it can’t be done to the best standard, and with smaller forces available
they need to operate at the best standard. Operating at less than that will be
expensive in lives and operational capability; both of which will have
consequences, not just to service member’s families but also for the government
of the day. Or what happens if there are big humanitarian disasters in the Far
East and the Caribbean at the same time? Both areas have nations which are
commonwealth allies, and of strategic importance in various ways to UK global
interests: the Philippines has rated an aircraft carrier[10],
and it needed multiple such vessels to provide the aviation hubs to allow for a
proper aid network to be set up, as well as to support an initial phase of
reconstruction – with only one ship available where would it be sent? That is
the situation if an Ocean replacement
is built, if it isn’t then situation will be far worse.
Whilst it
is true when they were introduced the stark simplicity of the escort carriers
was a product of their circumstances, and therefore to an extent of the
extremes of the time. They were after all a response (a logical precedent
response, but still a response) to a shortage of flight decks – like today
there were not enough to do provide for the missions required. So although
originally for the purpose of protecting convoys from ranging Focke-Wulf
Condors and to provide ASW aircraft in the gaps between land based aviation;
their sheer numbers and flexibility meant that as time went they expanded to
operating in all spheres of naval aviation until eventually they were key
platforms contributing to major operations in every theatre of the war –
arguably being the key enabler that made those operations possible. They were
not, it is important to state, replacements though for the first rate vessels,
just as this proposal is not about replacing either the Queen
Elizabeth Class or any Ocean
Replacement; the idea is that like escort carriers of World War II, and the
very modern relationship between the now three vessels of the Bay class and Albion & Bulwark it is meant to act as a force
enhancer/multiplier with the ability to act in a limited fashion solo if
required by circumstance.
The idea is to make use of the Dry
Stores vessel which is already proposed[11],
but instead of adding a dock[12]
at the back, a flexi-deck with space for containers to be moved around in[13],
and a hangar above that with a flight deck on the top[14].
The flight deck would of course run the length of the ship, with multiple
helicopter spots and a ski ramp on the front to allow STOL and VSTOL aircraft
to take off as well. There would need to be two lifts, which could serve both
the hangar and the flexi-deck, and perhaps even go lower to allow for stores to
be brought out[15].
There should be a ramp available from the flexi deck that can be used for RO-RO
and also for the launch/recovery of the small hovercraft currently available on
HMS Ocean – perhaps using the same pontoon
system that vessel has perfected[16].
The Replenishment at Sea (RAS) masts[17]
could be fitted to both port and starboard, although whilst starboard would be
alongside the island structure, the port side might need to have a telescopic
ability whereby it can be lowered to ease air operations – depending of course
on height in comparison to position on the hull. Alternatively if deck edge
lifts were used then a system similar to that used by USN carriers could be put
in place, whereby the RAS masts operate from the hangar opening.
_conducts_an_underway_replenishment_with_the_Military_Sealift_Command_fleet_replenishme.jpg)
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Figure 3. Moving
Pallets into the hangar of USS Enterprise
(CVN-65)
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Whilst the vessel, as an auxiliary,
would be built to commercial standards plus this would not be a detriment,
after all both HMS Ocean and the Bay class have been built so and they
serve with distinction. Furthermore, like the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, and indeed most of the
ships of the RFA, they would be armed for self-defence; perhaps three Phalanx
CIWS[18],
supplemented by three Typhoon Remote Weapon systems[19],
and although the Queen Elizabeth’s
are not getting it (and they really should be), perhaps a VLS of Sea Ceptor[20]
missiles mounted on the island to provide that extra layer of security against
possible leakers[21]. Alongside
these a range of passive defensive systems like those available with the
Centurion system[22]
would be sensible to offer further depth of security.
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Figure 4. A Royal Navy Phalanx practice firing
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To support weapons and operations
some electronics systems will of course be required. As far as electronic
systems go everything that can be leveraged from either the Type 26 or Queen Elizabeth class should be; for
example out fitting the vessels with the radar selected for the Type 26 would
give them sufficient capability for their likely operational needs (as well as
mirroring a decision made with the Type 45s & Queen Elizabeth class fits[23]),
and allow for savings as it would be using an existent production line – no
extra costs for development. That is basis for this whole platform everything
would be either off the shelf or in production, already developed –
beneficially this will actually reduce operating costs on the other units
because it will spreads costs of maintenance/upgrade across a large unit pool.
