Reason for writing: Britain is highly unlikely considering current
finances to get enough F-35Bs to properly equip the Fleet Air Arm and RAF so
that all the roles of Carrier Strike, Fleet Air Defence, Amphibious Operation
Combat Air Support, Suppression of Enemy Air Defences and Land Strike can all
be fully covered. Even if the full order
of 138 aircraft are bought, each carrier will presumably take around 32, then
any amphibs that come along to replace Ocean & Illustrious will need some,
(for arguments sake) aprox 16, that’s 96 aircraft accounted for and whilst in
theory fancy accountancy can be done and it can be pointed out that not all the
ships will be operating at the same time so those aircraft not in use for those
jobs can be used for other roles… but the reality is it’s going to be a fudge
job at best, with either Land Strike (and the RAF) or Carrier Strike (and the
RN) getting short changed and at least one if not both ending up in a situation
for which they are ‘theoretically’ equipped for but in reality haven’t had the
chance to train for it and do not have enough equipment to do it. To put it
another way, a phrase often quoted is “the best is the enemy of the good” –
keep trying for the best means Britain will never have enough when it needs it.
Currently though only 48 aircraft have been ordered – and should that be
all that are ordered it would mean problems; even if only the Queen Elizabeth’s
are procured.
Key Words/Phrases:
·
VSTOL: Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing, the
cheapest system of carrier flight deck, but requires the most expensive
aircraft… the Royal Navy (RN) was the first navy to employ this to provide its
fixed wing airpower, but that was out of necessity when the first Queen Elizabeth class was cancelled
(CVA-01 was due to have been called after the Queen) and all it managed to get
built were the ‘Through-Deck Cruisers’ of the Invincible class.
·
CATOBAR: Catapult Assisted Take Off & Barrier
Assisted Recovery, the system used on most major aircraft carriers, it allows
for the widest range of possible aircraft to operate…but it is also more
expensive to install and maintain than the VSTOL flight deck, although that is
offset by its capabilities visa-vie aircraft operation.
·
STOL: Short Take Off and Landing
·
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter): produced in
multiple variants, B for VSTOL and C for CATOBAR, this is the new stealth jet
strike/fighter (what used to be called a Fighter Bomber…i.e. could fight its
way to the target, drop its bombs and fight its way back) coming into service
with the RN for the Fleet Air Arm to fly off the carriers.
·
Eurofighter Typhoon: Principle aircraft belonging to
the Royal Air Force at the moment, a Cold War inspired Dog-Fighter that was
used in conjunction with Tornadoes over Libya to do some limited bombing…
although it was the much more venerable Tornadoes which had to aim the weapons.
·
UCAV: Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, in this work is
mainly used to refer to the X-47 - The
currently under development, but conducting carrier deck operations and flying,
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, the X-47 is the future of stealth strike &
reconnaissance; hence there is no coincidence that it looks like a mini B-2
bomber.
·
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Britain’s
principle strategic alliance,
·
Squadron: there are all sorts of differences in terms
of numbers/structure, usually in British practice it’s 12 aircraft, but these
notes will be using 16, it’s more practical with the numbers that are able to
be accommodated by the ships (44-48 aircraft divides in 3 squadrons, a fusion
squadron of 12-16 helicopters variously rolled for ASW/AEW/Commando Transport
and two squadrons providing 32 fixed wing aircraft[1]),
it saves money in terms of senior officers by reducing the number of senior
posts – which fits with the size zero
navy/armed forces that cuts have created (hopefully helping with middle
rank bulge).
·
Carrier Strike: strike aircraft launching from
carriers
·
ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare
·
AEW: Airborne Early Warning – flying radar, what the
RN was missing in the Falklands war, and the one change which would have made a
big difference to every operation.
·
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences: otherwise called
SEAD, this is a primary Day 1 task, and if a force is not capable of carrying
it out then the country that deploys it does not possess an expeditionary
capability.
·
‘Land Strike’: strike aircraft flying from airbases
·
Fleet Air Defence: this is a layered thing like an
onion[2],
the aircraft from the carrier provide the outermost layer air defence – if an
attack can be stopped at the ranges of this it represents by far the safest
course of action.
