Monday, 12 May 2014

May 2014: Published Elsewhere

Well since my computer troubles I'm still catching up some journal articles/conference papers (I was lucky enough to present to at the Global War Studies conference - now on the xx draft) that I need to have ready soon, so unfortunately have no written pieces finished for this blog; however I have one I did for British Naval History http://www.britishnavalhistory.com/sverdlov_class_rn_response/ which I recommend a read off - it's an interesting period of history.

Alexander Clarke’s second article examines the Royal Navy’s reaction to the emergence of the USSR’s Sverdlov Class gun cruisers.
“Although the Russian lack of aircraft carriers would make it hazardous for their Cruisers to operate outside the range of shore based fighter cover, the presumed long range of the Sverdlov Class makes it possible for them to operate as ocean raiders, particularly if the Russians have reason to believe that Allied carriers will not be met.”[i]
Surface raiders were a potentially deadly threat to a global trading nation such as Britain; whilst submarines were a problem, they were a containable problem – especially before the development of nuclear power. However, as had been demonstrated by Admiral Graf Spee of River Plate fame [ii] and others, surface raiders were for more unrestricted – hence killing them became such a priority. [iii] Therefore when the Soviets [iv] were seen to be constructing a similar capability a reaction was only a matter of time.
cruiser 1
Figure 1.The Cruise of the Admiral Graf Spee, illustrating not only the number of its success but the range and breadth of them (Image from National Archives).[v]
The most commonly referenced British reaction to the emerging Soviet surface raider threat is the Buccaneer bomber, which were of course principally focused on not only low level nuclear strike of ground targets, but also the hunting down and destruction of surface raiders. [vi] The Royal Navy’s (RN) response though was not simply limited to this one thing, and in fact whilst carriers were focused on as the premier tool of global reach, it was realised there would never be enough available for the RN to achieve the global presence which would be required to protect the arteries of trade & supply from raiders/hunt those raiders down.[vii] Therefore just as it had during the 1920s and 1930s the RN turned to surface combatants.