With this in mind, and considering what has already been outline, the following
are some proposed specifications:
·
Length: ~230m
·
Beam: ~30m (Waterline), ~33m (overall)
·
Propulsion:
·
Range: 8,000nm+ (18kts)
·
Speed: 25kts+
·
Hangar: large enough to
accommodate 24-28 aircraft either Fixed Wing or Rotary Wing (Medium) Aircraft;
but designed with space to take Chinook sized aircraft.
·
Flexi-Deck: Able with the
addition of proper containers to become accommodation for marines or evacuees, to
become a medical suite with operating theatres and diagnostic equipment,
alternatively those containers could be used to house a drone control facility,
or the space could be used to carry extra supplies – it could even be used for
a combination, that is after all the point of a flexi-deck, it’s flexible.
·
Weapons: 3x Phalanx CIWS, 3x Typhoon Remote Control Weapon Systems
and Sea Ceptors SAM
·
Other: Davit Posts should be stressed to take LCVPs, a RORO
door to allow for quick off/on loading – preferably that can reach the water at
an angle to allow for the launch & recovery of hovercraft
Whilst the Tide class MARS tankers are smaller than this (the proposal is 15%
longer and wider on the flight deck – in fact whilst being longer they would be
3m thinner than the Invincible class[25]),
the design has had to an extent been modified to facilitate aircraft operations
– for example these dimensions have been modelled in terms of deck space on the
Canberra & America classes[26].
The top speed required would of course be equivalent with the Queen Elizabeth class[27],
whilst the range was selected so that they could match Albion & Bulwark[28],
whilst 18kts seems to be an RN standard[29].
Neither was the aircraft number randomly selected; it was based on a
calculation of the space available accommodated vs capability to support; but
like the stocking of the modules/equipment in the flexi-deck, the stocking of
the hangar will depend upon the envisaged mission. With sensors it makes sense
to utilise a certain level of fit to enable operations, hence the selection of
the radar which is fitted to the Type 23 Duke
class Frigates[30], will
be fitted to the Type 26 frigates[31]
and which will be one of the radars fitted to the Queen Elizabeth class[32]
– it is a capable system, but it’s not as capable (and therefore doesn’t cost
as much, either in money or support) as the radar suite of the Type 45 Daring class AAD or the Queen Elizabeth class’s other radar[33].
So it’s been outlined and roughly specified, the question now is what the class
could/would do.
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Figure 5. The future of UK 1ST Rate Global Reach capability,
note the S1850M radars (the black rectangle on top of the forward mast of the
Queen Elizabeth class, and the aft
mast of the Type 45)
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Well in ‘Peace Time’, these ships would
of course be ideal for carrying out Humanitarian Relief missions; being able to
be configured thanks to their flexi-deck as a medical/evacuation facility,
their ability to operate helicopters and planes for search/recovery/logistics
support and most importantly as a dry stores RAS vessel – able to bring with
them a lot of supplies. Something which is not only useful for humanitarian
missions or war time is the ability to move supplies and act as something of
strategic lift vessel as well as of course carrying out one of their primary
functions, resupply of other ships at sea (this is a role which has importance
in times of peace, of limited conflict and most importantly during war); this
is after all what the ships are at the moment being built for, the aviation
facilities would be an enhancement on that. RFA Argus is currently used a lot for aviation training and these
vessels would be perfect to step into that role, moreover they would also be
able to be used for F-35 pilot’s first training on a ship which would be far
more sensible than risking a first rate for that role. Further to all this, the
class would be Spare Flight decks for emergencies, if there is an accident on
one of the first rates or if they are the other side of the world and a volcano
goes off again – they can be used. Finally the Flexi-deck space could be used
to support trade missions, by taking/hosting British goods at an event; like
aircraft carriers were often used for in 1950s & 60s - alternatively it
would be a large space for international conference to be hosted if necessary;
with the capacity of being used to host concerts as well should that be desired.
The whole point of the desire is flexibility and adaptability. However, peace
is of course a very relative term for navies, especially those with EEZ and
commitments which span the world, including such missions as as counter piracy
operations, counter-smuggling and ocean patrols, it is worth looking at what
they could offer in a limited conflict scenario.