·
Close Air Support (sometimes called Combat Air
Support): it’s when aircraft act as artillery and provide direct fire in
support of ground forces.
·
Amphibious Operations: ranging from special forces
insertions/extractions, to raiding to invasions, these cover any operation
whereby land forces are launched from the sea onto the enemy.
·
LHD/LHA: Amphibious Assault Vessel, Landing Helicopter
Dock/Landing Helicopter Assault, the former like a Landing Platform Dock (LPD)
has a dock from which landing craft can operate, the latter doesn’t which makes
it faster and more able to operate in a light carrier role.
·
D+1: the first day of the conflict; when SEAD is at a
premium, but after which if the mission is conducted properly the major air
defence and military threats to aircraft will have been dealt with.
Figure 1; The Queen
Elizabeth Class STOL Carrier
Context/Analysis:
So the problem becomes one of 4
options:
·
Option 1 – empty ships
·
Option 2 – buy the full 138 F-35Bs or even more…the
Fleet Air Arm & RAF can both make cases for 6 squadrons, plus training
& reserve squadrons, i.e. around 240 aircraft
·
Option 3 – buy UAVs that are capable of STOL/Ski-Ramp
carrier operations
·
Option 4 – buy STOL aircraft.
Option 1 is not
good, empty ships are inefficient, especially empty aircraft carriers -
furthermore lack of airframes in terms of missions will inevitably lead to
airframes being maxed out, to ill effect as this will increase wear and
maintenance costs while still never being able to achieve all the missions
required and certainly not all those desired.
The idea of ships sailing empty is a penny
pincher’s fix, who has no concept of reality, of the fact that it is not simple
to put aircraft onto carriers; the eternal lesson of the Falklands war if just
one is taken would be that whilst yes the RAF GR.3 Harriers were able to
operate from a carrier like the Fleet Air Arm’s Sea Harriers; they had to
operate from the bigger ship (Hermes)
in order for them to be accommodated, there were lots of minor accidents/operational
problems (mostly caused by not only a lack of familiarity with carrier
operation but also with naval operations/practices), and even with allies
prepared to allow them use airspace/bases they still had to be shipped out in
order to reach the war.
That is the biggest problem with an
aircraft carrier going round empty, when war happens, when operations are
required of it – the aircraft will need to be got, in worst case scenario the
carrier could have to come back to the UK to pick them up… but not only will it
need to take delivery of aircraft but personnel; after all without aircraft
aboard there is no reason to have the maintainers, the spare pilots, all the
squadron & air group support personnel aboard without the aircraft being
there.
The next problem is training, not
just of the pilots (which often gets the reply Simulators; well yes, they are
brilliant[3],
but they are not the same as the real thing – and with each aircraft costing £127
million would any sensible person really think it wise the first time a pilot
lands it on a multi-billion £ aircraft carrier, loaded with even more aircraft,
in a war zone, whilst under the pressure of combat operations?), but also the
other squadron personnel – the fitters, the weapons techs, the other support troops,
they need to learn how to operate on the ship, where things are stored, how to
carry out maintenance when the ‘hangar’ is moving & alive with a constant
stream of other aircraft/personnel moving about their duties, and finally how
to fight fires & conduct damage control: the RN does not have specialist
fire-fighters on its ships, all personnel have to know how to use the equipment
and how to make it safe, because time is critical when keeping operational/let
alone afloat. That was actually one of the key reasons why in 1939 the Inskip
report handed the Fleet Air Arm back to the Royal Navy because the RAF
personnel were not trained in this job, and because they would spend the vast
majority of their careers never having to use those skills as they would be on
airfields in Britain where there are specialist fire-fighters so why go to the
expense of training everyone else?
Finally there is the fact that
buying ships of the size and status of the Queen
Elizabeth class, justifiable though they are (the biggest reason for size
growth in aircraft carriers, is size of the aircraft they carry: the F-35 is
over double the weight of the Sea Harrier) by Britain’s global strategic
commitments & interests; sending them round the world half empty would be
the diplomatic equivalent of buying a really expensive house and only putting
in a bed & two chairs and then inviting all the world to come and see –all
the world will not only think that you are terribly shallow, but also are
little more than puffed up peacock, all feathers and image with no substance to
back it.