Well much the same as the Bay class in Somalia these vessels can
carry out limited ‘interventions’/incursions, although there’s would be more
helicopter based they would have the ability of course to carry and deploy
fighter aircraft which could be a serious operational force multiplier. Similar
factors would apply during covert operations; i.e. insertion, support and
extraction of Special Forces. Even regular maritime patrol
counter-smuggling/counter-piracy would be excellent supported by such an
axillary with a flight deck as again the volume of aircraft which could be
deployed to support not only own national vessels, but also allies. After this of course comes war; but before
getting there it must be pointed out the capability these ships would have with
unmanned aviation, as the flexi-deck again could be adapted quickly with the
correct modules into a control hub which could allow many such systems to be
operated[34],
allowing if desired for manned aircraft operation to be concentrated on one
vessel and unmanned on another[35].
A primary tasking they could be utilised
for during, in addition to logistics/RAS and supporting raiding, would be as
Engineering Force Enabler: like HMS Unicorn
– i.e. they could carry spare air craft, maybe take on any high
energy/commitment aircraft maintenance duties on freeing up space on the
carrier to support ongoing strike/air defence missions. Again, whilst not
replacing the first rates, they would be insurance where something to happen to
them, and even though they would be more limited the adaptability of the
flexi-deck would allow for the expansion of maintenance facilities or
accommodation facilities should they be required to operate as either a backup
Carrier or LPH. They might even be used to carry fighters and provide limited
organic air defence for the Amphibious Task Group, freeing up the Ocean Replacement to focus on its
duties, and freeing up the Carrier Battle Group to find & destroy/attack
the enemy. The final consideration is that at the moment Britain does not have
a proper hospital ship[36],
and whilst the discussion in terms of such vessels is often focused upon
humanitarian matters, they are also very important in conflict, especially when
conducting operations with smaller forces in more dense conflict zones – where
it becomes very important to moral, the likelihood of survival if injured.
As addition to all this should be
considered the possible export market for such vessels, nations which cannot
afford/justify buying an aircraft carrier could well find these escort carriers
irresistible – with all the flexibility and adaptability they would bring to a
nations overall capability; with the result if the case of providing years of
work.
Key Questions:
When first this was discussed, there
were three questions which friends kept bringing up, so it seemed sensible to
ask & answer those questions within the paper as well -
1) Statement - Auxiliaries can’t be sent into combat as they are not built for it nor
armed for it: Reply - the Bay
class are auxiliaries and they dock down in war zones, so are all the tankers
and stores ships which supply the warships at the moment, whilst fitting CIWS
weapons are not a guarantee (hence the preference for fitting Sea Ceptor as
well) they are a measure of protection which allows for operations in those
areas to be safer.
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Figure 6. This picture illustrates the semi-prone position
of a Bay class when ‘docked down’ to flood it’s stern area to enable the
operation of landing craft – this vessel is auxiliary, which can carry a
large proportion of the entire Commando Brigade’s supplies
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2) Statement – By proposing such a vessel, the argument for first rate (most often
described as ‘proper’) ships is being undermined: Reply – The RN are
getting two pretty good carriers and the case for an Ocean & Illustrious
replacement(s) might be off the stationary at the moment but it's still on the
table as no one is suggesting that we do not need such a capability;
furthermore, the RN will at best then will get four or five ships, which in
reality still won't produce enough force flexibility to provide for operational
requirements. With the addition of 3-4 Auxiliary Aviation vessels, then even if
only the RN ended up with three or four first rate ships it would still have
enough flight decks to guarantee enough for training, for humanitarian relief
and for conflict. So, therefore be able to provide the UK with the best
security possible; in most importantly a viable (in relation to national
circumstance) manner.
3) Statement - there is no spare money in the ship building budget: Reply - The RN
are due to build 3 dry stores ships anyway, all that is being suggested is they
should be built a little taller with space for a hanger and fitting a couple of
lifts; i.e. taking something we are already building, have acknowledged need
for and add to that it is a cost effective manner to make it even more
adaptable, capable, flexible and most importantly useful.
4) Statement – But where would they be built: Reply – well the capacity at
Portsmouth, Camel Lairds and other shipyards is apparently not going to be
fully utilised by the Type 26 build, this has led to a decision to close
Portsmouth[37]
(now leaving aside the arguments for 18 rather than 13 Type 26 frigates[38])
– this spare capacity is what could be used, and should it prove popular with
the export market would provide security for those yards for many years.