Figure 2; The F-35 Variants
Option 2 is the very
best option, but it’s also the most expensive, and therefore the least likely
to happen – there are many arguments still going on the F-35, whether B or C
should be bought; the final piece of Queen
Elizabeth is about to be put in place – she is a VSTOL carrier; yes but the
greater flexibility of the CATOBAR option does present a very attractive
picture of enhanced capabilities, but the VSTOL aircraft design could lead to
commonality of operation between the Carriers and any LHA/LHDs, with aircraft
being shared between all the vessels. Now that would mean the RN would have
multiple ‘aviation ships’, yes they’d be primarily orientated on carrier or
amphibious duties, but because all the aircraft could operate from all of them
– then all of the aviation vessels would have the ability to be used for
amphibious or carrier duties[4].
The subsequent options are based on the idea of a division of roles, the
F-35s would take Strike, Suppression of Enemy Air Defences and Fleet Air
Defence – these require the stealth, the high speed, the advanced avionics are
all designed for these ‘high-end’ missions. However, if squadrons are 16
strong, then that’s enough for most situations Britain might find itself in on
its own (if it’s not then another aviation ship with another squadron will have
to be despatched), so the other fixed wing squadron can focus on Combat Air
Support & Auxiliary missions – a very taxing, time consuming and critical
mission for any naval aircraft. This would also mean the Fleet Air Arm for
F-35Bs would be 16 for each carrier and another 16 to be divided between the
amphibious ships…i.e. just 3 squadrons or 48 aircraft would be needed for the
naval side. Of course further to this at least another 3 squadrons of the
Auxiliary Combat Aircraft would also be required.
Option 3 is an
attractive option too many modern eyes, the only trouble is the only carrier
strike aircraft currently even near an operational capability is the X-47 and
that is a CATOBAR design not a STOL. However, considering the RN’s recent
decision to enter the ranks of UAV operators (choosing a design that’s been in
service for 8 years with the USN[5]
rather than going for something like the Hummingbird which could have done the
same but not require a pneumatic catapult to operate – although it would have
probably taken up more space[6]),
so a UAV for carrier operations is not unforeseeable… but it would have to be
developed and as the only real user of such an aircraft at the current time
would be the RN, it would probably be expensive, and more than likely complex
to implement.
Figure 3; The X-47B taxies on the deck of the USS Harry S Truman
The other option in UAVs would be
to make use of one of the available Rotary Wing systems: these would have of
course the advantage of being completely interchangeable with any other ship
that has a helideck, allowing for the realisation of an exceedingly flexible
force. However, as a primary combat support aircraft they have yet to come of
age – although the reports of some startling things have emerged as to their
possible use in current conflicts.
The fact is though the real problem
with UAVs for Britain is the satellite time, we are ‘unique’ in having a
public/private partnership for our military communication satellite; and as
anyone with a modern mobile phone knows there is nothing more expensive than
going over the monthly data allowance. A system already had to be developed
whereby the signal was ‘piggy backed’ from one drone to another to try and save
costs.
Option 4 takes its
inspiration from British Naval Aviation history – the Swordfish, it was not the
best aircraft of its age, it was not the technologically most advanced aircraft
of its age… but it was available, it was capable and it was a good fit, it was
in fact an excellent fit for what the Royal Navy needed of the Fleet Air Arm at
the time. With the same idea there are multiple viable options available, STOL
aircraft range from the Texan II & Super Tocano to the BAE Hawk/T-45
Goshawk. They offer a wide range of options, but crucially all are available
off the shelf, ready to go and some are even already in use with the British
Forces meaning there are pools of experience to draw from. However this also
means there are some topics for strong discussion.
Figure 4; Some Goshawks waiting to commence training.