Key Points: (What Auxiliary Aviation Ships would do)
·
Operational
capabilities
o
All the time
§ Logistics – Dry RAS
§ Movement of Supplies / Strategic Lift
§ Spare Flight deck for emergencies
§ Could operate manned or unmanned aircraft
o
Peace Time
§ Humanitarian Relief
§ Training Ship – Like Argus and especially important with the reduction of available
carrier decks
§ Flexi-deck space could be used to support trade
missions, by taking/hosting British goods at an even…alternatively it will be a
large enough space for a very large international conference to be hosted if
necessary.
o
Other –
Contingency and Limited Conflict
§ Limited Conflict/Interventions such as what the Bay Class vessel did in Somalia
§ Support of Covert Operations
§ Providing a Unique Capability which will be of value
to allies
o
War Time
§ Engineering Force Enabler, like HMS Unicorn – i.e. could carry spares; take
the heavy aircraft maintenance duties on freeing up space on the carrier.
§ Back up Carrier/LPH – in which role they could be used
to move a section of the Brigade
§ Provide limited Organic Air Defence for Amphibious
Task Group freeing the Carrier Battle Group
§ Hospital Ship
Points of Interest:
·
Escort carriers were busy throughout the war[39]:
“We were
three days out when the fighter boys had the opportunity to show their mettle.
A Heinkel 177 with a glider bomb appeared astern of the convoy. I despatched two Wildcats which we could see
clearly as they climbed away, clawing for height to dive down on the German
aircraft. We watched them hurtling down to attack, hear the rattle of their guns,
then saw smoke issuing from the Heinkel.
White
parachutes blossomed out below it, then it spun down to crash into the sea. The
ships of the convoy sounded their sirens and the Wildcats returned to general
acclaim.”
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Figure 7. HMS Trumpeter
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·
HMS Trumpeter
in 1944 alone took part eight different operations (“Offspring”, “Goodwood”, “Begonia”, “Lycidas”, “Hardy”, “Urbane”, “Lacerate” and “Fretsaw”)
as well as carry out an anti-submarine sweep with Force 9 in support of Convoy
RA60[40]
·
The Pacific Fleet depended upon 11 escort carriers
acting in the role of aircraft Ferry and Replenishment[41]
(as well as occasionally providing more traditional escort carrier duties)
o Mission:
they were the link between all the support and the carriers, without them when
the carriers suffered loses they would have had to go back themselves to get
support, when instead thanks to the these escort carriers acting as conveyor
belt taking damaged aircraft back and bringing new aircraft forward then losses
never undermined momentum.
o Ships
involved: HMS Activity, HMS Arbiter, HMS Begum, HMS Chaser, HMS Fencer, HMS Reaper, HMS Ruler, HMS Slinger, HMS Speaker, HMS Striker and
HMS Vindex[42].
Summary:
Britain is
a nation of innovators, in fact as rule it’s arguably at its strongest and best
when its back is most pressed against a wall; the trouble is a tendency is
creeping in whereby that fact is tacitly if not openly relied upon. The
industrial capacity to click fingers and for ships to spring forth almost at
will is gone, the world is not a peaceful place; in fact the last 60 years have
been unusually peaceful if considering the rest of our history. There are many
predictions about the future, about whether the European Union or the UN will
survive or will change, whether world will become uni-polar, bi-polar,
tri-polar or multi-polar, the only thing that anyone is sure of is that it is
changing, that it is getting more not less complex. It is because of this, that
escort carriers, auxiliary aviation ships, make sense again – yes they cannot
replace the fleet carriers in terms of raw power or sortie rate, but they can
certainly relieve some of the pressure on those vessels, and become a force and perhaps more important presence
multiplier. They would be something which could be relied upon to help tip the
scales, whether used as drone control vessel or as a fill in; they would be the
auxiliaries, like the Bay Class, the
small ships which make a difference not because of just what they carry but
because of what they represent and enable the larger ships to do.
Further Reading:
Websites:
Holmes, Richard. "From the Field
Gun to the Tank; Tommy Cookers." BBC Home; History Trails - Wars and
Conflict. March 1, 2005.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/trail/wars_conflict/weapons/field_gun_to_tank_10.shtml
(accessed December 3, 2013).
Paul, James, and Martin Spirit.
"HMS Unicorn - Specifications and a Brief History." The Light
Brigade - Carriers in Korea. 2008.
http://britains-smallwars.com/carriers/Unicorn.html (accessed November 11,
2013).
Books
Bell, Christopher M. The Royal
Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars. London: Macmillan Press,
2000.
Brown, David K. The Grand Fleet;
warship design and development 1906-1922. Barnsley: Seaforth, 2010.