Hawk vs Prop – the BAE Systems Hawk/T-45
Goshawk is the fastest option, although it would probably have to have
undercarriage modifications, they already have a CATOBAR variant and it’s a
land STOL aircraft so could certainly be a candidate. The facts though are that
whilst it costs ~£20million, can carry Sidewiders and ASRAAM for A-to-A and
some bombs; it gets too much into the profile of the F-35B to be ever seen as
anything other than the ‘cheap option’. In comparison the propeller options
have greater endurance, certainly in the case of Super Tocano (n production)
and the OV-10X Bronco have already got a wider range of weapons available for
fitting (including Air-to-Air missiles) and the RN would benefit from buying
into a larger operating group; furthermore the propeller aircraft have other
things which they could do (that will be discussed later) that would stop them
being seen as just the ‘cheap option’. However before moving on it should be
noted that an all British light fighter aircraft would not be bad for British
industry, would undoubtedly be taken to whole heartedly by poorer allies who
would either have had to make do without or bought older aircraft/cheaper
Russian Options; therefore opening the possibility of defence exports and income
for the nation to further diversify Britain’s economic base – a strategic
necessity in the wake of the banking crisis (which would have not been so
damaging if Britain had not been so economically focused on it).
Close Air Support would of course
be the primary mission for this aircraft, and the key attributes for such a
role if we take them from the best current aircraft at it the A-10 Thunderbolt
II (aka Warthog) are pilot
visibility, long endurance, large load of weapons and good countermeasure systems.
The largest limiting factor though on any aircraft chosen will be carrier
operations, for this the OV-10X Bronco, thanks to it’s family history already
has a proven track record as a navalised aircraft. The trouble for the OV-10X
Bronco, is like the Texan II combat variant, it’s possibly going to be built…
the only option actually in production is the Brazilian originating Super
Tocano[7]
(although the Hawk is in production, as has been said to fill the role, a new
variant would have to be built, although it has a production line ready,
willing and able) costing about $14million pre-carrier modifications. The Super
Tocano can carry 3,300lb worth of weapons on 5 hardpoints as well as having two
internal machine guns – making it a flexible and capable system for supporting
ground forces. Close Air Support will not only include dropping bombs and
firing missiles at land targets, air-to-air weapons have been discussed so
often because counter helicopter/counter other Close Air Support aircraft
capabilities could be just as important to ground forces considering the
current dearth of mobile air defence systems capable of attacking enemy ground
positions.
Figure 5; an OV-10 Bronco about to take of from an American
Carrier
The same aircraft with the loiter
time for Close Air Support could also be used as part of a maritime patrol
operation, i.e. policing the seas for pirates, smugglers or terrorists – again
using the F-35B for such missions would in reality be expensive overkill; but
would be a perfect opportunity for the Auxiliary Combat Aircraft to be put to
good use. Furthermore, there is also the option of this aircraft taking on some
of the ASW, after all a sonar-buoy dispensing pod, a MAD pod and a torpedo or
two would be within the weight/crew capabilities of the Super Tocano – and in
either littoral or deep sea operations it never hurts to have an extended range
ASW aircraft. It’s not the same as LRMP aircraft but it would help to fill the
capability gap of that decision for a while, but also in the future provide for
operations where land based aircraft cannot reach but the RN can/need to be sent.
Figure 6; The Super Tocano and some of the weapons it carries
A mention’s been made to
‘navalised’ earlier, and whilst this primarily means things like folding wings to
ease storage in the confined space of an aircraft carrier’s hanger, modifying
engines to deal with salt water and strengthening the aircraft structure; it
also means looking into whether, for example the Super Tocano is limited to the
AG-65 Maverick or if it can carry the Sea Skua (or even that weapons
replacement the Future Air-to-Surface Guided Weapon[8])…there
is no aircraft analysed which would not require some degree of modification to
make it suitable, but whereas for some aircraft little modification is required,
others will require considerably more work.
Finally there is the role of
air-to-air refuelling, there is no reason why the hard points on the Auxiliary
Combat Aircraft could not be loaded with ‘buddy’ stores to enable it to refuel
the F-35Bs or other aircraft operating. However, the advantage of a propeller
aircraft acting as a tanker over a jet is that it could more than likely fly
slow enough to refuel a helicopter should such a system be invested in for
Merlins and Lynx in the future; whilst being able to fly fast enough and high
enough to refuel a jet aircraft.