Brown, Eric. Wings of the Navy.
London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1980.
—. Wings on My Sleeve.
London: Phoenix, 2007.
Brown, Louis. "A Radar History
of World War II; Technical and Military Imperatives." Bristol and
Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1999.
Cable, James. Britain's Naval
Future. London: Macmillan Press, 1983.
—. Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979.
London: Macmillan Press, 1981.
Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft
Carriers of the World to the Present an Illustrated Encylcopedia. 3rd
Editon. London: Brockhampton Press, Arms and Armour Press, 1998.
Clapp, Michael, and Ewen
Southby-Tailyour. Amphibious Assault Falklands, The Battle of San Carlos
Water. London: Orion Books, 1997.
D'Este, Carlo. World War II in
the Mediterranean 1942-1945. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books,
1990.
Friedman, Norman. British Carrier
Aviation. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988.
—. British Cruisers; Two World
Wars and After. London: Seaforth Publishing, 2010.
—. U.S. Aircraft Carriers.
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1983.
Glete, Jan. Warfare at Sea,
1500-1650; Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe. London:
Routledge, 2000.
Gordon, G.A.H. British Seapower
and Procurement between the Wars; a reapraisal of rearmament. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1988.
Greene, Jack, and Alessandro
Massignani. The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943. London:
Chatham Publishing, 1998.
Harding, Richard. Seapower and
Naval Warfare 1650-1830. London: Routledge, 1999.
—, ed. The Royal Navy, 1930 -
2000, Innovation and Defence. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2005.
Hobbs, David. Moving Bases; Royal
Navy Maintenance Carriers and MONABS. Liskeard: Maritime Books, 2007.
—. "Naval Aviation,
1930-2000." In The Royal Navy, 1930 - 2000, Innovation and Defence,
edited by Richard Harding, 69-88. Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005.
—. Royal Navy Escort Carriers.
Liskeard: Maritime Books, 2003.
Holmes, Richard. "From the
Field Gun to the Tank; Tommy Cookers." BBC Home; History Trails - Wars
and Conflict. March 1, 2005.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/trail/wars_conflict/weapons/field_gun_to_tank_10.shtml
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[1] (Holmes 2005)
[2] (Wettern 1982, 74)
[3] For example at the battle of
the Nile the only ships which Nelson commanded that were not Third Rates, was
the Fourth Rate HMS Leander and the
Sloop HMS Mutine (Rodger 2004, Glete 2000)
[4] (Massie 2005, Jane's 2001, Linton 2009, D. K. Brown 2010, Sondhans 2001)
[5] (D'Este 1990, Friedman, British Cruisers; Two World
Wars and After 2010, Greene and Massignani 1998, Morison 2001, Reynolds 1992,
Simmons 2011, Smith 1991, Thomas 2003)
[6] The Royal Navy completed 22 Fleet, Light Fleet and
Fleet Maintenance carriers between 1939 and 1945 (many were started pre-war),
Escort carriers were not even asked for till 1941 (Friedman, British Carrier Aviation 1988, Friedman,
U.S. Aircraft Carriers 1983, Chesneau 1998) .
[7] Whilst this has currently disappeared from official
communiques and is off the table at the moment, a new SDSR is coming and it is
necessary.
[9] (Clapp and Southby-Tailyour 1997, Southby-Tailyour, 3
Commando Brigade, Sometimes the best form of defence is attack 2009,
Southby-Tailyour, HMS FEARLESS; The Mighty Lion 2006, Southby-Tailyour,
Reasons in Writing, A Commando's view of the Falklands War 2003, Thompson
2007, Woodward and Robisnon 1992, paperback edition 2003)
[10] http://news.sky.com/story/1173673/typhoon-haiyan-hms-illustrious-in-philippines, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/video-news/video-hms-illustrious-takes-over-from-hms-daring-in-the-philippines-29785692.html, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-25085241, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25083802, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hms-illustrious-takes-over-from-hms-daring-in-the-philippines and http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2013/November/25/131125-HMS-Illustrious-takes-over-from-HMS-Daring (all gathered 02/12/2013)
[11] http://www.navalshipbuilding.co.uk/navalship_warships.asp?ID=WAR5&catID=5, www.bmtdsl.co.uk%2Fmedia%2F1057667%2FBMTDSL-Joint-Support-Ships-Conpaper-MAST-Oct09.pdf&ei=60WdUoPnMoeihge-j4GACQ&usg=AFQjCNFRg1a7qbCKf6MDGcWGTuvu4JLIPA&sig2=ci0IFMkpO1cGiDbmo_d0eQ and http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&ved=0CGkQFjAK&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.europeansecurityanddefence.info%2FAusgaben%2F2010%2F03_2010%2F04_Hooton%2FHooton.pdf&ei=60WdUoPnMoeihge-j4GACQ&usg=AFQjCNHI5i4URAUqyit1HX0AQWJHDotKlw&sig2=IuAdGGKU9Tv1FyP8EpuseA (all gathered 03/12/2013)
[13] either by perhaps an
overhead crane system or a roller deck with rollers positioned to allow for
easy movement – whichever system chosen there would need to be a very strong
locking system utilised
[14] This would in effect be a
sort of double hangar space, not an unprecedented design in British service (it
was a principle feature of the Implacable
class) and naturally providing a very flexible system for operational dexterity
(Friedman, British Carrier Aviation 1988, 154, Chesneau 1998) .
[15] Perhaps there could be some
type of corridor running the length of the ship connecting all the various
stores compartments at the top allowing for easy movement of stores to flexi
deck
[16] http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/details/ships/-8991528, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2013/August/01/130801-HMS-Ocean-leaves-dock, http://www.combatreform.org/amphigavins.htm, http://www.military-today.com/navy/hms_ocean.htm and http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Ships/Assault-Ships/HMS-Ocean (all gathered 01/12/2013)
[21] None of these systems are
candidates for being ‘fitted for not with’; like escort’s wearing multiple hats
this is an accountants trick (http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/10/september-2013-thoughts-armed-forces.html)
which could sound good until put into context, would a tanker or truck be sent
to Afghanistan fitted for but not with a machine gun? The answer is of course
no, so why would a ship which can be anywhere in the world and could be
re-tasked at a moment’s notice be fitted for but not with surface to missiles,
anti-ship missiles or in the case of some auxiliaries virtually any weapons at
all? It doesn’t make sense from a logic point of view, a tactical point of view
(it places an even greater burden on the, too small in number, 19 escorts
currently possessed by the RN) and from an economic point of view doesn’t make
sense long term either. This is because at some point the ship is presumably
going to go into a war zone, if it’s fitted for but not with those weapons,
then it’s like sticking an alarm box on the front of a house but not actually
connecting sensors to trigger it – worse than pointless, as the importance of
the vessel is highlighted but it gets no security. Therefore, in the event
actually making it more likely for that ship to be targeted and destroyed.
[23] It is not the specially
developed Sampson radar that is shared, but the S1850M: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/horizon/, https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/content/united-kingdom-selects-thaless-s1850m-radar-new-aircraft-carriers, http://www.baesystems.com/product/BAES_021434?_afrLoop=588168088415000&_afrWindowMode=2&_afrWindowId=null, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/cvf.htm and http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/cvf/ (all gathered 02/12/2013)
[24] http://www.baesystems.com/article/BAES_161252/ground-breaking-radar-for-aircraft-carriers-begins-testing-at-secret-facility-on-isle-of-wight?_afrLoop=588339015099000&_afrWindowMode=2&_afrWindowId=null and http://www.baesystems.com/product/BAES_021203/?baeSessionId=2L0FScLXV71ylGyBYW32JR8bly8B50tgZCy37KVLJqBzwhcMQnMX!1108472502&_afrLoop=541410032628000&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null (both 02/12/2013)
[35] This might seem unusual at
the moment, but
[36] HMS Argus carriers out this
role in a limited fashion http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Royal-Fleet-Auxiliary/Casualty-Ship-RFA-Argus (03/12/2013).
[37] http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/nov/06/bae-closure-portsmouth-shipyard-row, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-24831779, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/10430407/Portsmouth-shipyard-closure-heralds-the-end-of-an-era.html, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10430738/David-Cameron-Portsmouth-shipyard-was-closed-in-the-national-interest.html and http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131106/DEFREG01/311060018/ (all gathered 03/12/2013)
[39] (Wellham 2007, 163-4)
[40] (Hobbs, Royal Navy Escort Carriers 2003, 170-4)
[41] (Hobbs, Moving Bases; Royal Navy Maintenance Carriers
and MONABS 2007, 90-8)
[42] (Hobbs, Royal Navy Escort Carriers 2003, 17-20, 24-5,
48-9, 58-60, 70-3, 127-132, 143-5, 148-51, 156-9 & 175-9)