Key Points:
·
Advantages of Option 4
o It
maximises capability by providing for full carrier groups at the right price
o It
represents minimal cost (depending upon option selected)
o It provides
versatility by allowing the air group to be orientated and not overstretched
·
Disadvantages of Option 4
o It means
something will actually have to be done rather than muddling through
o It will
cause uproar with those who believe only the very best is what should be
procured, rather than what might be best fit.
Points of Interest:
·
Swordfish TSR is the basis for this idea in many ways,
it was best fit, not best aircraft available; to clarify this, yes the RN could
have got a better aircraft, and probably should have got one with at least an
enclosed cockpit & more powerful engine, but the Swordfish did fit the
brief issues under the Air Ministry’s advice, and it proved a stalwart of the
Fleet Air Arm throughout the second world war, outlasting its successor the
Albacore, in what could principally have been called Auxiliary Combat roles –
those which were unlikely to encounter enemy fighters. Furthermore, the
Swordfish’s role of Torpedo Spotter Reconnaissance – could be translated as
‘utility tool’, not the exciting electric drill or power saw, but rather the
good old screw driver or hack saw of 1930s naval aviation.
Figure 7; A Fairey Swordfish dropping a torpedo
·
Hawk is an interesting prospect for this role, the
idea of producing an indigenous aircraft has to be attractive to the
government, and especially with so many countries currently looking to field a
light strike/F-16 replacement it could secure a lot of jobs in the future. The
F-22 is the F-15 replacement, and no matter how it’s spun the F-35 is more an
F/A-18 level aircraft than the F-16, so there is a gap in the market for
Britain to fill should it go that route.
Summary:
This is a classic situation of
looking for the Best Fit not necessarily the Best Aircraft - the best aircraft that’s in production for a
STOL carrier is the F-35B, it is not though the best fit for what Britain
needs, on its own. It is a necessary aircraft with the required capabilities,
which has been chosen for the Queen
Elizabeth’s and has the potential to be a great aircraft if even half of
the promises that have been made about it come true. However, Britain needs the
Royal Navy to be sailing full aircraft carriers round the world not empty ones,
and they cannot be full of helicopters and hot air. This means an aircraft has
to be selected to fill those spaces, and it needs to be aircraft to fill a
necessary role, that’s justifiable not only to the public, to the government,
but also to the Treasury.
Therefore an Auxiliary Combat
Aircraft, which can provide support to ground forces - act as artillery,
reconnaissance platform, anti-helicopter/anti-UAV air defence (allowing the
F-35Bs to concentrate on major air threats, enemy air defences and long range
strike missions) and which also has the ability to fill the roles of maritime
patrol, ASW, anti-ship, Air-to-Air refuelling and more than likely some limited
personnel transfers is a system which can be justified.
Figure 8; A Super Tocano flying over the ocean
This must especially be true when
considering the cost, for example the Super Tocano is $14million, even if the
modifications (such as upping the power of the engine to help with take off from the carrier & navalising the aircraft) added on 50% to the price it would still be less than £14million
per aircraft[9]
– compared to the Eurofighter’s £125million+[10],
and the F-35Bs £127million[11],
meaning a squadron of 16 Super Tocano (factoring a massive worst case scenario
increase in price, which in reality would not be likely) would cost as much to
buy as roughly 1.8 Eurofighters or F-35Bs[12].
In simple terms the entire naval buy of 72 aircraft (3 combat squadrons, a
support/training/UK squadron and some spare airframes) would cost less than half
a squadron of either Eurofighters or F-35Bs.
In terms of weapons carriage,
whilst an F-35B can carry up to 15,000lbs of weapons (internal & external
bombs & missiles[13] –
although of course it’s ‘stealth’ is reduced when carrying external) and the Eurofighter Typhoon can carry
16,500lbs of weapons (external only bombs & missiles)[14]…
16 Super Tocano’s between them would carry (16x 3,300lb[15]) 52,800lb, but more importantly could pretty
much guarantee (as much as ever can be guaranteed in conflict) to keep 4
aircraft over the combat area and 4 more ready to go at all time, in comparison
even 2 f-35B’s (in cost terms the equivalent to over 19 Super Tocanos) in their
most un-stealthy configuration carrying
30,000lbs of weapons, could not provide coverage constantly between them (and
would have not capacity to provide an alert) – the rule of thumb is 1 in 3 to
keep an aircraft airborne as that takes care of the flight time and
maintenance(the same as ships), for alert it
goes up to 1 in 4. Yes, it would only be 14,400lb worth of ordinance on
call at a commander’s disposal rather than the 15,000lbs of a single F-35B, but
that’s not that much less and it could handle 4 different objectives at the
same time (and would not possibly be called away to deal with an urgent air
defence mission – except in the case of helicopters), and the 16 Super Tocano’s
could more importantly maintain those 4/4 aircraft for 24hrs a day constantly
which 2 just F-35Bs wouldn’t be able to[16]. This
is again not saying the F-35B is a bad aircraft or is not excellent for the
missions that it’s needed for (as has been said repeatedly in these notes), but
for the CAS, for maritime patrol and for a range of auxiliary combat roles it
makes sense.
Whilst it cannot be said that the
Super Tocano or any aircraft chosen for this role could replace the F-35B in
all its roles (hence it is being called in these notes the Auxiliary Combat
Aircraft), the ACA would complement it greatly; they would be a force enabler
for the F-35B that allows it to concentrate of the missions for which it is
best fit. That is the key point, and whilst it has been said repeatedly it is
worth hammering home, this is not about procuring Best Aircraft, but like the
Swordfish this is about making do with what can be, and procuring a good
aircraft which is the Best Fit aircraft for the role, the Best Fit aircraft for
the mission parameters identified by this discussion, the best fit aircraft to
build the best fit carrier air group to be able to carry out the missions the
British government will ask of it.
Further
Reading:
·
Close Air Support
·
Super Tocano:
o http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/sierra-nevada-leads-super-tucano-bid-for-usaf-deal-352676/
·
BAE Hawk / T-45 Goshawk
·
OV-10 Bronco
·
Texan II
·
X-47
·
F-35
·
Future RN
o http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_of_the_Royal_Navy#Aircraft –
recommend reading/downloading the PDF’s on Black
Swans… interesting stuff
·
Maritime Surveillance
[1] A
reduction from the 36 constantly being stated, but this seems sensible in light
of the disparity between aims & willingness, and most importantly it
provides space for extra helicopter airframes – which considering the
importance the roles they are doing ASW & AEW and the utility of special
forces/small raiding units is greatly enhanced by Troop Transport helicopters
and the specialist crews provided by the Junglies.
[2]
Read this post on theorists to learn more:
[6] http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/a160.htm,
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/darpas-hummingbird-unmanned-helicopter-comes-of-age-225070/,
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/bds/phantom_works/hummingbird.page
& http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/socom-reveals-plan-to-buy-20-improved-and-renamed-a160t-326071/
[7]
The USAF has selected the Super Tocano
for its Light Air Support program, and the aircraft is being built in
the USA… there is no reason a similar deal could not be reached for Britain’s procurement.
[9] Carrying
on from the costs/operability is the fact that replacing these aircraft after
battle damage or training accidents will be far less expensive than replacing
an F-35B; in the Close Air Support role aircraft are at the most risk, and this
risk has most recently been not from sophisticated threats (as these are taken
care of by the SEAD aircraft on D+1), but RPGs, machine guns and anything else
the enemy has to fire often gets fired up in the air. Whilst it is only right
for our forces that commanders seek to do everything they can to minimise
losses, losses are going to be taken, and whilst it’s true that the OV-10 Bronco
was withdrawn because of fears of losses, the proof of combat experience has
been that these aircraft are capable of operating very successfully in the CAS
environment, and more importantly are affordable to operate in this
environment.
[10]
As of 2011: http://www.nao.org.uk/report/management-of-the-typhoon-project/
no one seems to have updated for Tranche 3 though.
[12] A
more likely outcome would be about £9million per aircraft, making the ratio 1.2
Eurofighter, 1.1 for F-35B.
[16]
This especially true when its remembered that extra fuel is carried at the
expense of weapons, that once an aircraft uses its weapons it has to fly back
to base and another has to be sent out; that after each flight certain checks
have to be made. Then pilot fatigue has to be factored in as well.